On Kripke's lecture II [Samuel Hinderaker]

I'd like to revisit this statement that Kripke makes:
"In that sense, it's not trifling at all to be told that Socrates was called 'Socrates'. If this is any kind of fact, it might be false. Perhaps we know that we call him 'Socrates'; that hardly shows that the Greeks did so. In fact, of course, they may have pronounced the name differently. It may be, in the case of this particular name, that the transliteration from the Greek is so go that the English version is not pronounced very differently from the Greek. But that won't be so in the general case. Certainly it is not trifling to be told that Isaiah was called "Isaiah'. In fact, it is false to be told that Isaiah was called 'Isaiah'; the prophet wouldn't have recognized this name at all."

I think in a sense, it's clearly very true what Kripke is saying; that there is a difference between the way people are called in a language that is not their own and that it would be significant to note that an individual was being referred to with a name that sounded "out of their language" at the time. But I think there is some truth to the point that he says Kneale (and on occasion Russell) have made here. I think that he is avoiding the point of the statement that was attempted with that sentence: that there is some value, maybe only in this context, of naming being circular. While I'm not sure I completely agree with that, there is some logic in the fact that it doesn't make sense to refer to a person by a name other than the one that they're commonly known by. After all, the point of speaking is communication, and in most contexts, it makes quite a bit of sense to use the name that you think is most likely to be recognized. While this doesn't really help if the listener doesn't know the person being referred to, introducing a person starting with a name is a good introduction, if for no other reason because it makes future discussion of a person or a place more clear.