1. Something agreeable with Kripke is that identity statements such that there could be something similar to water but while having the characteristic feel, appearance and taste etc it is only something like fool's water similar to fools gold. (Kirpke 1972, p.128) "A substance which, though having the properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be water."
2. Something that I somewhat disagreed with was when he says all descriptions are such describe a certain thing such that a 'tiger' is a quadrupedal or gold is yellow. Which then there is the case where the tiger could become three legged, or the color of gold could be blue. Therefore there is the fact that though the properties of something differs, it still is that X.
3. Something that I was confused with was the section he argues that for any particular mental state, such as pain, that pain could exist without the corresponding physical state. It somewhat went over my head what he means by this on (Kripke 1972, pg 147) "the very pain I now have could have existed without being a mental state at all" compared to the other sensations.
In response to your disagreement, I think pages 136-139 give a response. They present the ideas that the original sample upon which we have fixed the reference, for example of 'tiger', is subject to change, alteration, or even exclusion of deviant items. However, this does not directly answer your point that tricycle tiger is still a tiger nonetheless. I wonder if there is a flexible boundaries or a form of a accepted range of deviations which come with properties.
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