Kripke, whose name I heard from my professor who probably who heard it from his professor who maybe heard it from whoever named Kripke

1. I agree with Kripke's overall assessment of how we use proper names in order to fix referents. It seems to not be the case that when given a proper name that we do not think of these names as meaning a series of descriptions, and moreover while these descriptions may in fact be linked in some way to properly named referents, they are not identical in the way that would suggest that these descriptions are the definitions of the names. It seems rather more intuitive to suggest that we have some brute understanding of the referent and we just name it based on some causal link.

2. Speaking of the causal link, I don't quite agree that the better picture of fixing referents with names is part of the actual causal chain as opposed to what we think we got the name from. While there is an actual causal link that could potentially trace the passage of a proper name for a referent, the actual use (to perhaps borrow from Strawson) of the proper name is more based on what the utterer has in mind. In fact, the arbitrariness of proper names that Kripke seems to suggest would seem to support this even more.

3. If referents are merely just fixed by proper names, is there in fact no link between meaning and language other than just brute naming? If we are not so much coming to understanding meaning through a language system and it is more language fixing onto what we have in mind, are we not just going right back to Locke's theory of ideas in language?