Kripke [Korey Nuehs]

“One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators. Certainly they seem to satisfy the intuitive test mentioned above: although someone other than the U. S. President in 1970 might have been the U. S. President in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon.” (Kripke 48)

Names are rigid designators in that they designate the same object in every possible world. ‘Nixon’ in this world refers to Nixon in every possible world, at least in every possible world that Nixon exists, whether that Nixon is actually called ‘Nixon’ or not.

Here, Kripke is saying that ‘Nixon’ designates Nixon in every possible world, but later on, he goes on to say that Nixon might not have been called ‘Nixon’. I do not see how an object that is called X in world one, should also refer to that same object in every possible world that that object should exist even if it should not be called X.

“We ask, ‘to whom does he refer by “Socrates”?’ And then the answer is given, ‘Well, he refers to the man to whom he refers.’ If this were all there was to the meaning of a proper name, then no reference would get off the ground at all.” (Kripke 70)

The quote states that a name, such as Socrates, cannot merely mean: the man who is called Socrates. If this were the case, and names meant only that which were designated by them, then we could never begin to refer to people in the first place; for the name would only mean the man called by the name, but how could we know that that which we call Socrates refers to Socrates in the first place?         

I somewhat understand what he is saying, and his noncircular condition makes sense, but it is also a little confusing for me as to what exactly the problem is behind Kneale’s theory. Ultimately, I agree that to say that a name merely means the man called by the name seems ridiculous, but as to exactly why I am sort of lost.