"It is also possible to think of cases in which the speaker does not believe that what he means to refer to by using the definite description fits the description, or to imagine cases in which the definite description is used referentially even though the speaker believes nothing fits the description" (107).
There may be cases where someone makes a referential definite description of something or someone, however they believe that nothing or no-one actually matches that reference. Referential descriptions can be used to reference X's which one believes are not actually X.
I find this to be an improvement over Russell's account as it provides an example much more in-tune with how people think, rather than the fairly systematic process of attributive (referencing in Russell's terms) definite descriptions. It adds a new level of cognition to Russell's definition of denoting, so, with Donnellan's addition, nothing may fit the description, and yet it can still denote an entity.
I would raise the question; In practice, if the speaker believes nothing fits the description, does the speaker thus dwell in a liminal space between believing that whatever is described fits the description (necessary if people are to understand) and knowing that nothing truly (to the speaker's knowledge) fits that description?
In response to your question, I do believe that the speaker would need to be able to give a referential definite description in order for people to get an idea of what the speaker is describing; however, given the object does not actually exist, it would not be plausible for the speaker to describe the non existent object clearly enough to have people truly understand the object.
ReplyDelete