I agree with Russell when he claims that the propositions, "I met a man" and "I met Jones," are of a different form (Russell 1919, 168). When we say "I met a man," we are actually describing a propositional function, "The function, 'I met x and x is human" is sometimes true." This is important because this handles the problem of non-existent objects; if x doesn't exist, then the propositional function is false and our intuitions about the sentence are not violated.
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Russell rejects the idea that objects can exist in literature when he says, "To say that unicorns have an existence in heraldry, or in literature, or in imagination, is a most pitiful and paltry evasion" (Russell 1919, 169). I disagree because I think we can convert propositions about existence into existential quantifiers, then just be very clear about our domain. When we say unicorns exist only in our imagination, we say Ex(x is a horse-like animal with a single horn) and the domain of x is limited to objects of our imagination, and this sort of interpretation maintains logical consistency.
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What is the difference in the use of 'is' between the two propositions, "Socrates is a man" and "Socrates is human" (Russell 1919, 172)? I understand how "Socrates is human" is ascribing a property to Socrates, but I don't see why "Socrates is a man" is any different. Certainly being a man is a property, and we can assign any other number of properties like "Socrates is a philosopher" or "Socrates is a baker" or "Socrates is a monkey" (not all of these propositions are true).
I agree that the use of "is" in the two propositions is similar. I don't get the distinction that Russell is making (or thinks he's making). Both propositions seem to me to be assigning a predicate to Socrates.
ReplyDeleteOn the question of fictional beings in the arts and comic books, I wonder what Russell would make of a statement like: "Mercutio is a character in Shakespeare's play Romeo and Juliet". It is clearly TRUE, but I guess Russell would call it FALSE because Mercutio does not and never did exist. I think Russell is so concerned with real existence that he is blind to the ways we talk (and make incontestably true statements) about fiction.
I also have some confusion over the use of "is" especially with the example using "a man" and "human". I hypothesize that the first case is somewhat equivocal, while the second is only descriptive. In other words, "Socrates is a man, and a man (in a single case) is Socrates" and "Socrates is human, but human is not Socrates". "Human", in this usage, refers to properties of being human, while "a man" refers to an entity with this state. Socrates is not the state of being human, but Socrates takes this state, so "a man exists who is Socrates" but "human does not refer to the state of being Socrates".
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