1. The verification theory of meaning could potentially be accused of committing the descriptive fallacy, in that although its main proponents are to move away from a more general sense of 'truth and falsity,' it seems that in order for anything that is said to be 'verified' on any level would naturally require a true/false evaluation in some form or other. The verification theory of meaning perhaps accounts for a complexity in language which may shroud the absolute 'true/false' realm, but that isn't to say that a truth value does not exist.
2. Austin's notion of performative utterances avoids committing the descriptive fallacy, because it shown how in many situations, like betting for example, what may be uttered may not be true or false on any immediately identifiable grounds, because what is being said is what is being done. At one point Austin invokes the old saying "our word is our bond," which I think nicely reflects the ambiguous nature of performative utterances, because while you can say something like 'I will be there tomorrow,' you may intend to be there, but it's not true or false that you've been there yet when you say it (Austin 1961, p223). If anything, Austin shows a clear class of verbal communication not easily susceptible to the descriptive fallacy.
3. This may be a bit of a silly thing to ask, but at the conclusion of the entry Austin mentions that at the very least his work may "clear up some mistakes in grammar" (Austin 1961, 239). This, to me, seems a far-fetched prediction/claim, because for a grammatical error to be universally recognized and revised would require it to be such a hugely overlooked mistake that everyone decides never speak or write that way again. Has that ever even happened?
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