I agreed with Kripke's summary and subsequent denial of the cluster-theory of naming. Kripke's examples were quite common ones and able to poke a lot of holes in the theory, and the footnotes/addendum added a lot of counterarguments that showed the cluster theory of naming doesn't reflect most instances of how we use names. The examples that especially interested me were the arguments about layman usage in relation to theorems (2) and (3), pg 80-85, as most common usages of names are by laymen and not philosophers.
I suspect I disagree with Kripke's assertion that names are rigid identifiers, because it feels like the rigid identifier assertion is tied tightly in with the possible/alternate worlds assertion, which feels like an entirely distinct argument from the naming and reference one. While I can't entirely put my finger on it, something about this packaged assertion feels off to me, and it feels a bit argumentatively dishonest to lean so heavily on the could-have-been's or might-not-be's for the argument. Also, it seems rigid identifiers aren't necessary if we don't use the possible worlds in a discussion, so setting the whole thing aside feels more straightforward to me.
Question 1: Is Kripke an ordinary language philosopher? He seems firmly rooted in how laymen use language but steps up against Russell on several occasions.
Question 2: I could use some clarity on Kripke's argument from pg 102-103, how 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is or isn't true based on possible worlds. It seems like Kripke argued something different earlier in the lecture and I can't seem to make sense of this argument.
For your second question, I believe what he means is that if we are to attain the truth value of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' we need to consider if the statement is always true. With our current knowledge, we know that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' which are both Venus, but it is possible that in another world they could be different (which is to say that their equality isn't necessary for each of their references).
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