In Descriptions I agreed with Russell’s statement that “a name is a simple symbol who’s meaning can only occur as the subject (Descriptions, 16).” Names are used as a symbols to express our thought, when we place the name as the predicate—“Bob is Bob”—there is expression but no meaning to that thought. Even if the name is replaced by nickname the proposition would stand the same—“ André Benjamin is André 3000.”
In On Denoting I disagree that Russell’s theory solves the puzzle of identity entirely—“a” is identical with “b”. Even though “a” and “b” both stand for the same names—“ André Benjamin is André 3000”—their connotation is different. If both words were truly identical then connotation would be carried; even with knowledge of both names.
What other puzzles does a theory dealing with denoting require?
I think Russell's theory is able to solve the puzzle of identity. His explanation can account for connotational differences, you just have to add things to the definite description. The referent is still the same, but nevertheless the connotation is preserved. I agree, though, that this was more difficult to draw from the reading than from the lecture.
ReplyDelete