Russell's Perfect Theory, Which According to Strawson Refers to Nothing

"Meaning (in at least one important sense) is a function of the sentence or expression ; mentioning and referring and truth or falsity, are functions of the use of the sentence or expression. To give the meaning of an expression (in the sense in which I am using the word) is to give general directions for its use to refer to or mention particular objects or persons ; to give the meaning of a sentence is to give general directions for its use in making true or false assertions. It is not to talk about any particular occasion of the use of the sentence or expression" (Strawson 1950, p. 327).

The main point that is being suggested from this quote is that there is a clear distinction between the meaning of an expression or sentence and the use of an expression or sentence. The distinction made is that expressions and sentences do in fact have some kind of general meaning to them, but in certain contexts the use of these expressions and sentences denote a particular kind of meaning that should not be confused with the sort of general guidelines attached to the types themselves.

What makes this an improvement over Russell is that it considers context as a primary function in ordinary language. This is to say that meaning is not primarily and sufficient a case of logical extension but what names do in fact refer to is determined in large part by how we use them.

Part of Strawson's project other than pointing out the flaws in Russellian theory is to suggest a linguistic theory that claims proper names as referents primarily by usage, which does seem to imply a kind of arbitrariness to all of language that we may not want to completely consider if we still want to admit to some kind of logical property in language.