1. The verification theory of meaning could be accused of committing the descriptive fallacy by assuming all sentences can or should be confirmed with empirical observation. It does not take into account any of the sentences that cannot be verified in this way, either because they do not possess a direct truth value or because the answer is not yet known. It also runs counter to the ordinary use of language and our intuitions about sentences.
2. Austin is asserting that we aren't tightly bound to each and every sentence having a firm true/false result. Austin gets fairly close to true/false with happy/unhappy or felicitous/infelicitous senses for the performative utterances, but I don't feel this commits the fallacy. By working within this 'grey area' of truth values while still accounting for the weight of truthiness in these specific speech acts, Austin is able to line up with intuitions without forcing every sentence into a mold it cannot fit.
3. Question: It seems to me that many utterances can be changed to the future tense and then have a clear truth value embedded in them: "I am going to ___", "I will name this boat __". Is this significant, or did it simply change the type of sentence to a more declarative type. Should the truth value of the future tense match with the truthiness (happy, unhappy, etc) of the performative in the present tense?
I thought about your question too... It seems that when that type of future declarative "I will name this boat X" is used, there isn't really an immediate truth value claimed because the action hasn't taken place yet. But then you wonder if it so happens that the action in the sentence is never declared, is it still in 'truth value limbo,' or is it false? Does the statement ONLY have the potential to be true if realized, and will never be false?
ReplyDeleteI think the intuition that performative utterances only occur in the present tense is the right one, because what is being said is being done at that moment. This future declarative seems to be more of a statement...until the statement is realized maybe? I don't know.
I like your explanation of how Austive avoid the truth values by saying "grey area" and how it cannot fit into a "mold"! As for your question, I didn't actually think of that question specifically, but I see how it can affect the utterance's value. Such that if it is changed to the future tense "I will name this boat X", on the other hand what if I were to say "I have named this boat X" instead? It also has some value does it not?
ReplyDelete--Henry Tran
Hi, I didn't think of the question you mentioned when I was reading the article, but now when I think about it, it does seem to be a quite interesting question. Although I don't think I completely understand Austin's argument, I would guess that in this case, Austin may think the things "to happen" are merely thoughts, and thus when we evaluate them, we take them as promises, thoughts, or something of those kinds of a person who says so. We take the the person's thoughts as an action (thinking).
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