I agree quite heartily with Kripke's a priori and necessity distinctions, and I think his method of fixing a reference to a specific instance of an entity/object which can then be used across possible worlds is quite creative. Kripke's elaborations concerning alterations and amendments to the "initial baptism" (Kripke, 1981, 135) of fixing a reference seem intuitive and reasonable as well.
On page 138 and 139, Kripke introduces the notion that 'original samples' can change over time as the names are passed from 'link to link'. I think this is at odds with how Kripke fixes a reference as he is thus promoting the idea that the fixings of the reference are manipulable or at the very least flexible. Does this not undermine Kripke's idea of fixing a reference and instead replace it with a tentative fastening?
I wonder, in regards to Kripke's declaration that scientific discoveries are necessary truths as opposed to contingent (Kripke, 1981, 125), how far up the scientific reduction chain this goes? Does it extend to all aspects of biology or even neuroscience? In essence, I am wondering if there is not a single exception to Kripke's assertion of necessary science.
I think if you interpret his ideas from his point of view there are very few ways around it - like he said, even if every possible place gold is in the this world were replaced with fool's gold, the atomic structure would be different so TO US we would not consider that gold in the other world even if in that other world the people there did (it gets a little confusing I think...). However, I think in a theoretical stance, this can be challenged, because some things in science are just theories. Gravity can't be PROVEN, it can just be supported, so who's to say that in this other world gravity is not supported every time like in this world? If I were more scientific I'm sure there would be other examples of science that is supported, but perhaps not as necessary as Kripke imagines in his other worlds.
ReplyDeleteI think the question of which scientific claims are necessary and which are not gets closer to philosophy of science than epistemology. I don't know if Kripke would answer the question this way, but it seems one could claim the scientific claims that are necessary are the ones that actually hold in the world. We may not know which those are (or at least the problem of induction might make us uncertain), but nevertheless principles like the conservation of mass, if they are actually correct, must be necessary.
ReplyDeleteYou make a good point about Kripke's statement about original samples changing over time. This does seem to contradict my interpretation of Kripke's fixed references.
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