I agree with Kripke in that if there is an object with the exact same external characteristics of water, but different molecular structure, it would not be considered water. Although we characterise water through external stimuli factors as taste or looks, it is due to the fact that it is usually unnecessary to check the molecular structure of ‘water’ every time, because there are few, if at all of objects that are like ‘fool’s water’ (Kripke 1970, 128)
I somewhat disagree with Kripke’s argument of if humans could never see light or know light, it would still exist. I do see his point, where there are blind people in this world, and although they cannot directly see light, it does still exist. However, if every single person could not see light or have any sensations towards light, to me that is the same as if it did not exist to people, since it makes no impact at all towards people (Kripke 1970, 130)
When Kripke talks about descriptions for certain objects like a tiger having four legs, did he mean that every single tiger must have four legs to be considered a tiger?
I also agree with you and Kripke with he talks about the external characteristics of an object. What we characterize something by can sometimes be misleading, and although we do not often have to look deeper into an object, it can come up sometimes. When he goes over his thoughts on existence when something is neither seen or known, it does get a little confusing. It also brings up a great topic of discussion, though, regarding the limits of deciding whether or not something exists. Regarding the part about the tiger, I was also very intrigued by this topic. He mentioned that due to the actual definition of a tiger, a 3-legged tiger would not be considered a tiger, but we know by common sense that that is not true, so that part does get very confusing and thought-provoking.
ReplyDeleteRegarding your question, I had similar thoughts when I was reading. If I asked you to describe what a dog is, you would most likely include having four legs. Yet there are dogs out there (I walk by one every day) that have less legs. To me, these animals are still dogs. I could mention something about a dog in proximity and everyone would understand that I am talking about the animal even though it only has three legs. Furthermore, having no prior knowledge of the dog, I could not know whether it ever had four legs to begin with. So I cannot describe the dog as one who had four legs, satisfying our previous description, only to have lost one, which would just be another description of the dog. I can't claim with certainty what Kripke's intent was, but it is clear to me that a tiger need not have four legs to be considered a tiger.
ReplyDeleteI find your disagreement quite interesting. What you point out is one of the biggest issues in almost every philosophical debate: when talking about the reality, are we talking about the true external world (as if it does exsit) beyond our knowledge, or the world we know/could possibly know? It is clear that the later one would be more appealing to you. So here is the question for you: who are you talking about when you say "if every single person could not see light or have any sensations towards light, to me that is the same as if it did not exist to people, since it makes no impact at all towards people"? If you are talking about people that "are existing" right now, you are not ruling out the people who have existed and people who will be born that may have sense of light. How do you know those people also don't have any sense of light? If they do, how will you communicate with each other? In this case, the consistancy of our human history is certainly questionable.
ReplyDeleteIn fact, you can find many examples in the history of science, when people come up with an idea of something that at the moment can not be sensed by human by all means. But, with many people who simply believe or are persuaded by the great thoughts, scientists keep studying and observing, and finally "see" the theory in reality in years or even decades. If nobody have acknowledged the theory at the first place, then people will not invest energy working on it any more.
Kripke has already commented in his Lecture 1 on the division of discussions between epistemology and metaphysics. "But what I am concerned with here is a notion which is not a notion of epistemology but of metaphysics, in some (I hope) nonpejorative sense. We ask whether something might have been true, or might have been false. Well, if something is false, it's obviously not necessarily true. If it is true, might it have been otherwise? Is it possible that, in this respect, the world should have been different from the way it is? If the answer is 'no', then this fact about the world is a necessary one. If the answer is 'yes', then this fact about the world is a contingent one. This in and of itself has nothing to do with anyone's knowledge of anything. It's certainly a philosophical thesis, and not a matter of obvious definitional equivalence, either that everything a priori is necessary or that everything necessary is a priori. Both concepts may be vague. That may be another problem. But at any rate they are dealing with two different domains, two different areas, the epistemological and the metaphysical" (Kripke, 1980, P35-36).