The verification theory of meaning says that a statement's meaning is determined based on whether or not it can be verified and its truth value. This theory commits descriptive fallacy because it relies on the concept that all sentences are declarative sentences and must be either true or false.
Austin's view on performative utterances avoids committing this fallacy because it is a theory that doesn't attempt to describe or make a description about the world. As far as adding to our knowledge about language, looking at sentences having to do with actions, if I were to utter, "I promise", I am expressing the action of promising by myself, the utterer, which is neither true or false. This is simply an action, but it is still meaningful even though it does not express a truth value or attempt to describe anything about the world.
Regarding Austin's claims, I have a question about a more specific instance: if I were to express an action toward a nonexistent entity, would it still be considered a performative utterance, or would it not be considered a performative utterance due to the fact that the subject that the action is directed toward does not exist?
I would say your statement is still performative, because the existence of the other entity doesn't impact your ability to make the statement. Some of the examples in the reading weren't directed at specific entities, like 'I apologize' or 'I go', so I think nonexistent entities would behave in the same way as no entity at all. Also, because these sentences aren't hard-bound to truth values, we don't run into the same problems as Russell for forcing truth values.
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