However, there are also some potential objections of his theory. If considering meaning of word somehow as being determined sociolinguistically, a presupposition would be that there must be some kind of institutional criteria of recognition has to form priori to such collective linguistic community. That is to say, the scientific discovery of the microstructure of water is among the criteria of recognition of water. The institutional part may cause some matter, since if some pseudo-scientific theory water has flourished and persuaded all of people, it is possible that we have another different way to recognizing water, in this way, the meaning of a word, since it is determined sociolinguistically may not be consistently a rigid designator, due to the possibility that the criteria of recognition may have been otherwise.
Overall I think this article is clear, however, I just need more clarification about what is meant by "a statement can be necessary(metaphysically) and epistemically contingent"
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ReplyDeleteSuppose we consider some statement, say, "Water is H2O." This statement expresses a metaphysically necessary truth if water must in fact be H2O in all possible worlds. It expresses a metaphysically contingent truth if water happens to be H2O but could really have been something else in some possible world. Likewise, it expresses a metaphysically necessary falsehood if water cannot be H2O in any possible world, and a metaphysically contingent falsehood if water might have been H2O in some possible world but not in the actual world. In short, whether a statement expresses something metaphysically necessary or contingent depends entirely on conditions of the actual world. Epistemic necessity/contingency depends on conditions of knowledge. Take the example of "Water is H2O" again. This statement may express a metaphysical truth (if water must be H2O in all possible worlds), but be epistemically contingent. Hundreds of years ago, before anyone knew of the composition of water, they would not have known that water is H2O. Now, that we have come to define water as H2O, the statement "Water is H2O" expresses an epistemically necessary truth analogous to "bachelors are unmarried men." A statement's epistemic status (of expressing something necessary or contingent) does not necessarily reflect anything at all about the metaphysical status of the entities involved. Just as there can be statements that express something metaphysically necessary but epistemically contingent, there can be statements that express something metaphysically contingent but epistemically necessary. To give a crude example the statement "2+2=4" is epistemically necessary, that is, we are bound to accept this statement as true because we are unable to conceive it as being false (and crucially, not because 2+2=4 must actually be metaphysically true). It seems like it has to be true, but that's a reflection of our state of knowledge, not of how the world must actually be. "2+2=4", despite expressing an epistemically necessary truth could actually be metaphysically false. Sorry, I could have written this response in a more organized manner but I hope you got something out of it.
ReplyDeleteShort version:
metaphysically necessary = must be the case
metaphysically contingent = happens to be the case
epistemically necessary = seems necessary to one
epistemically contingent = does not seem necessary to one
thanks for your clarification, it is pretty helpful. : ) "Metaphysically" refers to the status of the fact, the thing in itself, while the "Epistemically" refers to the status of understanding in the mind.
DeletePrecisely. That is a much more elegant way of making my point. :)
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