“Frege should be criticized for using the term ‘sense’ in two senses. For he takes the sense
of a designator to be its meaning; and he also takes it to be the way its reference is
determined. Identifying the two, he supposes that both are given by definite descriptions”
(Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 59).
Kripke is arguing against Frege's use of the term 'sense' in multiple ways. The first is what is grasped by the mind, the second is that the description is that which picks out the thing that the name is being used to refer to. Kripke thinks that these ideas should be separated into the above two facets. This idea helps to solve some of the problems with a Fregean view of names when considering statements of truth such as "Aristotle was a student of Plato" and "The most famous student of Plato was a student of Plato" and why these claims are not synonymous given that a name's associated description(s) only fix the reference and do not provide the semantic content of a name.
Let me state what the cluster concept theory of names is. (It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. It's wrong. You may suspect me of proposing another theory in its place; but I hope not, because I'm sure it's wrong too if it is a theory.)" (Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 64)
Besides finding this hilarious, I was a little confused on what Kripke's objections were to the theory. From what I understand, the theory consists of 6 theses, and Kripke's objections apply to any theory that tries to account for the meaning of proper names in terms of descriptions. This makes it seem directed against Frege and Rusell (and any other theories that try to account for hte meaning of a name in terms of clusters of descriptions). So are Kripke's critiques against the theory itself? Russell and Frege? or on the style or attempts made that he so opposes?
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