I agree with Grice that there is a difference between natural and non-natural meaning, and I agree with where Grice places the dividing lines between the two. Specifically the fact that natural phenomenon like smoke cannot be interpreted to 'mean' something in the way that a person 'means' something while speaking is an interesting observation, and one that English doesn't distinguish normally. I have found it useful to test which 'means' is in play by substituting other words in its place, for example 'shows' and 'explains' for natural and non-natural respectively.
I disagree with Grice's offhanded dismissal of the causal answer to non-natural meaning. He rejects the assertion that there is a causal relationship, by way of "... for x to meanNN something, x must have (roughly) a tendency to produce in an audience some attitude ..." The problem, I think, is that Grice is ignoring the 'roughly' and also trying to apply the theory in the other direction (as in his examples.) It would be much the same as saying that a reference is not a reference because it is pointed to by multiple phrases.
Question 1: Please clarify this sentence: "I propose, for convenience, also to include under the head of natural senses of "mean" such senses of "mean" as may be exemplified in sentences of the pattern "A means (meant) to do so-and-so (by x)," where A is a human agent."
Question 2: Grice states that not all uses of 'mean' fall into one of the two categories. What is an example that doesn't fit?
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