1. a) "Frege should be criticized for using the term 'sense' in two senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be its meaning; and he also takes it to be the way its reference is determined." (Naming and Necessity 1972, 59)
b) "A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid. One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators...although someone other than the US president in 1970 might have been the US president in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon." (Naming and Necessity 1972, 48)
2. a) Kripke is disagreeing with Frege's view that a designator's sense can lead to both its meaning and its reference. Taking the case of names as rigid designators, you can get a meaning out of a name's sense, but not necessarily determine an accurate reference from its sense.
b) Kripke tries to explain his view as to why he classifies names as strongly rigid. The example used is to show that while it while it possible for a title like 'US president' to change depending on who has that title, it isn't nearly as possible for the name 'Nixon' (when referring to the president of 1970) to be anyone other than Nixon. It's sort of a thought experiment to get his point across that names are more rigid of 'necessary existents.'
3. a) I agree with Kripke on this one. It seems possible that the same sense of a designator can lead to both meaning reference, but it I can't see how this can always be true, because different meanings from the same sense can entail different referents.
b) I see where Kripke is going with this, in that 'Nixon' as a name and referent is harder to poke holes into than 'US president of 1970' due to its rigidness, but he mentions 'all possible worlds' numerous times, and I think it's fair to assume that referring to Nixon in another possible world, we would be referring to someone else. Perhaps this is why it's strongly rigid, and not completely rigid?
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