"A priori, all we can say is that it is a[n] empirical matter whether the characteristics originally associated with the kind apply to its members universally, or even ever, and whether they are in fact sufficient for membership in the kind (Kripke, p. 137)."
This excerpt from Kripke's lecture discusses the categorization of objects into "kinds." I agree that our initial understanding of an object and it's "kind" is contingent on the nature of our observation. It is due to this relationship that I find Kripkes argument for a 'Millian' understanding of singular terms compelling. The scientific realizations of the essence, or necessary basics, of objects allow us to specify, not abandon, our understanding of the objects and how they relate in the world.
In regards to Kripke's discussion of pain and the identity theory; am I to understand he is suggesting that identity as experienced is actually a result of a series of experiences? A factoring out of identity, if you will?
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