1.
Well, if the meaning of a statement is
determined by empirical observation, then it can be said, in some way, that a
statement derives its meaning from adhering to the empirical facts of the
world. However, if this is so, then ultimately the meaning of a statement, or
business of a statement, is its truth value. Statements that don’t adhere to
empirical observation are false, where as those that do adhere to empirical
observation are true.
2.
For Austin, there are sentences/utterances that
are neither non-sense nor true or false. These sentences are performative in
nature, i.e., they perform an action, but do not make a statement of affairs
that could be regarded as true or false. These performative sentences are
evaluated on their felicity or infelicity in regards to the surrounding context
of the utterance, e.g., societal conventions, intension of the speaker, form or
genre of use, etc.; his theory creates or enlarges the distinction between how
language operates in describing the world, i.e., truth and falsity, and how our
language operates within the social arena.
3.
Austin’s theory seems to muddy the water a bit
in terms of trying to get at the actual meaning of an utterance. My question is
how, if at all, can the confusion of whether a person is making a stated or performative
utterance be resolved, in ways other than body cues, vocal cues, and/or loquaciousness?
Your question in part 3 is an interesting one that I happen to be curious about myself. That is, is the theory really equipped to discern the use of ambiguous statements that can either be formulated as constative or as performative? Likewise, how can we discern the force of performative utterances which do not make explicit the force of the performance, except through intuition? Maybe it is of no worry to Austin that the theory has no way to resolve these cases (I can't imagine that there is a rule for what is actually MEANT because what is meant depends largely or even entirely on the speaker's interests). There may be, in principle, a way to resolve what is actually SAID on some of these occasions of ambiguity, but this project is very different from what Austin is trying to do. In any case, I am impressed with the theory's novelty and ingenuity, especially with regard to the idea that by saying something, we often change reality. If I say "I do" at my own wedding under the conventionally recognized conditions, I'm not making a passive true or false description of the state of the wedding, my psychology, or something to that effect. Indeed, when I say "I do", I am changing the state of the wedding, indulging/participating in it.
ReplyDeleteI think Austin would argue that the stated or performed utterances get their meaning based on how they are *used* in the context of a certain situation, and this is what gives the utterances it's meaning and force. For example, when someone says "I do", during their wedding ceremony, they are using the words they utter, in that specific circumstance in order give the utterance the force to become a married couple. Here, the meaning isn't determined by body language or verbal cues, but by the way the speaker used these words in a certain situation. Also, near the end of the paper, Austin argues that the division between stated and performed utterances disolves under his view which is why how a word is used determines the meaning and force of the utterances.
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