Performative Utterances and the Descriptive Fallacy [Sean Wammer

1.
J. L. Austin says that the descriptive fallacy is the false belief that sentences ought to be treated as propositions, and that their meaning should be based on the truth value of that proposition (Austin 1970, 221). The verification theory of meaning stipulates that every sentence is meaningful if it has a verifiable truth value and nonsense otherwise. The verification theory of meaning is guilty of committing the descriptive fallacy because it only allows sentences with truth values to have meaning, and it essentially treats all sentences as propositions whose meaning depends on the verification of its truth value.

2.
Austin's suggestion of performative utterances avoids this fallacy because performative utterances are not propositions and do not have truth values in the traditional sense. The utterance is uttered to do something other than state a fact (Austin 1970, 221). This class of utterances lets us understand other ways in which we use language such as implication, promises, excuses, and expression of emotions.

3.
I'm curious about performative or operative sentences that seem false, such as lies or mistakes. Something like, 'I promise to be there tomorrow,' said with the intention of not being there at all, seems like a false promise. Austin says that in a case like this, our word is our bond, or else we welcome empty promises and scams. However, if someone is exceedingly untrustworthy, no one believes their empty promises. In this case, what exactly are they doing when they say, 'I will be there tomorrow'? Are they still forming a bond with their words that they will break tomorrow, or is their sentence meaningless since both parties know the promise is empty?

--Sean Wammer