Monday, April 25, 2016

Kripke [Alberto Torrigiotti]

I agree with Kripke's general criticisms toward the view that essential properties identify referents; he offers several convincing arguments that show the implausibility of accepting that proper names which seem to pick out unique objects can simply be replaced by any description of the unique object's properties. Even in cases in which some perceived property of an object is a relevant consideration in one's procedure of naming it, I think it is nevertheless certainly false that its name is synonymous in meaning with a description of the sort: "the unique so-and-so with such-and-such properties". Take for instance a case in which in a bout of bad humor, I decide to name my newborn puppy "TYP" (The Youngest Puppy) immediately after it's born, and I have a belief that at the time of my naming it, it really is the youngest puppy (in the world). But, it would be absurd to say that henceforth, each time a new puppy is born, the referent of my use of "TYP" is a different, new youngest puppy.

I am less hopeful than Kripke about the prospects of a theory of causal chain of reference. It seems like a very strange solution which places an arbitrary social condition on reference, the function of which I believe is not primarily social or communicative, and I see no good reason to accept the metaphysics of this view. To be sure, language is often employed for the sake of rich communication, but I am unsure how to make sense of a picture of reference that allows for the reference of one's use of a phrase to be determined by other users. (Kripke 1981, 93)

Am I misunderstanding Kripke's analysis of the causal chain of reference? Is he in fact saying that there may be social/communal reference-determining conditions in an individual's use of a phrase, e.g., when I say Mary Magdalene, there may be a causal chain of reference back to the person who assigned her with that name, presumably her parents?" Maybe I am realizing that I have been overly cynical about the potential of a social condition of reference since many things, like Mary Magdalene, are things for which I would have had no knowledge unless I was socially taught.

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