1. I agree with Kripke's point about origins and that an object created from a specific type of matter, then the object must essentially have its origin in that matter and not any other matter. Referring to his example of the table, it makes sense that any table that is made from a different block of wood is a different table, even if the table's were identical in appearance. Each table would have subtle differences in properties or different histories making them essentially different tables.
2. I don't entirely agree with Kripke's thoughts about pains. I feel like is incorrect in denying the identity claim regarding pain. Pain is a sensation caused by C-Fibers firing, so the mental-physical identity in this case is true.
3. Is Kripke correct in treating imagined pain the same as actual pain and ultimately denying the identity claim?
I think Kripke is correct in treating them alike. Although most actual pain is greater than imagined pain at the present instance of the event that caused the pain, the sum of a series of imagined pain time intervals would equal the present moment of pain. For example, the amount of pain caused by a surgery in a time frame will be 10, while pain that is imagined is 1. Now if this imagined pain happens ten times then both pains become alike.
ReplyDeleteI also agree that Kirpke's point of origins is rather essential. There couldn't exist a 'table' he says without an origin that constitutes that unique table. Such that it may have been made of ice from a river, but it was not. (Kripke 113-114). But how would things made of a composite of materials be defined?
ReplyDelete-Henry Tran