I agree with Kripke's assertions from page 95 to 97 that "more exact conditions" for references of names "are very complicated to give" as this seems to reflect the fact that, in my experience at least, when I think of a name, I don't usually (if at at) have anything definite in mind when I use that name (Kripke 1970, 95). For me anyway, the name itself is sufficient for reference and I just assume whomever I'm talking to knows the reference of that name. If pressed on what I thought the reference was. I would need to give further thought to it, which suggests to me that in everyday use, names have an extremely vague ability to reference in and of themselves, which seems reflected in what Kripke is saying.
I disagree with Kripke's response to Strawson's idea of a causal chain of reference in that I think it is a mistake to rely on such a chain at all. The reference of a name seems to be linked only to the initial naming, not the chain which describes how any given person comes to know of the reference. In order for language to be effective, I think that the meanings of words, including names, need to be something fixed and using any sort of chain of reference, even as loosely as Kripke does, violates this.
Towards the end of the lecture, Kripke begins talking about contingent identities, but I found it unclear if he thinks there can be such things. As our use of English necessarily picks out Venus when we use the words 'Venus,' 'Hesperus,' and 'Phosphorus,' is Kripke saying that this is a contingent truth or a necessary one?
The causal chain is actually a really interesting idea, but I agree with you that it doesn't work the way it's laid out here. Purely as a thought experiment, you can certainly trace back the references to a given object quite a ways, and it might even be informative. However, I feel the object gets a more solid reference than this. I don't draw my definition of 'tree' from several generations back, I draw it from having a physical tree pointed out to me (or several, as there are many types of trees.) I think the example gets away with sounding plausible because it is referencing older figures in history, which are not so directly accessed.
ReplyDeleteAlso, on your question, I had the same one and Arthur put it in easier terms on my post.
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