Sunday, April 10, 2016

Strawson: On Referring [Alberto Torrigiotti]

"The meaning of a sentence cannot be identified with the assertion it is used, on a particular occasion, to make. For to talk about the meaning of an expression or sentence is not to talk about its use on a particular occasion, but about the rules, habits, conventions governing its correct use, on all occasions, to refer or to assert." (Strawson 1950, pg. 327)

Strawson argues that sentences do not refer, and that instead we use sentences to refer (these are not necessarily incompatible). Furthermore, he believes that it would be absurd to regard any appropriate use of a sentence or expression as determining its meaning. To Strawson, the meaning of a sentence or expression are the rules which provide the scope of possibility of appropriate uses. I think that Strawson's major contribution (which is only in a marginal and imprecise sense an "improvement") over Frege's and Russell's theories is the introduction of yet another enterprise in the philosophy of language, namely the study of language use. While Strawson's objections to the theory of descriptions are largely unsuccessful, his eagerness to demonstrate that the of study of language use and language users deserves merit in the field no doubt led to the development of many fruitful theories.

How would Strawson reconcile the fact that we can use expressions in a way which Strawson would probably regard as violating the terms of correct use, but still in a way which others can understand, e.g., "I the yesterday went to mall"?

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