On Frege [Yuchen Jiang]

In this paper Frege draws a division of object, sense, and conceptions. Through using the example of the moon, he clarifies this division, based on which he later emphasizes the argument that referent of a judgement is its truth value. In addition, I also agree with his idea, which he regards judgment as a way to approach a truth value from a thought. He attempts to provide an account that can clarify that most what his belief of referent, sense, and conception.

However, as one of his claim about the origin of general conception may subject to question. In page 213, he states that conception of different individual are not comprisable since, similar to the sense, conceptions are private. If in this way, his idea of sense may also seems as private since what he believes as the sense is still more like a general and commonly accessible conception, which is not intuitive to people’s understanding rather it is something institutional or customary. In this way, sense is no longer what he believes as, but some hypothetic or abstract idea that he might have forced a little into his discussion.

My question may be more like an attempt to supplement to Frege’s arguments about this division of referent, sense, and conception. What will he additionally write in order to advance this division so that the idea of sense can be more clearly distinguished from the idea of conception or the referent (the object)?