I like the general form of Russell's arguments on denoting as it is closely linked with logic. The way of explaining words as denotations makes words concrete (instead of vague) which is due to how a logic sentence is created since a sentence of logic is never vague.
Russell towards the end mentions that "the revolution of the sun round the earth" and sentences like this do not denote anything and fit with other concepts which don't denote entities. Does this mean that everything that defies logic or have no counterpart in the world are these nonentities such as an immortal human or other unreal aspects? If so, I would disagree with the claim that these ideas are nonentities (since I could imagine an immortal human and imagine Egypt despite having seen either) but would still agree that paradox's such as a round square are still nonentities.
In response to your question about Russell's stance on statements like "the revolution of the sun round the earth" it is not that he is necessarily discussing non-existent entities, but the existence of an entity given whether or not a difference exists. I think it's explained pretty well in the preceding paragraph on page 490, but the general idea is this: Because the sun does not revolve around the earth, the proposition is false, so the statement does not denote an entity.
ReplyDeleteWhile, it's nice that logic is never vague, language can be vague. So, I think the fact that language is not always so concrete in the way logic is makes it hard to suggest that logic is the best explanation for linguistic practices.
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