Austin's attention to performative utterances avoids committing the descriptive fallacy by avoiding facts altogether in the speech-act so that labels of 'truth' and 'falsity' do not apply. This type of utterance, by Austin's claim, may be nonsense as others might argue, but a particular type of nonsense that is part of a performance or action. This focus on performative utterances adds the idea that language can do more than simply describe and refer to things, but is also capable of performing (or at least being a part of) actions.
"This brings out that you can't just make statements about other people's feelings (though you can make guesses if you like); and there are very many things which, having no knowledge of, not being in a position to pronounce about, you just can't state." (Austin, 1961, p. 236)
In regards to this quote, is Austin stating that any statement you make about something you are in no position to pronounce are just guesses? or that by making such a statement it is something like nonsense?
In regards to your questions, I think metaphysical answers provide a decent response. While we are exposed to our own mind and mental states, we can never interact with other's. What we can interact and comment on are their behaviors, but nothing short of having their mind and experiences as one's own could allow someone to make a statement beyond guesswork. I think this is a significant point of contention for Dualism and Behavioralism, where logical behaviorists think we can make non-guesses regarding other's mental states based on behaviors.
ReplyDeleteI think I mentioned this in class, but I think it does have something to do with John Searle's conception of the epistemic objective and the ontological subjective. We can scientifically speculate on feelings (e.g., make diagnoses), but since we do not actually experience those feelings, it is not something that is ontologically objective rather it is by nature something that can only be known subjectively.
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