There's an important point that Russell makes on the way in which sentences are in fact meaningful. For propositions, it is important that they can be logically represented but also that what is being represented does in fact have a meaning to which we can assign a truth-value. The descriptions that derive from sentences can either be true or false and this is important at least in the way we wish to use language as an epistemic tool.
What I'm not so sure is that sentences always imply the kind of descriptions that Russell puts forth, that is, these logically representable descriptions. It does not seem to be the case that our use of language is always to put forth some truth-functional description, but we do in fact use language in more than a logical sense, such as mere communication, creativity, etc.
In the final section of Descriptions, I'm not so sure what it meant by 'primary' and 'secondary' occurrences (Russell, 1920, p. 180), namely what are these concepts and how do they fit into this descriptivist theory on language?
In response to your disagreement, my understanding of what Russell is trying to argue is that even if in conversation we might not be overtly concerned about truth values, sentences should be able to have truth values for conversation to function properly. If for example two people have contradictory views, it is helpful to be able to determine which one is true and which is false so that the conversation can continue. Otherwise the only option is for the conversation to halt entirely which isn't very useful when it comes to the purpose of language.
ReplyDelete--André Robert