I enjoyed Frege's approach in On Sense and Reference. Tackling the concepts most easily accepted in Locke and Mill's arguments with his own understanding of sense and reference, set the paper up with a strong basis on which to elaborate. In particular, Frege's description of the differences in the ideas, senses and reference of a proper name provided a clear illustration of the trajectory of his reasoning. Applying the same concepts to more abstract clauses was then a matter of asserting the stability and thoroughness of Frege's notions.
The concept of truth values was particularly intriguing. I agree with the idea that the individual references of words in a clause or sentence lose their relevance in favor of the entire "truth value of the greater structure (Frege 1982, p. 43). In general I appreciate this concept as it allows a reference for nonsense signs (i.e. sounds with no other reference). I also agree with Frege's understanding of customary and indirect senses and references.
I found little to disagree with, but I am interested to see what my classmates bring to question.
Frege discusses the problematic nature of certain words or terms existing without a true reference. Citing the potential for "demagogic abuse (Frege, 1982, p. 48)," Frege clearly thinks this is a negative aspect of language. I am inclined to think of it neutrally, and am interested to hear the opinions of my classmates.
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