Donnellen [Raphael Nunziata]

 Generalizing from this case, we can say, I think, that there are two uses of sentences of the form, "The ϕ is Ψ." In the first, if nothing is the ϕ then nothing has been said to be Ψ. In the second,
the fact that nothing is the ϕ does not have this consequence" (Donnellan, 1966, p. 287).

Donnellan shows a contrast between referential and attributive use of definite descriptions, by descriptions to questions that describe nothing--"if nothing is the ϕ then nothing has been said to be Ψ"(287).  When we use a referential description, we may reference an object that doesn’t satisfy the description given, but succeeds because there is a reference to something. But, for the attributive use if a description is ambiguous or blank--by describing nothing--then an answer cannot be given.

My reasoning for finding this quote is that this quote shows the problem of Strawson’s referential use and points out the consequences of descriptions that deal with nonexistence.

Is there a solution to the problem of nonexistence attributive definite descriptions?