Chris Hom critiques and builds off of Hornsby's account of slurs, introducing the institutional basis for them as well as combinatorial externalism, where the derogatory properties are semantically accounted for. This leads to Hom's position on slurs to be able to account for the "shifty and scalar" aspects of slurs.
Liz Camp's argument takes the existing positions on slurs and introduces perspectivalism; the derogatory power of a slur is derived from various feelings of the agent who uses the term. Camp's argument holds slurs to actually refer to something, as evident by those who use them needed to believe or prescribe to a certain belief set.
I found Hom's account more persuasive as he does not rely on the introduction of derogating perspectives (Camp, 2013, 331) instead basing his theory on the philosophy of language. Camp's theory also seems to incorporate many variables and influences into describing an account of slurs, she draws from many previous philosophers/commentators (Camp, 2013 339), and doesn't give a ready account for how these parts come together to form the derogatory aspects of a slur.
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