I do agree with Russell when he disagrees with Meinong's theory. Meinong's theory implies that someone or something can exist, although that someone or something is unreal. I don't agree with this theory because as much as I would like for someone or something to exist, if I don't have logical proof that that someone or something exists, how can I believe that it exists? Russell states that this theory conflicts with the law of contradiction (Russell 1905, 61).
Russell's theory implies that denoting someone or something that doesn't exist is not considered denotation. I have a problem agreeing with this aspect of his theory because this implies that if you're denoting something that is hypothetical, then you're not denoting anything.
I wonder if this includes denoting something you're planning on creating in the future. Something that doesn't exist yet but may be possible to exist.
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ReplyDeleteWhether or not we consider one as being able to denote something that doesn't exist relies on what we take "denote" to mean. Russell's technical term "denote" presupposes existence. I cannot denote x if x doesn't exist, just as I cannot touch x if x does not exist. I think that Russell would say that hypothetical statements, insofar as they posit non-existent subjects, denote nothing (there is nothing to be denoted). If they posit only real objects, determining their truth value should in principle be an empirical matter. I agree with you that Russell's theory raises some curious questions about Russell's understanding of existence. Would he grant that an object which "comes into existence" at a certain point in time exists in some domain (say, the temporal realm) prior to its "coming about"? Would he say that on the occasion of uttering a statement about a future object, the utterance denotes nothing because the object does not yet exist? I'm not really sure, and it would have been helpful if he had said a little bit about his view of the conditions of existence. Similarly, does Ophelia exist, with the qualification "in Shakespeare's Hamlet"? Perhaps in this case, he would urge us to avoid using the same word, "exist", to describe real existence and the kind of existence which seems appropriate to attribute to Ophelia in Hamlet.
ReplyDeleteWhether or not we consider one as being able to denote something that doesn't exist relies on what we take "denote" to mean. Russell's technical term "denote" presupposes existence. I cannot denote x if x doesn't exist, just as I cannot touch x if x does not exist. I think that Russell would say that hypothetical statements, insofar as they posit non-existent subjects, denote nothing (there is nothing to be denoted). If they posit only real objects, determining their truth value should in principle be an empirical matter. I agree with you that Russell's theory raises some curious questions about Russell's understanding of existence. Would he grant that an object which "comes into existence" at a certain point in time exists in some domain (say, the temporal realm) prior to its "coming about"? Would he say that on the occasion of uttering a statement about a future object, the utterance denotes nothing because the object does not yet exist? I'm not really sure, and it would have been helpful if he had said a little bit about his view of the conditions of existence. Similarly, does Ophelia exist, with the qualification "in Shakespeare's Hamlet"? Perhaps in this case, he would urge us to avoid using the same word, "exist", to describe real existence and the kind of existence which seems appropriate to attribute to Ophelia in Hamlet.
ReplyDeleteNot sure why that posted so many times.
ReplyDelete