"A speaker who uses
a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other
hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom
or what he is talking about and states something about that person
or thing." (Donnellan 285)
What Donnellan is stating here is that he believes that there are two different uses of referring to entities; He says that the first kind of assertion is the speaker picking out a definite object, while the second describes an object and "asks" the listener to pick it out. This is an improvement over previous theory because it allows for a kind of referencing based on finding an entity that fits a given description. This hasn't been addressed previously by Russell.
I think one problem with this is that attributively named entities are still nonspecific unless they are named with an excess of attributes that would be a hindrance to regular conversation, so I don't agree that this is necessarily the same kind of reference.
I am interested in your idea of attributively named entities; namely, the case that their non-specificity is a hindrance. You are correct that, in order for them to be specific, an excess of attributes would have to be listed. However, I think Donnellan's adoption of Russell's interpretation of denoting coupled with his own focus on context helps explain away this concern. Could you elaborate on what you mean by "the same kind of reference?"
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