"One is this: when a definite description is used referentially, not only is there in some sense a presupposition or implication that someone or something fits the description, as there is also in the attributive use, but there is a quite different presupposition; the speaker presupposes of some particular someone or something that he or it fits the description."
Here Donnellan made a distinction between the referential use and a attributive use of a definite description. I take his idea being that, sometimes expressions are not only meant what there meant literally, it also has a referencing force under certain context. Here as Donnellan noted, when using as a referential term, an expression or a definite description, is really close to mean "this" or "that". When taking perspective, the falsehood of that expression may not necessarily form a major barrier for its function, as long as the listener can grasp the referred object that the speaker has intended.
This may give rise to the puzzles that disturb Russell and Strawson, about the problems with the non-existential description and descriptions of imagined things. Since this account brings a somewhat communicative perspective of expression, partially implying that as long as the speaker and listener have a same grasp of what object has been referred, the truth value of a expression is essential to this topic.
Q: How Donnellan can separate the referential use of a definite description from the pronouns like "this," "that", is the referential use just some particular derivatives that serve the function of such pronouns?
Interesting how you raise questions about the relationship of demonstrative pronouns and the referential use of definite descriptions. I could be mistaken, but I think the use of 'this' and 'that' are just commonly used when referring to things when claiming a definite description of someone or thing. I agree with what you mention about the actual falsity of a reference not mattering if the intent of the speaker is properly communicated, and I found it interesting how Donnellan was only willing to accept the falsity as non-conducive to meaning when the speaker himself couldn't pick out the item to which they were initially referring.
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