1. I agree with Putnam's argument that words keep their reference in all worlds, but their meaning does not stay the same, or in other words, that terms like 'water' are rigid. When we say something (XYZ in Putnam's example) is 'water' we apply our knowledge of its chemical formula, properties, etc. in the actual world to it, and if that thing does not match up with our knowledge of what water is, then it cannot really be called 'water' (Putnam, 1973, p. 707). I think it is an important to distinguish that the meaning of the word 'water' is based upon the world in which we live, and when something in some other world looks and functions like water but does not match our knowledge of water, the meaning does not adjust depending on the world that object exists in.
2. I disagree that the division of linguistic labor justifies the average speaker acquiring and using words, 'gold' for example, without also acquiring a "method of recognizing whether or not something is or is not gold" (Putnam, 1973, p. 705). To use a somewhat relevant example, if the average speaker were to slowly apply the word 'literally' to something that did not match meaning of the word 'literal' because they cannot tell the difference or choose not to tell the difference between when something 'literally' happens and when something 'figuratively' happens, it could lead to miscommunication. Putnam says that this distortion of meaning in language would be prevented by appealing to a small subset of experts who know the difference between 'literal' and 'figurative' and would correct the the average speakers using it, but if they do not actively moderate the use of the word, or are not effective at doing so, the word 'literal' may be applied to things that are not in fact literal.
3. If my objection above is correct, would the expert use of the word 'literal' and the colloquial use of the word 'literal' require 'literal' to develop two meanings depending on the context in which it is used, or is the the expert use of the word the "correct" meaning, even though the average speaker would be able to effectively communicate their meaning by incorrectly using the word 'literal'?
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ReplyDeleteI think your point here is insightful and may hint a fruitful direction. Here I will try to conceive some arguments in regard to your objection, and feel free to reply if I have some misunderstanding of your point right here.
ReplyDeleteConcerning your objection right here, it differs from the example of “Gold” given by Putnam, mainly because that the criteria of recognizing something as being gold is different from the criteria of recognizing something as being literal. The former is pretty straightforward since it bases on certain scientific method, e.g. using chemicals. Those results given by such method is always constant, that is to say the criteria of recognizing gold or fixing the meaning of gold presupposes a method concerning some facts that are always constant and falsifiable.
On the other hand, the criteria of recognizing something (expression) being literal or figurative is not based on scientific fact, or some falsifiable fact. Such criteria largely based on interpretation, which, unlike scientific fact, is neither constant nor falsifiable. Everyone can have different interpretations of a particular expression. Here, the role played by expert may seem a little different from the expert of gold. The expert of this kind, may not have an absolute power of deciding whether something is literal, unlike an expert of gold, who indeed have this absolute privilege in deciding whether something is gold.
In this way, your objection suggests a way to interpret the linguistic community given by Putnam, presupposing an institutional criterion of fixing the meaning of word. That is to say, the meanings of words or expressions are fixed by certain institutional affirmation. In this case, the scientific institution gives a way fixing the meaning of gold to certain metal, which is constant and objective, while the institution of language cannot give such a clear-cut way to fixing the meaning of literal and figurative due to the interpretive nature of expression of language.