Putnam [Anthony Baker]

I agree with Putnam's overall invocation of the claim about the largely ignored division of 'linguistic labor' that words and their meanings possess. One person's reference to a word's meaning may be completely different to another's, and therefore the intension of the word is largely contingent on social determinants.

Although I agree pretty much impartially with Putnam on how the extension of a words meaning isn't a singular unchanged entity, as in the case of "traditional semantic theory," the examples he uses, as in the case of water (being the same utility-wise, but different chemically on identical planets), seem to have an obvious intuitive objection (Putnam, 1973, p711). That is the very fact that although 'water' is used in the exact same way on both planets, it is not the same. I understand Putnam's point, but the example can be seen as a bit of a stretch.

There is a slight reference to Frege in the beginning, and how his view of the 'sense' that words have is similar to that of Putnam's, although it isn't really elaborated upon further. I wonder how similar Putnam's view of the reference following the sense is to that of Frege's view.

Putnam [Gabriel DeBacker]

"'meanings' just ain't in the head!" is a great quote; and one I have to agree with. While Putnam's talk about psychological states is a little hard to chew, the meaning comes across clear enough. His example using Twin Earth and water, along with Oscar1 and Oscar2 was pretty effective. If both thought of 'water' and could not distinguish one from the other, even though they are different on Twin Earth and Earth, the meaning of the term is not given by the psychological state of the speaker itself.

I disagree with most of Putnam's examples regarding Earth and Twin Earth. I understand what he is attempting, however I cannot help but think that the examples defeat themselves. You cannot state (or I cannot imagine) that the two planets have the same English language and then begin to change the reference for different words. At that point you might as well say that the two languages are more like separate dialects, and that gives rise to several other explanations that have less to do with the meaning of a word. Although the water example was alright, the aluminum and molybdenum example was rather weak for me.

In the second paragraph, Putnam talks about the "timeworn example of the two terms 'creature with a kidney' and 'creature with a heart'" and how it shows that two terms can have the same extension and yet differ in intension. He says that no argument for this impossibility was ever offered. Has any other philosopher addressed this?

Kripke's Lecture 3 [Drew Owens]

"A priori, all we can say is that it is a[n] empirical matter whether the characteristics originally associated with the kind apply to its members universally, or even ever, and whether they are in fact sufficient for membership in the kind (Kripke, p. 137)."

This excerpt from Kripke's lecture discusses the categorization of objects into "kinds." I agree that our initial understanding of an object and it's "kind" is contingent on the nature of our observation. It is due to this relationship that I find Kripkes argument for a 'Millian' understanding of singular terms compelling. The scientific realizations of  the essence, or necessary basics, of objects allow us to specify, not abandon, our understanding of the objects and how they relate in the world.

In regards to Kripke's discussion of pain and the identity theory; am I to understand he is suggesting that identity as experienced is actually a result of a series of experiences? A factoring out of identity, if you will?

Putnam [Yuchen Jiang]

In this article Putnam manages to refute two point of view about the meaning of of a word, through which he stresses the importance of two perspectives of language. First is the idea that meaning of words are somewhat determined sociolinguistically, which means that meaning of a word is fixed through a collective work between different parts within a linguistic community. On the other hand, along with Kripke he also notice the indexical perspective of language, i.e. the meaning of same word also varies in different contexts from the perspective that "names are rigid designators"(710) These above I believe is clearly demonstrated by this article. 

However, there are also some potential objections of his theory. If considering meaning of word somehow as being determined sociolinguistically, a presupposition would be that there must be some kind of institutional criteria of recognition has to form priori to such collective linguistic community. That is to say, the scientific discovery of the microstructure of water is among the criteria of recognition of water. The institutional part may cause some matter, since if some pseudo-scientific theory water has flourished and persuaded all of people, it is possible that we have another different way to recognizing water, in this way, the meaning of a word, since it is determined sociolinguistically may not be consistently a rigid designator, due to the possibility that the criteria of recognition may have been otherwise.

Overall I think this article is clear, however, I just need more clarification about what is meant by "a statement can be necessary(metaphysically) and epistemically contingent"

Putnam: Meaning and Reference [Raphael Nunziata]

I agree with Putnam that knowing the meaning is “not a function of the psychological state of the speaker by itself” (Putnam 1973, 702). For if there were two identical mirror objects that held existence in two different places with people having exactly the same psychological state and use the same states of words used to describe the object,but the object differs by composition of chemicals, then the people residing in these places would not differ psychologically by the use of the word based on chemical traits of the object. Furthermore, if we hold this concept to our own world and objects of alike words—peanut and cashew—that are the same in our idiolect, it is found that meaning is not a function of the psychological state of the speaker by itself.

I disagree with Putnam that we could hardly use words without recognizing the object associated with that word, such as knowing to say gold when one sees gold. I see this as false, for there is the possibility that an individual can make words off of the object that  he or she sees and that this be the correct word associated to the object. Although unlikely, the power of inference based on a set of know rules would allow of this possibility—for example, I don’t know the name of an nth number, but when I see that number I use a set of naming rules to correctly name that number.


What did Putnam’s argument against extension determined by its meaning?

Putnam on Meaning and Reference [Morgan Johnson]

1. I agree with Putnam's argument that words keep their reference in all worlds, but their meaning does not stay the same, or in other words, that terms like 'water' are rigid. When we say something (XYZ in Putnam's example) is 'water' we apply our knowledge of its chemical formula, properties, etc. in the actual world to it, and if that thing does not match up with our knowledge of what water is, then it cannot really be called 'water'  (Putnam, 1973, p. 707). I think it is an important to distinguish that the meaning of the word 'water' is based upon the world in which we live, and when something in some other world looks and functions like water but does not match our knowledge of water, the meaning does not adjust depending on the world that object exists in.

2. I disagree that the division of linguistic labor justifies the average speaker acquiring and using words, 'gold' for example, without also acquiring a "method of recognizing whether or not something is or is not gold" (Putnam, 1973, p. 705). To use a somewhat relevant example, if the average speaker were to slowly apply the word 'literally' to something that did not match meaning of the word 'literal' because they cannot tell the difference or choose not to tell the difference between when something 'literally' happens and when something 'figuratively' happens, it could lead to miscommunication. Putnam says that this distortion of meaning in language would be prevented by appealing to a small subset of experts who know the difference between 'literal' and 'figurative' and would correct the the average speakers using it, but if they do not actively moderate the use of the word, or are not effective at doing so, the word 'literal' may be applied to things that are not in fact literal.

3. If my objection above is correct, would the expert use of the word 'literal' and the colloquial use of the word 'literal' require 'literal' to develop two meanings depending on the context in which it is used, or is the the expert use of the word the "correct" meaning, even though the average speaker would be able to effectively communicate their meaning by incorrectly using the word 'literal'?

On Kripke's lecture II [Samuel Hinderaker]

I'd like to revisit this statement that Kripke makes:
"In that sense, it's not trifling at all to be told that Socrates was called 'Socrates'. If this is any kind of fact, it might be false. Perhaps we know that we call him 'Socrates'; that hardly shows that the Greeks did so. In fact, of course, they may have pronounced the name differently. It may be, in the case of this particular name, that the transliteration from the Greek is so go that the English version is not pronounced very differently from the Greek. But that won't be so in the general case. Certainly it is not trifling to be told that Isaiah was called "Isaiah'. In fact, it is false to be told that Isaiah was called 'Isaiah'; the prophet wouldn't have recognized this name at all."

I think in a sense, it's clearly very true what Kripke is saying; that there is a difference between the way people are called in a language that is not their own and that it would be significant to note that an individual was being referred to with a name that sounded "out of their language" at the time. But I think there is some truth to the point that he says Kneale (and on occasion Russell) have made here. I think that he is avoiding the point of the statement that was attempted with that sentence: that there is some value, maybe only in this context, of naming being circular. While I'm not sure I completely agree with that, there is some logic in the fact that it doesn't make sense to refer to a person by a name other than the one that they're commonly known by. After all, the point of speaking is communication, and in most contexts, it makes quite a bit of sense to use the name that you think is most likely to be recognized. While this doesn't really help if the listener doesn't know the person being referred to, introducing a person starting with a name is a good introduction, if for no other reason because it makes future discussion of a person or a place more clear.

Kripke Lecture 3 [Evan Cottingham]

1. I agree with Kripke's point about origins and that an object created from a specific type of matter, then the object must essentially have its origin in that matter and not any other matter. Referring to his example of the table, it makes sense that any table that is made from a different block of wood is a different table, even if the table's were identical in appearance. Each table would have subtle differences in properties or different histories making them essentially different tables.

2. I don't entirely agree with Kripke's thoughts about pains. I feel like is incorrect in denying the identity claim regarding pain. Pain is a sensation caused by C-Fibers firing, so the mental-physical identity in this case is true.

3. Is Kripke correct in treating imagined pain the same as actual pain and ultimately denying the identity claim?

Putnam: Meaning and Reference [Korey Nuehs]

1.

The idea that there is a division of linguistic labor is an interesting concept that I agree with. Certainly, there are folks who create or add to meaning and folks who abide by said meaning, (although, the lowly masses do hold power on whether the meaning of a word picks up steam or not).

2-3.

I disagree with Putnam’s assertion that the meaning of water did not change for the average speaker in the interval of from 1750 to present day. It seems to me that language, as constructed, is a man-made artificial attempt to classify or categorize the world based on our subjective knowledge.

For example, I took an ichthyology, the study of fishes, class two quarters ago in which the professor told us that all known species of mammals can be classified as fishes; under this view I believe it improper to say, ‘well our notion of fishes has not change, only our mistaken belief of what belongs or does not belong to the class of fishes’, for certainly, we could have easily come up with a system of biological classification in which whales are still not considered fish and tuna are, but instead we created a somewhat arbitrary system in which whales and tuna are both fish, at least according to said professor. Therefore, meaning can be said to almost wholly consist of (might be a stretch, but shoot for the stars, right?) our subjective classification of the world independent of actual experience, for we could have easily decided that the meaning of water is not its molecular structure, but its ability to serve a set of purposes, i.e., sustaining life, growing crops, spoiling parades etc.

Putnam: Meaning and Reference [Rigo Acevedo]

I agree with Putnam's sociolinguistic hypothesis about the existence of a division of linguistic labor within our society; there does appear to be a difference in the  types, and details, of empirical descriptions that are held about particular objects within social groups. In this respect it seems impossible to identify words through meanings that are dependent upon characteristics that may not be universally known by the population. How can someone denote to a glass of water sitting on the table when they do not have an understanding of the meaning or sense of what water is; so it only seems reasonable that this method of describing how names function is inaccurate. 

Putnam believes that natural-kind words (like names) are indexical; If I were to make a statement about "water" I may be making a statement similar to the water around here (pg 710). I feel like this interpretation might be hard to apply to non-existent entities or fictional characters; a reference to a fictional entity does not seem to be dependent on context. If I were to say Harry Potter, would I be saying something similar to the Harry Potter around here/by here/near here/at this time?

So, my question relates to my confusion about how non-existent entities are considered. Can I make references to non-existent entities, and are the names of these non-existent entities indexical as well?

Kripke Lecture III [Jonathan Kosaka]

I agree quite heartily with Kripke's a priori and necessity distinctions, and I think his method of fixing a reference to a specific instance of an entity/object which can then be used across possible worlds is quite creative. Kripke's elaborations concerning alterations and amendments to the "initial baptism" (Kripke, 1981, 135) of fixing a reference seem intuitive and reasonable as well.

On page 138 and 139, Kripke introduces the notion that 'original samples' can change over time as the names are passed from 'link to link'. I think this is at odds with how Kripke fixes a reference as he is thus promoting the idea that the fixings of the reference are manipulable or at the very least flexible. Does this not undermine Kripke's idea of fixing a reference and instead replace it with a tentative fastening?

I wonder, in regards to Kripke's declaration that scientific discoveries are necessary truths as opposed to contingent (Kripke, 1981, 125), how far up the scientific reduction chain this goes? Does it extend to all aspects of biology or even neuroscience? In essence, I am wondering if there is not a single exception to Kripke's assertion of necessary science.

Kripke Lecture 3

I agree with Kripke in that if there is an object with the exact same external characteristics of water, but different molecular structure, it would not be considered water. Although we characterise water through external stimuli factors as taste or looks, it is due to the fact that it is usually unnecessary to check the molecular structure of ‘water’ every time, because there are few, if at all of objects that are like ‘fool’s water’ (Kripke 1970, 128)

I somewhat disagree with Kripke’s argument of if humans could never see light or know light, it would still exist. I do see his point, where there are blind people in this world, and although they cannot directly see light, it does still exist. However, if every single person could not see light or have any sensations towards light, to me that is the same as if it did not exist to people, since it makes no impact at all towards people (Kripke 1970, 130)

When Kripke talks about descriptions for certain objects like a tiger having four legs, did he mean that every single tiger must have four legs to be considered a tiger?

Kripke Lecture 3 [Henry Tran]

1. Something agreeable with Kripke is that identity statements such that there could be something similar to water but while having the characteristic feel, appearance and taste etc it is only something like fool's water similar to fools gold. (Kirpke 1972, p.128) "A substance which, though having the properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be water."

2. Something that I somewhat disagreed with was when he says all descriptions are such describe a certain thing such that a 'tiger' is a quadrupedal or gold is yellow. Which then there is the case where the tiger could become three legged, or the color of gold could be blue. Therefore there is the fact that though the properties of something differs, it still is that X.

3. Something that I was confused with was the section he argues that for any particular mental state, such as pain, that pain could exist without the corresponding physical state. It somewhat went over my head what he means by this on (Kripke 1972, pg 147) "the very pain I now have could have existed without being a mental state at all" compared to the other sensations.

Kripke Lecture 2 [Danielle Trzil]

1. I agree with Kripke that if the speaker does not remember from whom or where they got their reference he cannot give a description. This is an argument in rebuttal to Strawson, and it makes sense. Even if you don't remember the first time you saw, learned about, or touched a cat, you can still refer and describe a cat in present day. Having remembered from the get go is not a requirement for describing.

2. I disagree with this idea of rigid designators. Even though this is applicable in certain situations, his case of "suppose we were all speaking x language", being different from English, would not be as rigid as he says it would. This theory does not account for the fact that some languages have words that can not be described or considered in other languages. For example, in Ukrainian there is only one word to refer to "arm" or "hand". It is the same word. Where in English we obviously have two. I don't think he accounts for these linguistic differences among languages and other possible worlds because he still sees it as the way we refer to these other worlds is in English, even though the hypothetical world is another language.

3. My question for Kripke is how he accounts for rigid designaters in other worlds in which the thing it refers two is reliant on the situation. Such as an alias someone in this world goes by, but suppose a world in which they never acquired that alias but are still the same person, just a different scenario and name. But we cannot refer to them with the alias that refers to them as before because in this world it would be different?

On Lecture II [Hui Yang]

I agree with Kripke that by mentioning a name, we are sometimes not referring to the person (entity) this name commonly refers to, as in the case Hitler is not the Hitler, who played an evil role in World War II. However, I think in real life situation, if someone does start to talking about some “Hitler" that is not in fact the person first comes across the most people/the people he/she talks to’s mind, then he/she will usually note something like “So, when Hitler, not that “Hitler”, called me yesterday”. I believe it is a common sense, although errors do occur, in this case, the error is not the name itself but the person who speaks, who does not correctly predict the thing his/her audience should know (he/she thinks he/she knows his/her audience well enough while he/she really does not).

I don’t agree on Kripke when it comes to the relationship between the “name” and its properties. I usually think a name, as itself, is associated with properties, instead of “having" properties, since I feel a “name," by itself, is a property of an entity/idea as well. I hope the illustration here can be any more helpful:

I agree with Kripke on that when understanding what a name refers, we need to consider not only the “real world” but also the possible worlds, however, I believe he is yet being too general on all kinds of possible worlds, as if besides 0 and 100%, everything else in-between are the same/can be treated as the same. For example, there are possible worlds where everything else is exactly like "the real one" besides the fact that one more fruit fly exists in Seattle on April 25th, 2016; while there are other possible worlds where we are all six eyes pigs who never eat or sleep and can live no longer than 2 years.

Kripke Lecture 2 [Arthur Toland-Barber]

I agree with Kripke that we do not need to know from who a person is referenced in a “reference chain” to be able to reference them. I can reference several entities by which I do not know where I got the information from such as global warming or Saint Nicholas. I could of learned these marks from school, parents, news, books, or even the internet, but I have no idea which one I have a reference from.

I disagree with Kripke that (in the example of Venus) if Phosphorus equals Hesperus it must be the case that they are the same object in every world. It can be the case that we observe some object in a certain way and give it some name to refer to it in each of its environments. This is to say that even though we know a crescent and full moon are both moons and the same moon, I wouldn’t say crescent moon = full moon since they refer to different descriptions (if a crescent moon is out I wouldn’t call it a full moon).

For Kripke, how does he consider the reference chain of a non-existence? If the legend of king Arthur was not known to be written in a book, would we (by Kripke’s theory) be able to put qualities onto this made up object? 

Kripke: Lecture 3 [Christina Sanchez]

I agree with Kripke when he talks about how some things simply do not have a specific name, but only what they are referred to as which is not a specific word. He mentions the concept of heat and how we identify heat by its giving of a certain sensation which we know simply as the 'sensation of heat' (Kripke 1970, pg. 131). Kripke brings up a good point here when he mentions that some things are known by their sensations, although it can go deeper than just that.

I somewhat disagree with the "cluster concept" because I think the overall concept may be on the right track, but I think there are too many specific instances where it gets a little blurry to be 100% successful. Kripke talks about a 3-legged tiger and how by the definition of a tiger, there cannot be a 3-legged tiger, which we all know to be false by common sense, there can be a 3-legged tiger. He talks about how it, much like the other part where he talks about gold not being yellow, but really blue due to an optical illusion of sorts, may be an optical illusion and that all tigers may have 3 legs because this one obviously does, and I am not sure that I completely agree with Kripke when he talks about this possibility of this optical illusion (Kripke 1970, pg. 119-120).

One question I might be a little shaky on is this whole idea of an optical illusion Kripke talks about. Does he mean the physical appearance to our eye, or does he mean something more along the lines of a mind illusion of sorts that is something non-physical?

Kripke Lecture 2 [André Robert]

I agree with Kripke's assertions from page 95 to 97 that "more exact conditions" for references of names "are very complicated to give" as this seems to reflect the fact that, in my experience at least, when I think of a name, I don't usually (if at at) have anything definite in mind when I use that name (Kripke 1970, 95). For me anyway, the name itself is sufficient for reference and I just assume whomever I'm talking to knows the reference of that name. If pressed on what I thought the reference was. I would need to give further thought to it, which suggests to me that in everyday use, names have an extremely vague ability to reference in and of themselves, which seems reflected in what Kripke is saying.

I disagree with Kripke's response to Strawson's idea of a causal chain of reference in that I think it is a mistake to rely on such a chain at all. The reference of a name seems to be linked only to the initial naming, not the chain which describes how any given person comes to know of the reference. In order for language to be effective, I think that the meanings of words, including names, need to be something fixed and using any sort of chain of reference, even as loosely as Kripke does, violates  this.

Towards the end of the lecture, Kripke begins talking about contingent identities, but I found it unclear if he thinks there can be such things. As our use of English necessarily picks out Venus when we use the words 'Venus,' 'Hesperus,' and 'Phosphorus,' is Kripke saying that this is a contingent truth or a necessary one?

Kripke's Lecture 2 [Alex Rowell]

I agreed with Kripke's summary and subsequent denial of the cluster-theory of naming. Kripke's examples were quite common ones and able to poke a lot of holes in the theory, and the footnotes/addendum added a lot of counterarguments that showed the cluster theory of naming doesn't reflect most instances of how we use names. The examples that especially interested me were the arguments about layman usage in relation to theorems (2) and (3), pg 80-85, as most common usages of names are by laymen and not philosophers.

I suspect I disagree with Kripke's assertion that names are rigid identifiers, because it feels like the rigid identifier assertion is tied tightly in with the possible/alternate worlds assertion, which feels like an entirely distinct argument from the naming and reference one. While I can't entirely put my finger on it, something about this packaged assertion feels off to me, and it feels a bit argumentatively dishonest to lean so heavily on the could-have-been's or might-not-be's for the argument. Also, it seems rigid identifiers aren't necessary if we don't use the possible worlds in a discussion, so setting the whole thing aside feels more straightforward to me.

Question 1: Is Kripke an ordinary language philosopher? He seems firmly rooted in how laymen use language but steps up against Russell on several occasions.
Question 2: I could use some clarity on Kripke's argument from pg 102-103, how 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is or isn't true based on possible worlds. It seems like Kripke argued something different earlier in the lecture and I can't seem to make sense of this argument.

Kripke [Alberto Torrigiotti]

I agree with Kripke's general criticisms toward the view that essential properties identify referents; he offers several convincing arguments that show the implausibility of accepting that proper names which seem to pick out unique objects can simply be replaced by any description of the unique object's properties. Even in cases in which some perceived property of an object is a relevant consideration in one's procedure of naming it, I think it is nevertheless certainly false that its name is synonymous in meaning with a description of the sort: "the unique so-and-so with such-and-such properties". Take for instance a case in which in a bout of bad humor, I decide to name my newborn puppy "TYP" (The Youngest Puppy) immediately after it's born, and I have a belief that at the time of my naming it, it really is the youngest puppy (in the world). But, it would be absurd to say that henceforth, each time a new puppy is born, the referent of my use of "TYP" is a different, new youngest puppy.

I am less hopeful than Kripke about the prospects of a theory of causal chain of reference. It seems like a very strange solution which places an arbitrary social condition on reference, the function of which I believe is not primarily social or communicative, and I see no good reason to accept the metaphysics of this view. To be sure, language is often employed for the sake of rich communication, but I am unsure how to make sense of a picture of reference that allows for the reference of one's use of a phrase to be determined by other users. (Kripke 1981, 93)

Am I misunderstanding Kripke's analysis of the causal chain of reference? Is he in fact saying that there may be social/communal reference-determining conditions in an individual's use of a phrase, e.g., when I say Mary Magdalene, there may be a causal chain of reference back to the person who assigned her with that name, presumably her parents?" Maybe I am realizing that I have been overly cynical about the potential of a social condition of reference since many things, like Mary Magdalene, are things for which I would have had no knowledge unless I was socially taught.

Kripke, whose name I heard from my professor who probably who heard it from his professor who maybe heard it from whoever named Kripke

1. I agree with Kripke's overall assessment of how we use proper names in order to fix referents. It seems to not be the case that when given a proper name that we do not think of these names as meaning a series of descriptions, and moreover while these descriptions may in fact be linked in some way to properly named referents, they are not identical in the way that would suggest that these descriptions are the definitions of the names. It seems rather more intuitive to suggest that we have some brute understanding of the referent and we just name it based on some causal link.

2. Speaking of the causal link, I don't quite agree that the better picture of fixing referents with names is part of the actual causal chain as opposed to what we think we got the name from. While there is an actual causal link that could potentially trace the passage of a proper name for a referent, the actual use (to perhaps borrow from Strawson) of the proper name is more based on what the utterer has in mind. In fact, the arbitrariness of proper names that Kripke seems to suggest would seem to support this even more.

3. If referents are merely just fixed by proper names, is there in fact no link between meaning and language other than just brute naming? If we are not so much coming to understanding meaning through a language system and it is more language fixing onto what we have in mind, are we not just going right back to Locke's theory of ideas in language?

Kripke's Theory of Reference [Sean Wammer]

1.
I agreed with Kripke's story about chains of reference originating from the first use (baptism) of the name and linking all the way to any particular use of that name. As strange as it may sound at first, this theory of reference seems to accurately describe how we learn and use words, and it remains consistent with the non-necessity of descriptions that he explains. Particularly convincing is how we can successfully refer to someone without knowing their anything about them, like when I refer to the venerable Bede.

2.
Kripke presents the problem of George Smith, that is, when a teacher picks the first name off the top of his head, it doesn't seem to that he has passed the reference to his students, so Kripke's theory of reference seems shaky here. However, I don't see this as a problem because the teacher really isn't referring to his neighbor, and he doesn't expect the students to pick up the reference to his neighbor. In this case, you can pretend that the teacher never used the name in the first place and just said 'a man' because he wasn't trying to make a reference and just used the name 'George Smith' incidentally.

3.
Kripke says that identity statements are not contingently true; they are necessarily true. Is it a problem if identity statements are completely mistaken? For example, Tom Cruise is Ryan Gosling is a false identity statement, contingent on the referent of both names.

--Sean Wammer

Putnam on Meaning and Reference [Hayley Thompson]

I agree with Putnam's Hypothesis of the Universality of the Division of Linguistic Labor. In other words, I believe that different people or "linguistic communities" may have different senses of a word that cooperate or fit together like puzzle pieces to refer to a single reference.

I disagree with many of the ideas discussed in Putnam's paper, or at the very least the examples he uses to portray them. First of all, in his far-fetched "twin earth" anecdote, I do not follow his argument that the extensions of earth and twin earth varieties of water differ. Sure, they may have different formulas, but I do not think that is what is important to the people using the term 'water' in his example. To them, 'water' refers to the clear, drinkable liquid that falls from the sky and is found in lakes and rivers. Similarly, let's think of the word 'juice'. In this case both apple juice and orange juice have the same extension regardless of the psychological intensions people have about what 'juice' means. For this reason, I do not agree with Putnam's idea that intension does not determine extension.

Are "intension" and "extension" roughly related to sense and reference, which is how I understood them? In this case, should the reference or extension depend on the sense or intension used rather than the other way around, as Putnam seems to think?

Agreements and Disagreements on Lecture 1 [Hui Yang]

Agree

"But what I am concerned with here is a notion which is not a notion of epistemology but of metaphysics, in some (I hope) nonpejorative sense. We ask whether something might have been true, or might have been false. Well, if something is false, it's obviously not necessarily true. If it is true, might it have been otherwise? Is it possible that, in this respect, the world should have been different from the way it is? If the answer is 'no', then this fact about the world is a necessary one. If the answer is 'yes', then this fact about the world is a contingent one. This in and of itself has nothing to do with anyone's knowledge of anything. It's certainly a philosophical thesis, and not a matter of obvious definitional equivalence, either that everything a priori is necessary or that everything necessary is a priori. Both concepts may be vague. That may be another problem. But at any rate they are dealing with two different domains, two different areas, the epistemological and the metaphysical" (Kripke, 1980, P35-36).

Kripke seems to point out here that there is significant difference between the thing we do not know and do not believe if we could ever know is true or not, and the thing is simply not true, letting along we know it or not. When we say “I don’t know something”, we are talking about something definitely not on the same level of “something could not possibly be true/does not exist as if in we could at least know something/as if we consider in the situation beyond us”.

I agree with him because I also believe it is necessary to separate these two domain, or it will be difficult to make argument regarding naming, as we would do in case of someone writes incorrect Italian sentence in his/her French exam: firstly point out that what he/she writes is a completely different language from what is requested, and secondly point out that even if it is an Italian exam, he/she still spells some Italian words incorrectly. I, an agnatic, for example, have to make arguments here as if I do at least know/could possibly know something, for the sake of keeping the conversation going.

Disagree

"Perhaps according to me the truth should not be put in terms of saying that it is necessary that there should be no unicorns, but just that we can't say under what circumstances there would have been unicorns. Further, I think that even if archeologists or geologists were to discover tomorrow some fossils conclusively showing the existence of animals in the past satisfying everything we know about unicorns from the myth of the unicorn, that would not show that there were unicorns" (Kripke, 1980, P24).

What Kripke tries to make distinction here is similar to the case of "a man with a glass of champagne case in his hand which is intact water”. He point out that even if later on we create something true or discover something true that have the same characters that given by people to the word “unicorn”, that is still not "the unicorn” but rather something else which happens to have all features that a nonexistent creature given name “unicorn” is subject to have.

I don’t completely disagree with Kripke in this specific case, although I do agree with him in some parts and wish he is simply presenting a bad example here that contradicts his main thoughts. First, in this specific case of unicorn from the folktale, I do not think we can say this thing with all features of a “unicorn” is not the unicorn in the folklore, because we do not know who exactly first created this “fiction” animal and what exactly was in his/her/their mind when he named the first “unicorn”. Maybe he/she/they did see the real unicorns that archeologists discover, and maybe although he/she/they did imagine this animal but when he/she/they give “it" its name, he/she/they were hold a belief of “although I/we never see a real animal like this, this animal possibly exists”.

Kripke lecture 1 [Arthur Toland-Barber]

“To every name or designating expression ‘X’ there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of properties φ such that A believes ‘φX (Kripke, 64).”

This is saying that someone who says a word like Nixon has innate values which the speaker believes is true such as (generally speaking) President and Republican. Therefore, the meaning of the word/name “Nixon” is designated by these beliefs which can also vary by individual.

I like this idea since it seems to mirror what and how we actually think. My view of Nixon may be different than other people and when I mention “Nixon” my meaning will be from my own thoughts of what Nixon is/was which may be incorrect, but still true since I am the reference point.

“”Moses exists” means “enough of the properties φ are satisfied (Kripke, 65-66).”

What this quote is saying is that, for example, the name Moses has certain qualifiers that make the name refer to something. In the case where someone say’s Moses and I also think of Moses, but the Moses each of us think of shares no qualities of the Moses from the Bible, then we are not thinking of the same thing, or in other words, the Moses we are thinking about doesn’t exist.

What I don’t like about this is the idea that we have to decide what properties Moses exits entails that need to be satisfied. I’m not sure how one mention of the word Moses can equate to another unless only one conjunction is satisfactory (if the bible mentions that Moses was married and parted the red sea and my conception of Moses was married and didn’t part the red sea, are these the same Moses or not?). 

Naming and Necessity Lecture 2 [Henry Tran]

1. Agreed/Interesting Quote:

Whatever the merits of such a view may be as a view of history or the nature of great men, it does not seem that it should be trivially true on the basis of a theory of proper names. (Kripke 1972, p.75)

This quote means to me to say that, similarly as Kripke continues to explain, that historical things such as figure are attributed by the achievements/properties associated with them. However, just because we may attribute names with these properties such as: "Aristotle's most important properties consist in his philosophical work, and Hitler's in his murderous political role" (Kripke 1972, p.77) we might not know them by exact facts. To conclude, Kripke says: "an object could have had properties very different from its most striking actual properties, or from the properties we use to identify it."

I agreed (in some sense) with this quote because if I were to think of a merit that someone has done, such as Abraham Lincoln, my knowledge of the name and it's attributes are certainly not from first hand experience. We associate the attributes such that we believe them to be 'true' such that Abraham Lincoln the 16th president was a prominent figure against slavery. Lincoln could've been a vampire slayer hunter for all I know.

2. Disagree/Puzzling Quote:

"But still that's not a case in which Hesperus wasn't Phosphorus. For there couldn't have been such a case, given that Hesperus is Phosphorus." (Kripke 1972, p.103)

This quote was puzzling to me but I think it explains to me something about the understanding of names and the identity involving names. However it also seem counter intuitive comparing the first and second part of the quote. Thus why it was somewhat puzzling. (I think i'm confusing myself even more)

I was puzzled and disagreed with this part because the thought that "If Hesperus exists,
then Hesperus is Hesperus" is rather conditional such that the quote is somewhat posteriori and is related to observation rather than understanding. As something about :'If Hesperus exists then Hesperus is Phosphorus', it is counter intuitive to say the previous identity statement.

Naming and Necessity Lecture 1 [André Robert]

In his discussion about names as a cluster of descriptions, Kripke says, "Not only is it true of the man Aristotle that he might not have gone into pedagogy; it is also true that we use the term 'Aristotle' in such a way that, in thinking of a counterfactual situation in which Aristotle didn't go into any of the fields and do any of the achievements we commonly attribute to him, still we would say that was a situation in which Aristotle did not do these thongs" (Kripke 1970, 62).

What this doing is refuting that names could just be a cluster of descriptions. Since we can and do talk about people in counterfactual ways, as Kripke does here, and still be talking about the same person and intelligently use their name, there has to be something about the name other than a description. Otherwise, changing things about that person would mean that they would no longer satisfy the conditions of their name, but this is clearly not what happens when we talk about counterfactual things.

I agree with this idea because many people talk about "what if..." scenarios and all parties involved in said conversations can understand what is going on. I also think they  are all still talking about the same person in a different scenario rather than a different person entirely who happens to share traits with the original (as might be suggested by the cluster theory).


When talking about the meter and the one meter stick, Kripke says, "On the other hand, even if S is used as the standard of a meter, the metaphysical status of 'S is one meter long' will be that of a contingent statement, provided that 'one meter' is regarded as a rigid designator: under appropriate stresses and strains, heatings and coolings, S  would have had a length other than one meter even at t0" (Kripke 1970, 56).

Here, Kripke is contrating the differenc between epistemologial status and metaphysical status in that the latter has a fixed meaning. One meter is one meter, according to Kripke, so whatever reference is being used to determine that could be wrong in a metaphysical sense if that reference is not in fact one meter.

I found this part confusing because I wasn't sure how the stick could be different from a meter at time 0: if the stick is what determines what a meter is in the first place, how could it not be a meter? This may just be a poor example of a rigid designator as units of measurement are arbitrary,, but it seemed like a crucial part of Kripke's argument and I wanted to make sure I'm understanding it correctly.

Kripke I [Sam Hinderaker]

Agree:
"We may raise the question whether a name has any reference at all when we ask, e.g., whether Aristotle ever existed. It seems natural here to think that what is questioned is not whether this thing (man) existed. Once we've got the thing, we know that it existed. What really is queried is whether anything answers to the properties we associate with the name--in the case of Aristotle, whether any one Greek philosopher produced certain works, or at least a suitable number of them." (Kripke 29)

I agree with this very much because it clearly picks out a person - as Kripke mentions, this can be anybody. However, for this to pick out a certain individual, they must satisfy a set of conditions. Those conditions are specific enough that there can only be one Aristotle, therefore this reference refers not to the name itself, but some unspecified person who seems to have existed. This isn't really covered by Frege or Russell, because it seems to be a reference without a referent (in the case that we don't know who Aristotle was.)

Disagree:
"Suppose we have someone, Nixon, and there's another possible world where there is no one with all the properties Nixon has in the actual world. Which one of these other people, if any, is Nixon? Surely you must give some criterion of identity here! If you have a criterion of identity, then you just look in the other possible worlds at the man who is Nixon; and the question whether, in that other possible world, Nixon has certain properties, is well defined." (Kripke 42)

I disagree with this because Nixon seems to me to be a very specific referent. I think that Nixon exists the way he does in history and in our minds because of his associations through our culture, and that even if a 'Nixon' did exist in some other world, we would clearly mean someone and something different than we mean here - but take and replace Nixon with someone else, or change his life course so that he does not match our descriptions in our universe, and we will seem to mean something different. To me, this seems to be because we can use Nixon as a descriptive term, not literally, but still be referring to the individual. For example, we can say "Trump in the white house would be another Nixon." where we don't think that he would actually be Donald Nixon, but we ascribe the properties that Nixon had as a president to the situation of our current presidency. I think even if Nixon was well defined in another world, he wouldn't be able to have his name used this way unless he was the same Nixon we have in this universe.

Kripke, Naming and Necessity [Alberto Torrigiotti]

"'Possible worlds' are stipulated, not discovered by powerful telescopes. There is no reason why we cannot stipulate that, in talking about what would have happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual situation, we are talking about what would have happened to him."

Kripke argues against the transworld identification thesis, i.e., the view that in talking about an object in other possible worlds, we must determine whether the object would be the same object. To illustrate an example, suppose I want to stipulate a possible world in which George W. Bush did not become the 43rd president of the United States. First of all, I'm certainly not saying that the 43rd president of the United States did not become the 43rd president of the United States, and furthermore, it isn't a matter of discovery or investigation into the characteristics that constitute the identity of Bush whether the object I'm calling Bush in this possible world is still Bush; the need to identify across worlds is bypassed through stipulation.

As far as I am aware, talk of possible worlds in the philosophical sense is indeed stipulative and my agreement with Kripke on this point is strengthened by the following consideration. It is not by virtue of any description or body of descriptions of Aristotle that I come to assign him the proper name "Aristotle", so the name "Aristotle" is used to refer to that man over there (who happens to have the characteristics of Aristotle). If for instance, I met a Greek philosopher whom I took to be the best student of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great and called him "Aristotle" only to find out that the best student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great is actually Jones, I wouldn't say to Aristotle "Oh I'm mistaken, you are not Aristotle", nor would I say to Jones, "You are the real Aristotle".

"But a simple answer to the question is this: Even if this is the only standard of length that he uses, there is an intuitive difference between the phrase 'one meter' and the phrase 'the length of S at t₀'. The first phrase is meant to designate rigidly a certain length in all possible worlds, which in the actual world happens to be the length of the Stick S at t_0."

Even if we fix the reference of 'one meter' to the length of S at t₀, the meanings of the two phrases 'one meter' and 'the length of S at t₀' are not synonymous. There is, for Kripke, an important difference between the functions of giving a phrase meaning and fixing a phrase's reference. 'One meter' is a rigid designator which purports to hold across all possible worlds, whereas 'the length of S at t₀' is not because the length of S at t₀ could have been a different length from the one we used to fix the reference of one meter.

I am having difficulty finding a compelling a reason to believe the bolded portion of the quote, but I don't disagree with it. Kripke compares this to the example of water boiling at 100°C, but in the case of water boiling it is more obvious that 'the temperature at which water boils' is a rigid designator, and that '100°C' just fixes its reference. Why does 'one meter' designate the same object across all worlds? I think I have some inkling of what Kripke would say, but it would be helpful if someone could explain.

Kripke: Lecture 1 [Christina Sanchez]

Agree

"...Well, then, in fact we find that it's not a star, but is the planet Venus and that Hesperus and Phosphorus are in fact the same. So we express this by 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'" (Kripke 28-29).

Here, Kripke is suggesting that there can be two different names referring to the same thing. We can associate different descriptions with the two distinct names, and the same object can satisfy the two descriptions. In this example, 'Hersperus' and 'Phosphorus' are names for the same thing, Venus, but one is referring to it in the morning, and one in the evening, however, both names are still referring to the exact same object. I agree with this statement because in our language, we do have many different names to refer to the same object, and even though the two names are different, in context or from common sense, we know exactly what each name is referring to. Objects can be referred to by different names due to the context of the situation, and because the descriptions might have the same general direction to them, we will know the two names are referring to the same object.

Disagree

"...because the term 'horse', means in English 'the things called "horses"'. Similarly with any other expression which might be used in English. Since it's trifling to be told that sages are called 'sages', 'sages' just means 'the people called "sages"' (Kripke 69).

This quote is talking about how proper names are difficult to explain to a person regarding why they are named what they are. Maybe only some people called them this, as Kripke refers to Socrates and how he might have only been most known by 'Socrates', but he may have gone by other names, as well. Knowing what something is called or named without being referred to can be a difficult pathway to understand. I somewhat disagree with parts of this because even though I am starting to understand how referring is important in the process of naming, we, as humans, are still brought into the world learning different names for different things without necessarily understanding the meaning behind the name until we really think about it for ourselves. Horses are horses, and when we first learn about them, and sometimes forever, we do not have any idea why horses are called 'horses', but that is just what they are called until we pick the name apart philosophically.

Kripke Lecture I [Alex Rowell]

Agree
"Frege should be criticized for using the term 'sense' in two senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be its meaning; and he also takes it to be the way its reference is determined. Identifying the two, he supposes that both are given by definite descriptions. Ultimately, I will reject this second supposition too; but even were it right, I reject the first. A description may be used as synonymous with a designator, or it may be used to fix its reference. The two Fregean senses of 'sense' correspond to two senses of 'definition' in ordinary parlance. They should carefully be distinguished." [pg 59]

Frege uses 'sense' instead of 'definition' and therefore the reader is less likely to have the intuition that the two definitions of 'sense' are being used interchangeably. This allows for some blurring of the argument to make points that would not succeed if the word 'definition' was used instead. This should be more clearly laid out, and Kripke attempts to do so in this lecture.

I had some trouble with Frege's use of the word 'sense', though I didn't know why at the time. Philosophy works to make the implicit explicit, and Kripke's observations inform my understanding of Frege's work.

Disagree
"For example, though it may be informative to tell someone that horses are used in races, it is trifling to tell him that horses are called 'horses'. Therefore this could only be the case because the term 'horse', means in English 'the things called "horses" '. Similarly with any other expression which might be used in English. Since it's trifling to be told that sages are called 'sages', 'sages' just means 'the people called "sages" '. Now plainly this isn't really a very good argument, nor can it therefore be the only explanation of why it's trifling to be told that Socrates is called 'Socrates'. Let's not go into exactly why it's trifling." [pg 69]

Referencing a word as meaning the same word is not an informative statement, because it transmits no meaningful content. There are theoretical reasons for this, one of which is that words may simply be shorthand for '(x) is called (x)', but Kripke suggests there are deeper reasons than this.

I don't think I'm willing to dismiss this theory as trifling, mostly because Kripke did not seem to present it seriously. This passage felt like he was hand waving the theory, and I'm not sure why -- please DO explain why this is trifling.

Kripke Lecture 1 [Danielle Trzil]

Agree

"... designation rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object wherever the object exists; ... the objects is a necessary existent, the designation can be called strongly rigid."

Here Kripke uses the example of Nixon and Humphrey to convey his point. The President of the US in 1970 was, definitely, Nixon. This statement is strongly rigid because it is a fact. However, in the election Humphrey might have been president in 1970, and that is a designation that is not rigid. I agree with this because there are some statements that are up to interpretation or variable to change, whereas some facts, especially in history, are non-negotiable. Nixon was the president and so if you say "the president from 1970" that would, indefinitely, mean Nixon. If you said "the president in 2018", because it hasn't happened yet we can not rigidly say it will be Bernie, Hilary, or...Trump...

Disagree

"...nine could also be equally well picked out as the number of planets. It is not necessary, not true in all possible worlds, that the number of planets is odd."

This quote is what we mentioned in class the other day. It basically means even though if we say in THIS world is the number of planets in our solar system is odd, the statement would be true, but in another thought-up possible universe the answer could be false (there is no way for us to know). Meanwhile, if we say there are nine x's in this world or another thought up world, the statement remains true because nine planets does not equal the concept of nine in general. I think this is a very controversial statement, because even though it makes sense and I see the argument Kripke is making, I do not think it is a valid one. Even if there are other possible universes, we have no way to access them or provide any significant knowledge other than "there might be more or less than 9 planets", unless we talk about like the Star Trek or Doctor Who universe, which is subject to change through human thought and creation. While Kripke has a valid point about other worlds, that's not what they other philosophers were talking about in the first place anyway, because Mill, Russell, and Frege were only talking about the real world in the first place...

Kripke - Naming and Necessity Lecture II [Hayley Thompson]

"...when asked what the theory of relativity is, they will say: 'Einstein's theory' and thus be led into the most straightforward sort of vicious cycle."

Kripke uses this example to argue names may break either the unique individual thesis, in which a set properties are believed to pick out one unique individual, or the non-circularity thesis and retain meaning. The violation of the non-circularity thesis, described in Kripke's quote above, that happens when certain entities are forced to comply with the unique individual thesis, may best be described with the following diagram:

In this case, Einstein refers to a man who had a theory, namely that of relativity.  But due to its complexity, for many people the 'the theory of relativity' has little meaning. When asked what this theory refers to, they would likely say 'a theory by Einstein'.

I agree with Kripke that the non-circularity thesis is not required for an name to have reference. In the case described, at least for some people, 'the theory of relativity' and 'Einstein'  are two names that might only be uniquely referenced as properties of each other, leading to the cycle. Still, this cycle establishes a semantic connection that allows both the names 'Einstein' and 'the theory of relativity' to refer to unique entities.

"We have to be referring to Godel if we say 'Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.'"

In this quote, Kripke is explaining that the speaker intends only one specific man, who either was given the name Godel at birth or came to be known as such through a game of transliteration telephone, to fulfill the predicate of the statement. Would this necessitate that the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic had to be Godel? No. The statement may have a false truth value. While agree with this to some extent, in common usage, when not used as an equivocal or identity statement, 'Godel' may be used as a generic term for 'whoever it was who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic' or vise-verse. For example, if one were to say "Godel must have been a coffee-drinker, since he got coffee stains all over the papers containing his incompleteness proof", they are making this assertion about the actual man who wrote the incompleteness proof for arithmetic and not just some random person named Godel who was credited with proving said theory.

Saul Kripke, the fixed referent for the man in this world who wrote Naming and Necessity

Agree:
"I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might not have been called 'Nixon')."
Kripke is putting forth this idea of how we should think of properly named things in all possible worlds. It is the case that for some x, in this case the man with the proper name Nixon, we rigidly designate as Nixon. Because in this world, the man is called Nixon, we refer to the man in all possible worlds as Nixon regardless of the properties or the name that person has in those other worlds.
I agree with this, because it takes a fairly practical stance on possible worlds where we in some sense privilege the actual world we live in by using this world as the starting point where we talk about things in other worlds by identifying things as they pertain to this world

Disagree
"How can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its properties? I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it. I don't have to identify it after seeing it through a telescope . . . Some properties of an object may be essential to it, in that it could not have failed to have them. But these properties are not used to identify the object in another possible world, for such an identification is not needed. Nor need the essential properties of an object be the properties used to identify it in the actual world, if indeed it is identified in the actual world by means of properties."
This quote too extends from the point of the quote above where we suggest that we can locate things in other worlds by locating them in the actual world. He explicates further that the way in which we identify things in this world is not by their properties but by a brute identification of it in this world for it may not be the case that what is identified in the actual world has those properties in other worlds.
This point just seems to be a rather philosophically lazy way of describing how identity works between what we locate in this world to how they are in fact the same thing with perhaps different properties and names in other worlds. We seemingly can suggest that something in this world can have an identical correspondent in another world without certain properties, but it seems rather unexplored how this is the case.

Kripke - Naming and Necessity Lecture II [Sean Wammer]

1.
This is a quote from Kripke that I agreed with,

"It just is not, in any intuitive sense of necessity, a necessary truth that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him...It would seem that it's a contingent fact that Aristotle ever did any of the things commonly attributed to him today, any of these great achievements that we so much admire." (Kripke, 1972). 

This is a quote from Kripke that I disagreed with,

"We certainly say, and sincerely, 'Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Does it follow from that that we believe that Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic—that we attribute the incompleteness of arithmetic to this man? No. Not just from that. We have to be referring to Godel when we say 'Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. If, in fact, we were always referring to Schmidt, then we would be attributing the incompleteness of arithmetic to Schmidt and not to Godel...But we do in fact refer to Godel." (Kripke, 1972).

2.
In the first quote, Kripke is trying to show that there is no necessary connection between the names we use and the description or bundle of properties we ascribe to that name. We might want to say that Aristotle refers whoever fits all these properties, but any of the properties we assign to Aristotle may be false. Thus, there is no necessary connection between the name we use and the person we are trying to pick out or their "unique" properties.

In the second quote, Kripke is pointing out a problem with the connection between names and their intended referent. If we are loose with the reference and say that 'Godel' refers to whoever proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, then our reference to Godel is circular because it depends on exactly what we are ascribing in 'Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'.

3.
I agree with Kripke here because when we use a name, it really doesn't seem like we are trying to also assert a big bundle of properties that uniquely pick out that person. We just casually refer to some actual object and hope that the listener can pick out the same object as you do from your name, so there really is no necessary connection between names and their properties.

I disagree with Kripke in the second quote and find this passage very puzzling since our beliefs about Godel are contingent on our actual knowledge of Godel. It seems appropriate (or at least permissible) that our reference is contingent on the properties we ascribe; when I refer to Godel, I am just referring to whoever proved the incompleteness of arithmetic because I don't know any better.

--Sean Wammer

Kripke and Designation [Drew Owens]

Kripke spends a good deal of energy discussing the implications of "transworld identification." He uses this exercise to strengthen his argument for rigid, non-rigid, and accidential designators (Kripke, 1972, p. 48. "Lets call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object." I find that Kripkes's evidence gathered in the thought experiment of "other worlds" is extremely gratifying in that it approaches how we think of what is spoken in a much more intuitive manner.

I agree with his assertion that, "We do not begin with worlds, and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world (Kripke 1972, p. 53)." This seems to me a compelling argument; due to the fact that we usually have a specific object, person, idea, etc. in mind before we determine to suppose properties of that specific item under different circumstances (or in other worlds).

I also think the idea of rigid determiners setting a reference is a much more consistent concept, due to it's lack of reliance on properties as are contextually relevant. This allows us to discuss an object from two very separate, and potentially disparately ignorant perspectives without denying that we are still referencing the same object.

Kripke Lecture I [Anthony Baker]

1. a) "Frege should be criticized for using the term 'sense' in two senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be its meaning; and he also takes it to be the way its reference is determined." (Naming and Necessity 1972, 59)

b) "A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid. One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators...although someone other than the US president in 1970 might have been the US president in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon." (Naming and Necessity 1972, 48)

2. a) Kripke is disagreeing with Frege's view that a designator's sense can lead to both its meaning and its reference. Taking the case of names as rigid designators, you can get a meaning out of a name's sense, but not necessarily determine an accurate reference from its sense.

b) Kripke tries to explain his view as to why he classifies names as strongly rigid. The example used is to show that while it while it possible for a title like 'US president' to change depending on who has that title, it isn't nearly as possible for the name 'Nixon' (when referring to the president of 1970) to be anyone other than Nixon. It's sort of a thought experiment to get his point across that names are more rigid  of 'necessary existents.'

3. a) I agree with Kripke on this one. It seems possible that the same sense of a designator can lead to both meaning reference, but it I can't see how this can always be true, because different meanings from the same sense can entail different referents.

b) I see where Kripke is going with this, in that 'Nixon' as a name and referent is harder to poke holes into than 'US president of 1970' due to its rigidness, but he mentions 'all possible worlds' numerous times, and I think it's fair to assume that referring to Nixon in another possible world, we would be referring to someone else. Perhaps this is why it's strongly rigid, and not completely rigid?

Kripke [Gabriel Debacker]

“Frege should be criticized for using the term ‘sense’ in two senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be its meaning; and he also takes it to be the way its reference is determined. Identifying the two, he supposes that both are given by definite descriptions” (Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 59).

Kripke is arguing against Frege's use of the term 'sense' in multiple ways. The first is what is grasped by the mind, the second is that the description is that which picks out the thing that the name is being used to refer to. Kripke thinks that these ideas should be separated into the above two facets. This idea helps to solve some of the problems with a Fregean view of names when considering statements of truth such as "Aristotle was a student of Plato" and "The most famous student of Plato was a student of Plato" and why these claims are not synonymous given that a name's associated description(s) only fix the reference and do not provide the semantic content of a name.

Let me state what the cluster concept theory of names is. (It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. It's wrong. You  may suspect me of proposing another theory in its place; but I hope not, because I'm sure it's wrong too if it is a theory.)" (Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 64)

Besides finding this hilarious, I was a little confused on what Kripke's objections were to the theory. From what I understand, the theory consists of 6 theses, and Kripke's objections apply to any theory that tries to account for the meaning of proper names in terms of descriptions. This makes it seem directed against Frege and Rusell (and any other theories that try to account for hte meaning of a name in terms of clusters of descriptions). So are Kripke's critiques against the theory itself? Russell and Frege? or on the style or attempts made that he so opposes?

Kripke Lecture 1 [Yuchen Jiang]

Kripke Lecture 1 [Yuchen Jiang]


"If someone identifies necessity with a prioricity, and thinks that objects are named by means of uniquely identifying properties, he may think that it is the properties used to identify the object which, being known about it a priori, must be used to identify it in all possible worlds, to find out which object is Nixon. ( Kripke 49)"

"It [The table] has all these properties and is not a thing without properties, behind them; but it should not therefore be identified with the set, or 'bundle', of its properties, nor with the subset of its essential properties. ( Kripke,52)"

For the first quote here, I understand Kripke as stating that if necessity is understand as being a priori then identification of certain object would be based on recognizing its essential properties. In this case, he starts his attempt to rejects this idea that  a priori properties are sufficient to identify certain objects in different worlds. For the second quote here, I find it to be surprise. Kripke denies the empirical approach of these issue of identification, though he confirms that these objects have indeed properties, and essential properties.

For the first I agree him to the extent that a priori properties may be meaningful as well as the necessary properties, yet when identifying certain objects, such properties may divert from  necessity. That is to say, a priori properties and necessary properties may be similar in this world, but it does not follow that they would always be the parallel to each other in some other situations.For the second one, I just some what unclear, if Kripke rejects the view of "bundle of properties", is he has to have the ability to identify things intuitively, which could follow that he has to identify things a priorily?

Sual Kripke 1 [Raphael Nunziata]

“So the analysis of singular existence statements mentioned above will have to be given up, unless it is established by some special argument, independent of a general theory of the meaning of names; and the same applies to identify statements. In any case, I think it’s false that ‘Moses exists’ means that at all. So we won’t have to see if such a special argument can be drawn up.” (Kripke 2011, 33)

The quote states and argues how names and descriptions that are non existence cannot be analyzed, because there is no meaning.  For example, if the name Plato or description acting as a name for Plato has no meaning to a philosopher or object then nothing can be analyzed. Even if some analysis were derived from a non existent statement, this would imply existence and therefore a contradiction.

My reasons for agreement is that it is simple to see the validty and also it is easy to see a contradiction if Kripke were false. Where if Kripke were false then existence could be derived from the non existent.

 “They think that if something belongs to the realm of a priori knowledge, it couldn't possibly be known empirically. This is just a mistake. Something may belong in the realm of such statements that can be known priori but still may be known by particular people on the basis of experience” (Kripke 2011, 35).

The quote is concerned with how knowledge without experience can be know empirically and non empirically, where Kripke believes that knowledge can be both with and without experience in the same realm. The distinction Kripke makes is that knowledge can be both with and without experience; and not solidified to one category. For example, Kripke’s later example of a computer spiting out a prime number can be know with experience by belief of evidence from the computer or can be know without experience by the basis of calculations in determining if the number is prime (Kripke 2011, 35).

I chose this quote because the distinction of knowledge Kripke argues for, is still puzzling. Although Kripke example of a computer and primes sounds to be true, in both cases (of knowledge with and without experience), i’m unsure if computing calculations in your head is considered knowledge without experience—where the calculations it self, could be considered experience.

Kripke Lecture 1 [EVAN COTTINGHAM]

1. "even if [a name's] reference is in some sense determined by a description, statements containing the name cannot in general be analyzed by replacing the name by a description, though they may be materially equivalent to statements containing a description" (Kripke 2011, 33).
"Surely you must give some criterion of identity here! If you have a criterion of identity, then you just look in the other possible worlds at the man who is Nixon; and the question whether, in that other possible world, Nixon has certain properties, is well defined. It is also supposed to be well defined, in terms of such notions, whether it's true in all possible worlds, or there are some possible worlds in which Nixon didn't win the election" (Kripke 2011, 42).

2. In the first quote, Kripke is stating that although a name refers to a description, generally when analyzing a statement, a name and its description cannot be equivalent or analyzed the same way. Kripke gives the example of Moses being 'the man who did such and such.' If Moses is equivalent, in analysis, to 'the man who did such and such,' then if Moses were to not exist, then there is no 'man who did such and such.' In the second quote, Kripke is saying that for a name to be defined by the description it is referring to, then you must consider all other situations that could have happened in another world. Would the same description we associate with a name be the same if a different situation involving the thing with that name be different? Kripke goes on to say that for this to work, there must be a set of criteria that contains attributes that identify Nixon across all possible worlds.

3. I agree with Kripke that when analyzing a statement, a name cannot be replaced with the description it refers to. It could be the case that the same set of properties we attribute to a name also be true of another name, in which case, statements containing the same description could be referring to two different things. I disagree with the need to consider all possible realities when defining a name. If the purpose of language is to help make sense of and communicate about our own world, then I think it is unnecessary to consider all other worlds and situations to establish the identity associated with a name.

Kripke [Korey Nuehs]

“One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators. Certainly they seem to satisfy the intuitive test mentioned above: although someone other than the U. S. President in 1970 might have been the U. S. President in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon.” (Kripke 48)

Names are rigid designators in that they designate the same object in every possible world. ‘Nixon’ in this world refers to Nixon in every possible world, at least in every possible world that Nixon exists, whether that Nixon is actually called ‘Nixon’ or not.

Here, Kripke is saying that ‘Nixon’ designates Nixon in every possible world, but later on, he goes on to say that Nixon might not have been called ‘Nixon’. I do not see how an object that is called X in world one, should also refer to that same object in every possible world that that object should exist even if it should not be called X.

“We ask, ‘to whom does he refer by “Socrates”?’ And then the answer is given, ‘Well, he refers to the man to whom he refers.’ If this were all there was to the meaning of a proper name, then no reference would get off the ground at all.” (Kripke 70)

The quote states that a name, such as Socrates, cannot merely mean: the man who is called Socrates. If this were the case, and names meant only that which were designated by them, then we could never begin to refer to people in the first place; for the name would only mean the man called by the name, but how could we know that that which we call Socrates refers to Socrates in the first place?         

I somewhat understand what he is saying, and his noncircular condition makes sense, but it is also a little confusing for me as to what exactly the problem is behind Kneale’s theory. Ultimately, I agree that to say that a name merely means the man called by the name seems ridiculous, but as to exactly why I am sort of lost.

Saul Kripke (Lecture 1) [Rigo Acevedo]

"Surely not: if Hesperus had been hit earlier by a comet, it might have been visible at a different position at that time. In such a counterfactual situation we would sat that Hesperus would not have occupied that position, but not that Hesperus would not have been Hesperus. The reason is that 'Hesperus' rigidly designates a certain heavenly body and 'the body in yonder position' does not- a different body, or no body might have been Hesperus (though another body, not Hesperus, might have been called 'Hesperus'). Indeed, as I have said, I will hold that names are always rigid designators," (Kripke, p58)

Here Kripke gives an example of why he believes that names function as rigid designators, thus acting to refer directly to an object. He uses the idea of 'other worlds' to argue that using descriptions to refer to individuals becomes useless if anything about that individual were changed, or if anything else within another world, or even within our own world, matched a set of given descriptions. We would lose our ability to identify objects with certainty.
I like how Kripke's account of names considers situations that allow us to identify that some properties of an object are not necessary to its identity.

"If we used that as a definition, the name 'Aristotle' is to mean 'the greatest man who studied with Plato'. Then of course in some other possible world that man might not have studied with Plato and some other man would have been Aristotle. Of, on the other hand, we merely use the description to fix the referent then that man will be the referent of 'Aristotle' in all possible worlds. The only use of the description will have been to pick out which man we mean to refer." (Kripke, p57)

This is another example that expands upon Kirpke's argument that names act as rigid designators to their respective objects, but he also brings up the function of descriptions. Here Kripke states that he believes that descriptions are only useful when attempting to identify an object, to "fix the referent", but is not successful as an appropriate definition given that had anything been different about that object, or if anything else currently also possessed a similar description, then that description would be useless in defining that object.
I am a bit confused by this section of Kripke's argument, and other sections like it; here Kripke seems to acknowledge that descriptions aid in the identification of an object, though they are not necessary. This seems to imply that descriptions do perform some significant function in our references to objects in everyday life, however Kripke seems to sweep this consideration aside in his argument.

Kripke

If 'Moses' means 'the man who did such and such', then, if no one did such and such, Moses didn't exist; and maybe 'no one did such and such' is even an analysis of 'Moses didn't exist'. But if the description is used to fix a reference rigidly, then it's clear that that is not what is meant by 'Moses didn't exist', because we can ask, if we speak of a counterfactual case where no one did indeed do such and such, say, lead the Israelites out of Egypt, does it follow that, in such a situation, Moses wouldn't have existed? It would seem not. For surely Moses might have just decided to spend his days more pleasantly in the Egyptian courts. He might never have gone into either politics or religion at all;(66) If we used a description to associate a person, for example ‘Moses’ with ‘the man who did such and such’, then it would be a possible conclusion that if the man did not do such and such, ‘Moses’ would not exist. However, in this situation it is entirely possible that someone named ‘Moses’ did exist, but did not do those specific actions. This would mean that even if b did not exist, that would not conclude ‘a’ does not exist, rather a did not do those specific actions. I agree with this description and found it very interesting because at first glance it seems to be a case of if a = b, and if b does not exist, that would mean a does not exist as well. However, it is clearly not the case that a = b in this situation. While it may be true that statements in b (the man did such and such) are true for the given person a (“Moses”), that doesn’t mean that a = b, rather it means b posses s traits or aspects that may be true about If one says 'Moses did not exist', this may mean various things. It may mean: The Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from Egypt-or: their leader was not called Moses-or: there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses- I shall perhaps say: by 'Moses' I understand the man who did what the Bible relates of Moses, or at any rate, a good deal of it. But how much? Have I decided how much must be proved false for me to give up my proposition as false? Has the name 'Moses' got a fixed and unequivocal use for me in all possible cases?? (31) There are many ways that people can interpret the phrase, “Moses did not exist”. Kripke is providing a few different examples, like if it means the Israelites didn’t have a single leader who withdrew from Egypt (which is what Moses did in the Bible). Even if we assume the most generalized case, of saying Moses is the man who has done the deeds that the person in the Bible who is referred to as Moses has done, how much can you actually attribute to Moses? To me this dilemma just seems like an issue of context. The name ‘Moses’ in the phrase “Moses did not exist” will be referring to every case of the actions done by the person, ‘Moses’ in the Bible because for anyone who has read the Bible, or has heard enough has enough awareness to know that ‘Moses’ will refer to that person.

Kripke, Lecture 1 [Jonathan Kosaka]

"The first phrase is meant to designate rigidly a certain length in all possible worlds, which in the actual world happens to be the length of the stick S at t0. On the other hand 'the length of S at t0' does not designate anything rigidly. In some counterfactual situations the stick might have been longer and in some shorter" (Kripke, 55).

This quote helps demonstrate the reference of names, rather than defining of names, by providing a very visual example; the use of measurements. It showcases the potential differences between the characteristics normally defined of X as some attribute to it, and shows how these characteristics can change depending on other circumstances, in this case other worlds. It helps illuminate the differences between rigid designators and nonrigid designators as well as 'a priori' and 'necessary'.

I agree with the logic that names carry some designation and reference in and of themselves. Kripke's argument makes more intuitive sense to me as it is more circumstantial than Frege-Russell's strict definitions.

"Mathematics is the only case I really know of where they are given even within a possible world, to tell the truth. I don't know of such conditions for identity of material objects over time, or for people" (Kripke, 43).

Kripke does not believe that there are any concepts beyond mathematics which are capable of having inarguable or interpretative qualities. Aside from this exception, Kripke's argument asserts that definitions of Xs as a way of designation is a circumstantial method.

I wonder, based on scientific reduction, if physics are another example of this as they are grounded on mathematics. This seems like an obvious example to miss, so I am puzzled whether they have a different quality from mathematics making them interpretive or whether Kripke used mathematics as an umbrella for hard sciences.    

Donellan [Rigo Acevedo]

"When a speaker says, "The Φ is Ψ," where the Φ" is used attributively, if there is no Φ, we cannot correctly report the speaker as having said of this or that person or thing that it is Ψ. But if the definite description is used referentially we can report the speaker as having attributed Ψ to something. And we may refer to what the speaker referred to, using whatever description or name suits our purpose." (Donellan, 1966, p. 301)

In this quote Donellan gives a compelling example of the implications of what he calls attributive and referential definite descriptions. This example allows us to understand the distinction between situations in which we attempt to attribute definite descriptions (Φ) to non-existent entities, and when a definite description (Φ) is used to referentially to say something (Ψ) about said Φ. Donellan argues that to incorrectly attribute Φ to some object is not a null statement, but that given the understanding of the listener, the proposition can still be understood and the listener may then refer to that same object with whatever Φ is appropriate given their knowledge of that object. In this Donellan is arguing to reference something does not mean that anyone must make a correct statement about an object. Donellan uses this argument to rebuttal what Russell has put forth, because be believes that Russell's description of language appeals to only attributive uses. This perspective on definite description brings forth the consideration of implications, and what may be implied when a particular  object of reference is Φ.

Donellan stated that a given proposition can contain both a referential or attributive use of Φ, however, I am curious about which perspective is considered when determining what function has been used; in a room of 30 individuals, all of which have a different understanding of an object that I have just made a "The Φ is Ψ," statement about, how do I know what sort of statement I have made?

Strawson on Russell [Hui Yang]

"Expressions used in the uniquely referring way are never either logically proper names or descriptions, if what is meant by calling them "descriptions" is that they are to be analy[z]ed in accordance with the model provided by Russell's Theory of Descriptions" (Strawson, 1950, P323-324).

Strawson apparently doesn’t believe that in order for a sentence to be significant, it is necessary for the singular nouns in the sentence to fit in Russell’s logical analysis format, or weather the singular nouns can fit in Russell’s description doesn’t directly affect the significance of the sentences. Instead, he suggests to use his theory, which aim to distinguish 1.) a sentence/an expression, 2.) a use of a sentence/a use of an expression, and 3.) an utterance of a sentence/an utterance of an expression, which he believes truly crucial. Personally, I simply never truly believe that it is possible for a “singular noun” to “refer” to a singular object, so I am glad Strawson also thinks it is problematic, although we think the same for different reasons. To me, singular nouns never refers to one singular object, but rather provides a series of characters which have already been programed in our brain, which narrows down the coverage of possibilities until there happen to be only one singular object actually left in this rage (instead of none as in the sentence “the king of France is wise”, or multiple as in “the king is alive”).

Strawson seems to mix two usages of the word “is”, one is “common situation” (if there is a king of France, he is wise) and the other is “ongoing event” (there is a king of France, and he is wise), as in the case when Mr. Clinton claimed “ there isn’t an affair (going on)".