I agree with Grice's very general notion that in many cases the meaning of an utterance can in some way supersede the meaning of what is literally said i.e. the intentions of the speaker. It is difficult, as Grice raises towards the end of the entry, to cache these intentions out precisely, or to even explain the meaning of an intention in some cases. I have found myself in the position mentioned by Grice, where a Philosopher upon being asked what something means, has to choose "how what is said is to be taken," and I think this example shows that meaning intertwined with intention can become very complex (Grice, Meaning 1957, 384).
The example of failing someone in a class with the intention of being vindictive vs. cutting in line is an interesting one, because Grice says here that the meaning of an intention is only 'meant,' or actually means something, when distress is obviously caused/meant by the action. I fail to understand how if the intention of failing man X is perceived by X as being vindictive, then why this isn't important qua 'meaning' as much as cutting someone in line when the distress caused is meant by the line cutter. Perhaps this has something to do with the people in line as being equals, whereas the teacher has some sort of authority over the student?
A distinction made by Grice as to how the the expressions 'means,' 'means something,' or 'means that' or used in differently depending on their 'sense,' seems problematic, especially as the way language is used changes. The theory seems at face value like it may present the the possibility of being too dependent on the words themselves, as opposed to what they are actually 'meant' to be used for (I'm aware that I used 'meant' in the previous sentence)... Of course this a paradox that can't be overcome from either side of the approach, so it's only a minor objection (if one at all).
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