"...that sentences can be divided up into predicates, logical operators, and referring expressions in not generally true. In the case of definite descriptions, one cannot always assign the referential function in isolation from a particular occasion on which it is used." (Donnellan, Reference and Definite Descriptions, 1966, p.297).
This quote expresses specifically Donnellan's understanding of sentences and definite descriptions, and how he does not believe they can adequately be expressed with logical operators. More generally, I think the quote nicely represents how he feels about the truth value of attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions, as throughout the paper he brings up numerous hypothetical sentences to counter the claims made by Strawson and Russell on the topic. It is clear that he thinks that the truth value of definite descriptions is often difficult to decipher, because some sentences with the exact same syntax can have different meanings, and are entirely dependent on context. Donnellan brings light to an ambiguity widely ignored by Strawson and Russell, and develops a further understanding of definite descriptions because of it.
My question is, if the referential function of a definite description has the possibility of being context dependent, does that mean that the truth value of the reference changes?
I do not think that the truth value can change because the sentence is in fact attributive or referential and that does not change. But I think if you believe a sentence is referential and draw a conclusion about the truth value of that sentence only to later discover the sentence was attributive, your conclusion about the truth value might change. The truth value itself does not change, though.
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