I agree with Russell’s rejection of using definite
descriptions as proper names, and instead interpreting the description as existentially
quantified statements. This solves the problem of excluded middle where the negation
of the statement, the present King of France is bald, must be true. By
introducing existentially quantified statements, the negation of the previous
sentence, or at least one of its interpretations, turns into: It is false that
there is an entity which is now King of France and is bald, which turns out to
be true (Russell 1905, 490).
With that being said, I disagree with the assertion that statements
concerning unreal entities such as, the present King of France, must be false.
For example, what if I say that I have an “imaginary” friend whose name is Frank?
To outright label this sentence as false seems to me to be counter-intuitive(Of
course, I might be missing something).
One problem with Russell’s theory of descriptions, at least
as far as I understand it, is that it doesn’t take into account spatial-temporal
context. For example, if referring to a particularly well liked girl, I say, “Everyone
likes her.” Surely, in this case I do not mean everyone that has ever existed,
but merely mean to say than everyone within a certain social circle likes her.
I found the question you brought up at the end to be pretty interesting. I feel like all of the descriptions of language that we have encountered so far have yet to task figures of speech in an effective way. Though, I feel that Russel's description can formulate what is being expressed when it is said that "everyone likes her", and though it may not be represented as a true statement (in that there exists a thing x that is a girl and which all things y in which y is a person and y has the property of liking x), it can still be understood. I feel like Russel's description of language would view this as an inaccuracy in the language that you have chosen to use, when really the statement that you have made is exactly how you wished it to be.
ReplyDeleteI think the imaginary friend question is a good one, since a conversation on that topic is easy to imagine happening between a child and an adult in real life. I wonder how Russel would feel about the possibility of having 'imaginary' as an attribute?
ReplyDeleteAnd adding on to what Rigo said above, I would say that he does allow for whatever meaning you might have with that statement. For example, you could say anyone who has the property of being alive/everyone who has the property of being in x social circle, etc.