Course Reflection

I was most interested when we started talking about language in more context-sensitive approaches. Beginning with the papers on the taxonomy of language and how we can group certain uses of language into different categories to how this even relates to uses of slurs, a lot of the introduction of illocutionary force in language was definitely the most thought-provoking and, in my opinion, most complete understanding of how language works. I think it really captured how much of meaning in language is defined by relationships and structures in play. These readings gave more merit to language as more than a mere abstract symbolization of thought and more as a system of communication that involves people. Thus as a system of communication, these ideas of force offers ways of understanding how relationships and structures that are present within language affect the way language exists in our usage of it,

Course Reflections [Danielle Trzil]

B) The section that stretched my thinking the most was probably indirect speech, implicature, and names. Something I have not really thought of before is how I refer to things and assume those that I speak to know what I'm talking about. Not only did this stretch my thinking on how this is used, but the underlying information behind this. Alternate worlds that Kripke mentions is something I never really thought about explicitly before - it was just an underlying thing that was there but not thought about. When really diving into it, however, it became more clear how there is so much more to language and connected though and descriptions than I have every considered before, and that really impacts the way that I now think about when communicating with others. This helps avoid miscommunication, and is also effective when wanting to dive into theoretically madness and a cycle of "what ifs".

Reflections [Alberto Torrigiotti]

I think that the Putnam paper was probably one of my favorite materials of the course. His Twin Earth thought experiment was very insightful and it turns out that he since revised the experiment to deal with numerous criticisms. He argued in a lecture somewhere and proceeded to show that actually the thought experiment could get rid of Twin Earth entirely and still show that meanings aren't in the head, but that stipulating Twin Earth is just simpler and more elegant. I thought that his thought experiment and subsequent analysis was a particularly ingenuous way to demonstrate that the contents of our brains are not sufficient for determining meanings, and that meanings must also be determined causally by external factors. After all, water (H20) is not water (XYZ) despite there being, to Putnam, no difference in the psychological states of the individuals on Earth and on Twin Earth. There are elements of the example which I believe carry less force than Putnam himself probably believed, but it was still a pleasure to read.

Week 10: Reflection [Rigo Acevedo]

(A) The current topic that we've been discussing relating to slurs and their unusual expressive content has been the most interesting to me. The idea that slurs portray some additional content that appears to scope out and cause offense regardless of the speakers intentions is not knew to me, but I've never considered what properties of slurs might be responsible for this phenomena. I like the idea that slurs have obtained their expressive force through external influences, such as prejudicial institutions or prohibition by a particular group of whom the slur refers. However, what I think is most interesting about these theories is that their structure allows for a potential scientific investigation; a group of brave proprietors of thick semantic externalism may be able to establish an institution of prejudice, against a group of their choosing, with accompanying slurring terms, and see if such a practice is capable of imbuing the chosen terms with additional expressive force.

Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference [Sean Wammer]

I found Kripke's lectures particularly engaging. Of all the theories and frameworks, Kripke's seemed the most plausible. I think it was especially relevant to me because I find myself learning terms for new things almost everyday. My girlfriend introduces me to new ingredients and dishes that I had no name for very frequently. When I use those names, I really do use them just to refer to exactly whatever she intended to refer to. Kripke's criticism of the cluster theory of names is pretty solid, but his theory of reference is the most convincing to me.

--Sean Wammer

Hom and Camp [André Robert]

Chris Hom's account of slurs sees them as a combination of an ideology and a set of institutional practices/ They get their offensive qualities from representing bigoted views and calling on institution practices that support or perpetuate these views.

Liz Camp's account of slurs is that they represent certain perspectives. When they are used, they bring to the hearer's attention those bigoted perspectives which is why any use or mention of slurs is so uncomfortable to the hearer: in some sense they feel complicit in the perspective being referenced by the slur.

I find Camp's account slightly more compelling (but not completely accurate) than Hom's. I think there is some sense in which slurs represent ideologies and institutional practices, but at the same time I think this idea can be captured by perspectives. I do think that intuitions about how slurs can "scope out" are accurate and that this can be captured by perspectivalism. My only worry about Camp's account is that she does not provide an explanation as to how the perspectives represented by slurs are part of their semantic meaning, which seems to be the case and I want to know how Camp would account for it.

Hom vs Camp [Hui Yang]

Hom prefers semantic strategy to explain slurs, which means slurs are bad words in every context of utterance. He first rejects three plausible formulations of the pragmatic strategy, seemingly believing they are too vague to be a principled analysis. He then tries to prove in his paper that words like “nigger” themselves contain bad meaning in all possible contexts. 

In Camp’s point of view, slurs contain two parts: the objects they point out, and the perspectives from a certain group of people’s towards such objects. She points out, notably, ones cannot reject the slurs without accepting the designated meaning of them at the first place. That is probably why, before she starts her explanation, she first apologizes for using plenty of slurs in her paper that may offend some readers. 

I prefer Camp’s view, although I am not completely on her side. I disagree with Hom’s rejection of the pragmatic strategy for they cannot provide a principled analysis, and how he believes words like “nigger” has to be offensive in all utterances (considering the examples I gave last week about how “nigger” is used in a positive way in the black/color communities). I do not think something can be wrong only because it cannot provide a principled analysis, because I do not believe there must be a principled analysis for everything, and in order to make such claim, you need to first prove why there has to be a principled analysis for the things we are talking about.

Hom and Camp [Yuchen Jiang]

Hom has given the his account of Cominatorial Externalism, which emphasizes on the semantic distinction between slurs and their counterparts and the ideological practices of racism as what give slurs' their meaning. Hom believes that slurs is semantically different from its natural counterparts which means that they are filled with different meaningful contents, and referring someone with a slur is different from referring the same person by using a normal word. Also, Hom thinks the negative content of slurs is determined by social institutions, which means application of slurs inherently incorporates negative or racist contents.

Camp attempts to give a perspectival account for the use of slurs. She believes that the negative content
present by slurs is presented from a certain perspective. This means that when using a slur, the speaker has
show the allegiance to a certain perspective. Thus, Camp's account implies that the use of slurs tie to certain
thoughts or stereotypes of people, which cannot really be managed as words can.

I think it is the weakness for both case that they both left rooms for use of non-slur yet language toward
targeted groups. Both account has somewhat hinted that slurs are just a conventional way to blatantly express certain  negative content, which gives some space to use of normal words to express same amount of contempt attitude.  

Hom and Camp [Gabriel Debacker]

Hom argues there are two strategies explaining how slurs work: a semantic strategy and a pragmatic strategy. The semantic strategy argues that derogatory content is a part of a slurs meaning and cannot be separated from it, so that any use of the slur expresses its meaning. The pragmatic strategy argues that derogatory content is a part of how a slur is used, relying on context to determine for what purpose the slur is used and if it is derogatory. Hom proposes an account of slurs called combinatorial externamlism that says the derogatory meaning of a slur is determined by an external source (the relations of the speaker to the world and their speech community) usually in the form of some existent, racist attitude towards certain groups. A slur then is something that expresses the complex, negative properties held in connection with such racist ideas.

Camp says that slurs contain some meaning, unlike expressives like 'damn', and bring into a conversation some amorphous thing, some perspective, that is tied to the slur. According to Camp a perspective is a representational thing that signifies "the speaker's social, psychological, and/or emotional relation to that semantic value" (335). A slur then is something that signals a commitment to a perspective that represents some negative properties about a certain group.

I have little experience with slurs, and so I feel my opinion here holds little weight, but I found Hom's account of slurs more compelling because he gives a more detailed explanation of his reasoning. Hom defines more clearly how and when a slur has derogatory force, along with his other "uncontroversial features of how epithets function in ordinary, natural language" as listed on page 426. Camp's explanation seems more a feeling imparted by her use of examples and attempts to trap that in the idea of a 'perspective' that is presented.

Hom and Camp [Henry Tran]

The main idea behind Chris Hom's account of slurs is that he believes that the semantic argument with slurs fares better than the pragmatic in many ways. He introduces us with combinatorial externalism as he states is, "the view that racial epithets express complex, socially constructed, negative properties determined in virtue of standing in the appropriate external, causal connection with racist institutions",(Hom 2008, 431) or in other words, slurs are given pejorative meanings by the institutes whom uses them and have a certain force. Which then brings us to shifty and scalar terms, such that slurs may be derogatory in some context or have variation in force.

The main feature that Liz Camp accounts for is that there is a perspective behind the slurs, as using perspectivalism. She attributes slurs not to truth conditions but the way they are used, serving only to express emotional state of a speaker. Such that a speaker using a slur has an attributed force (perspective) towards a certain group in which that slur refers to in certain contexts.

Comparing the two from what I understand, I am compelled to lean towards Camp because I feel that it makes sense that slurs are meant from the perspective of the speaker. It is in contrast with the meaning of the slur because as I see it, there is may be no pejorative force at all if used in a certain perspective. That makes me also think about Hom's view as closely related, therefore I can't discount that slurs have a variation in force and are 'shifty'.

Camp Horn [Anthony Baker]

Horn discusses both semantic and pragmatic approaches for evaluating the derogatory content of racial epithets, and presents his own evaluative account called combinatorial externalism (CE). CE is a semantic theory in principle, and as he puts it "the view that racial epithets express complex, socially constructed, negative properties determined in virtue of standing in the appropriate external, causal connection with racist institutions" (Horn, 2008 431). This view is considered more semantic than pragmatic, partly because threats that use racial epithets have an intrinsic harm to them.

Camp holds a perspectival view which takes into account how the pejorative force of different slurs is ultimately beyond a mere relative semantic understanding of the words, and has take into account the individual psychological aspects of both slur-speaker and slur-receiver. Camp seems to be under the impression that a perspectival understanding of a slur is contingent on understanding the respective semantic role of the slur.

Intuitively, I like Camp's account because of its pragmatic perspectival considerations, however, Horn does acknowledge this intuition to side with pragmatic standpoints in the beginning of his writing, and proceeds to hold a largely semantic standpoint. In a way, the semantic macro-social considerations held by Horn sort of align with the perceived individual (micro-social?) pragmatic views of Camp. In virtue of Horn's acknowledgement here, I think I agree more with him.

Hom and Camp: [Korey Nuehs]

Christ Hom says that slurs derogatory content cannot be removed from the slur such that the speaker can cancel it, but that the slur can fail to derogate in certain situations. The Slurs ability to derogate relies on the institutions of racism that are associated with any given slur and their current power and influence over that group. A slur then states that group A has negative properties and that due to these negative properties ought to be subject to certain negative practices.

Slurs are expressions of the speaker’s relation to certain ideologies or perspectives expressed by a group of individuals towards another group indicated by the slur. Also, slurs do not in themselves express contemptuous feelings but are only contemptuous because the perspective you commit to by the use of the slur is often contemptuous or negative.

I find Camp’s solution more appealing because I think she provides a better account on how slurs become derogatory in the first place. Her theory also seems to account for how slurs are not always associated with a feeling of contempt, such as, how the n— word in the 18-19^th century was for many just a standard way of speaking about a group without a feeling of contempt (though, this might seem somewhat controversial; I think the word 'negro' also fits into this picture as well). Also, her point on slurs ability to ‘prime’ the audience is very interesting, and I think explains how forms of prejudice can spread so quickly.

Camp Hom [Drew Owens]

Hom suggests that historical and contemporary racist institutions are the external source for the derogatory content of slurs. That is, the pejorative force of a slur is semantically linked with the relevant racist practices. When a speaker utters a slur, they are expressing the negative, socially constructed, aspects of the racist institution, as experienced within their speech community.

Camp's view maintains that within a speaker's use of a slur is a declaration of belonging to a perspective. This perspective's core and structure inform a speaker's thoughts regarding a specific group of people. In the case of slurs, this perspective is structured so that when indexed, it relays both the speaker's difference from the specified group, and at a fundamental level, the speakers lack of respect for that group.

I find that I am partial to differing aspects of both approaches. Hom's external, causal source of racist institutions seems a better foundation for the beliefs which contribute to Camp's internal perspective. Camp's perspective is necessary because it incorporates the internal ordering of beliefs, rather then suggesting that the force of a slur is only determined by the external social factors experienced in a speech community. This hybrid allows for a slur's pejorative force to range (or not) between interlocutors of both similar or dissimilar experiences of the relevant racist institutions.

Hom and Camp [Raphael Nunziata]

 1. Hom’s account of slurs is that there  meaning comes from the derogatory content of the epithet and also the uses of the epithet, so it is an account that is mostly semantic but has a pragmatic strategy as well. This view that Hom advocates for, expresses that slurs stand by social constructs and there meaning corresponds from racist institutions.

2. Camp’s account of slurs is that they are based by perspective and argues this by the context, not the sound of such words or emotion put into the word. Furthermore,  Camp’s argues that these slurs have a referring facet to them, because of beliefs synonymous with the slur. She also highlights how slurs are mechanism to communicate feelings aside from contempt, but as sometimes a feeling of positivity.

3.While Camp’s account is compelling by accounting for more of the syntax of the word, I lean toward Hom’s view. Hom’s account looks at both the semantic and pragmatic strategy and takes both to make a better theory though looking at the content of the slur and meaning based by their racist institutions. Although Camp's view accounts for the content of slurs, Hom's is more wholesome and more persuasive by looking at the history and standings of slurs. 

Hom and Camp on slurs [Sam Hinderaker]

1. Hom is leaning towards and exploring an interpretation of these slurs that he calls the semantic strategy. This says that part of the actual meaning/definition of these slurs is the offense they cause. He believes that this is very context dependent however, and so the meanings of these words is to some degree determined by external forces.

2. Liz Camp is addressing the idea that it is difficult to disagree with a sentence that contains a slur without endorsing it yourself, because they remain offensive somewhat regardless of how they are used (they remain forceful in "complex constructions") She addresses what she calls the "other component" of slurs, which is separate from the predicated words, and its ability to force agreement in speakers in situations that other words (even other taboo words) don't seem to.

3. I find the first more compelling, mostly because I like the idea of the use of definitions of words being generated outside the speaker's head (which to me seems like an interesting but strong argument for the way slurs are often used) and because I agree that it seems that these slurs depend heavily on context to draw their meaning.

Hom and Camp [Alex Rowell]

Hom's account of slurs attempts to explain that slurs have partially hidden assertions within them that tend to have a negative context. Hom argues that slurs contain the non-pejorative counterpart as well as a series of traits and consequences that the members of the NPC should feel due to being the slur in question. Hom also highlights that the force of a slur is directly related to how strong the institutions that would back this slur are at a given point in time.

Camp's account of slurs argues for a perspective-based approach that is packaged in to each slur. Camp explains that slurs contain the perspective of a particular group in judging another group, and assign weight to specific attributes of the NPC group the slur points to, causing a hearer to focus in on these attributes and become complicit in the statements about this group which they may not consciously agree with. Camp focuses on the idea that this hidden bias is something that we intuitively reject, which explains the negative reaction non-bigoted listeners have to slurs.

I am not ready to give up on Hom's account, as it feels like it gives a clean and truth-evaluable way of dealing with slurs in general. However, Camp's account comes from a very intuitive and simple place that can explain the shifty and scalar nature of slurs just as well as Hom's account. I tend to lean toward Hom's account as it addresses how institutions influence slurs, and it also explains why slurs cannot be cancelled. However, Camp's account seems very strong and to me only falters in the area of truth evaluation.

Hom and Camp [Arthur Toland-Barber]

A part of what Hom talks about is how slurs are content dependent and they can’t be separated from that aspect, and he argues that there are more semantic than pragmatic. This is to say that slurs will always be degrading no matter when they are said, but they can vary on scope and harshness depending on the situation. The situations are derived from the racial institutions from where they are said, such as southern US compared the north-east US.

Camp claims that slurs are based upon perspectives and that they function differently than normal words. Slurs can just be heard by the listener to provoke an associated perspective that makes the listener consider the word from the view of the speaker, which states a certain belief system. While on the other hand, cursing words can add content without displaying a certain belief system (and are thus different from slurs). 

I believe that neither has the complete picture but they both have merits that explain certain questions about slurs. Hom’s theory accounts for how slurs can vary by intensity, and Camp shows how slurs have an inherit perspective that come with them. Both of these thoughts I believe apply to slurs and their linguistics value.

Hom and Camp [Christina Sanchez]

Hom brings up the idea that racial slurs are either semantic, which he argues more on the side for, or pragmatic. He also argues that slurs always have a negative connotation regardless of context, and these derogatory terms get their force by their meaning and racist institutions.

Camp argues that slurs get their negative force based on the perspective of the user. The force comes from what the user is implying rather than always being deemed negative. Camp also mentions that the negativity of a slur is dependent upon the relationship between the user and the target.

Given these two takes on slurs, I agree with parts of both, but I have to say I agree more so with Camp. This is because I can use derogatory words toward my best friends, such as calling her a "bitch" or something along those lines, and I do not mean that in a negative way, and she knows that. Because that is just how we talk to each other sometimes and neither of us mean anything negative by it, I have to go with the side that deals with the perspective of the user.

Camp time with Hom Sandwich [Danielle Trzil]

1. Hom first introduces the idea that racial epithets are generally believed to be either semantic (the derogatory meaning is expressed in every use of the word) or pragmatic (the derogatory meaning is based off of how they are used). While he merits each theory their due respect, he argues much more towards the semantic side. In the end, racial epithets express properties that are derived from racist institutions and carry the potential for being deeply hurtful and threatening, and this cannot be shrugged away with context.

2. Camp firmly argues that slurs are rhetorically powerful, and depend heavily on perspective. Using this treatment of slurs, she counterbalances the effects of the systematic effects and those that are left open to the conversation. She points how how we can't just take into consideration the semantic views all the while ignoring the role of the speaker and the attitudes they bring with the usage of the word.

3. I think that both arguments have a really great point, and honestly I think both can be true at the same time. This can be seen in example for when I called my roommate a, "Bitch" or "Hoe bag". I mean it as a term of endearment, and from my perspective and my roommate this is not a derogatory term or offensive. That being said, that does not change the fact that from an institutional perspective and those who do not know us, this would probably be seen as bullying or offensive.

Horn and Camp

Chris Hom argues that slurs, or racial epithets, are not pragmatic (as many people believe to be the case), but rather each slur is semantic, meaning the hatred that comes through each word is built into the word itself. Although Hom does state that both theories have issues, he believes that the semantic strategy “fares better on a number of criteria” (416).

Camp on the other hand argues that slurs do get their hatred from the perspectives of the one who gives the slur, rather than the word itself. Rather than the truth statement of the word, camp is focused more on the attitude that the word is intended depending on the one who uses it.

I agree more with Camp, who seems to argue that the derogatory slurs are derived from the perspective of the person using the word, rather than the word itself. There have been words that are now currently used which are considered to be slurs; however, in the past they had conveyed different meaning and was not considered to be universally derogatory. I agree that slurs are context dependent and words gain their meaning from the perspective or attitude that the person who uses it.

Hom and Camp [Alberto Torrigiotti]

Hom introduces combinatorial externalism (a semantic theory) because he sees no way for pragmatic minimalism to account for certain properties of slurs, and rejects radical contextualism for its wholesale skepticism toward semantic explanations. Probably the biggest difference between Hom's theory and Camp's is what makes Hom's theory externalist, i.e., that the force and meaning of the derogatory content in slurs is causally dependent upon the institutions that inform those slurs. Hom takes combinatorial externalism to be a sort of natural development of semantic externalism applied to slurs.

Camp's theory does not really set out to argue for or against semantic/pragmatic approaches to the study of slurs, and doesn't really engage with many of Hom's arguments directly or specifically. She wants to argue that what gives slurs their rhetorical force must be something like an allegiance to some perspective; perspectivalism is primarily concerned with the contributions of the speaker and recipient in uses of slurs. By using some slur, we signal our "affiliation with a way of thinking and feeling" about the targeted group, which is why listeners and bystanders may feel complicit simply in virtue of allowing themselves to entertain these thoughts and feelings, or engage with them on any level at all. (Camp 2013, 340)

I was initially convinced by Hom's sentiment that slurs ought not to be treated on an ad hoc basis because there is a sense in which it would seem superficial or arbitrary to treat slurs as exceptions or as so different from anything else in language that it ought to be approached uniquely, but I don't think I feel this way anymore. This change has led me to have more sympathy for Camp's view, particularly with regard to unique perspectival considerations for slurs, and though there certainly are incompatibilities between Hom's and Camp's theories, I think that there is room for them to be combined into a better overarching theory. Altogether, I probably have to favor Hom's theory because it is clearer, more comprehensive, gives deeper explanations for truth conditions, and includes elements or adaptations from semantic externalism which resemble my own view.

Horn and Camp [Adam Plesser]

1. Hom argues that slurs derive their derogatory force from their meaning, which is defined primarily by institutions in place amongst the speakers of a language. Horn's externalist semantics helps clarify how slurs can change in meaning or degree of offensiveness. 
2. Camp argues that slurs derive derogatory force from context; the force comes from the speaker's implication that they are affirming a certain perspective. Racial slurs, for example, derive derogatory force from their implication that the speaker endorses the hatred of the race in question as a consequence of their race.
3. I prefer Horn's account because it better explains how words can have derogatory force even when we use great care to make clear that we are not endorsing their meaning. The existence of the phrase "the N word" is difficult to account for on Camp's account. She might claim that such a phrase is merely a more convenient way of pointing to the original term, but making clear that the speaker does not endorse its perspective, but this explanation feels too facile; intuition strongly suggests that the phrase does not merely exist for the sake of convenience. 

Hom and Camp [Hayley Thompson]

Hom argues that slurs always carry an inherent negative connotation regardless of how, when, and why they are used. Even when used by the target group, or in a 'positive' manner, these words still carry their pejorative power, which these groups may try to reclaim as their own.

Camp argues a perspectivalist view of slurs, which holds that the pejorativity of a word depends on the speakers relationship with a target group. The word is only pejorative if the speaker intends it as such or does not have an inside or close relation with the target group.

I tend to side with Camp over Hom, since words such as 'queer' may lose their negative connotations in certain groups and environments. While Hom (and Hornsby) makes a good point that groups may try to reclaim words for use of the power that comes with their pejorativity, I believe over time the words become normalized and start to lose their negative connotations. Since Seattle is a largely liberal city, many of us Seattlites know people who identify as 'queer' if we do not ourselves. The term, at least in Seattle, seems to have become so commonplace, that the 'queer' is acceptable or even preferred term to refer to the lgbtqia community and its members, regardless of whether the speaker is one, as long as its not said with negative context or attitude. In other words, the majority of Seattle has a relationship with the target group that warrants a non-pejorative use of the word. In more conservative locations, the word may be pejorative regardless of who says it.

My Perspective on Camp and What Horn's Article Means

1. Horn is arguing for an account of slurs that locates its power in its meaning. By meaning, we are referring to intrinsic properties of the word itself. This is to say that the nature of slurs being derogatory is not primarily due to the context of the speaker but some actual force or institution that is inherit to the word itself which makes it derogatory.

2. Camp argues on grounds of perspectivism. Camp states that usage of a slur is to take on a certain kind of attitude that reflects the derogatory sentiment that usage of a slur implies. To make a claim that uses a slur is not merely based in truth or falsity but the making of the claim and agreement with it depends on the perspective one has in the matter.

3. I tend to lean towards Horn's semantic account of slurs, because it actually seems to provide a general framework for how words have meaning. To say that the derogatory nature is intrinsic in the way Horn describes is not to imply that words or slurs have some natural meaning but that the words come to have meaning is through some force or relationship. In the cases of slurs, the derogatory nature lies not in an individual's hateful attitudes but rather the word's power comes to exist as something derogatory in nature as it exists as part of a derogatory force or structure.

Hom & Camp [Jonathan Kosaka]

Chris Hom critiques and builds off of Hornsby's account of slurs, introducing the institutional basis for them as well as combinatorial externalism, where the derogatory properties are semantically accounted for. This leads to Hom's position on slurs to be able to account for the "shifty and scalar" aspects of slurs.

Liz Camp's argument takes the existing positions on slurs and introduces perspectivalism; the derogatory power of a slur is derived from various feelings of the agent who uses the term. Camp's argument holds slurs to actually refer to something, as evident by those who use them needed to believe or prescribe to a certain belief set.

I found Hom's account more persuasive as he does not rely on the introduction of derogating perspectives (Camp, 2013, 331) instead basing his theory on the philosophy of language. Camp's theory also seems to incorporate many variables and influences into describing an account of slurs, she draws from many previous philosophers/commentators (Camp, 2013 339), and doesn't give a ready account for how these parts come together to form the derogatory aspects of a slur.

Hom and Camp [Rigo Acevedo]

1. Hom presents an argument for what he calls Combinatorial Externalism, which suggests that racial epithets gain their ability to express socially constructed, negative properties by standing in a certain causal relationship with racial institutions. These racial institutions are composed of ideologies and certain sets of practices that distinguish themselves and their view. It is with these distinguished views and the size of these racial institutions that endow racial epithets with their expressive content and strength.

2. Camp presents an argument for Perspectivism, which suggests that racial epithets gain their expressive content and power through the identification that a speaker signals their allegiance to a certain perspective. Adopting a perspective requires that a speaker notice and remember particular features of a group, to a point in which these features become salient, along with holding the believe that some features of a group are central to their identity. For slurs, perspectives hold negative intentions and beliefs and it is this cognitive position that is conveyed when a slur is exclaimed.

3. I find Hom's argument to be more compelling. Both seem to present arguments that the expressive content that is expressed when slurs are said or mentioned appear to come from some external source or causal relationship. However, I feel that Camp's perspective(ism) doesn't seem to exactly account for why slurs hold their expressive power when mentioned, and not said. Regardless of the intent, or true perspective of a speaker it appears as if slurs still hold their expressive power and ability to cause a strong feeling in all listeners- whether the listener is of the target group, or whether the speaker is merely mentioning the slur.

Horn and Camp on slurs [Evan Cottingham]

1. In his article, Horn discusses the inadequacy of both the semantic and pragmatic strategy of explaining the meaning behind racial slurs. In doing so, Horn advocates the combinatorial externalism view. The CE view suggests that the meaning of racial slurs are derived from the racist institutions they connected to and the negative properties they are intended to express.

2. Camp argues that racial slurs are more related to the perspectives of the user of those slurs. She states that slurs are used to communicate the strong negative perspectives towards a specific group. In this way, slurs are used to derogate rather than simply express contempt.

3. Although I find Camp's thoughts about slurs being used to derogate compelling, I agree more with Horn's combinatorial externalism viewpoint. I think that combinatorial externalism does more to account for the history behind slurs and how that contributes to their meaning by connecting slurs to racist institutions.

Asserting the Negation versus Denial [Ryan Tarbet]

Asserting the Negation versus Denial:

                In another paper authored in part by Elisabeth Camp, the subject of my last blog post, and John Hawthorne, they explore the case of “like prefixed sarcasm” such as ‘Like that’s a good idea’.  One of their core claims in this essay is that in contrast to bare-sarcasm, ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm focuses on expressing the illocutionary force of denial.  Take for example the sarcastic utterances of:

1.       1. ‘Like that’s a good idea”

2.       2. ‘That’s a brilliant idea’  

1.’s focal content sounds like it is mocking anyone who would utter that sentence more than it is asserting the negation of the idea, ‘that’s a bad idea’.  The way they put it is that ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm “denies the possibility that the embedded sentence could be true” while asserting the negation “commits the speaker to the truth of its negation” (Camp and Hawthorne, 12).  It is in this regard that Camp and Hawthorne see pretense as playing a role in sarcastic utterances. 

                Additionally, Camp and Hawthorne state that in contrast to the paradigm cases of sarcasm the implicature of ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm is undeniable (given that they call their illocutionary force ‘denial’ it is important to not confuse the un-deniability of ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm with the denial, the mocking effect of its use).  Deniability is directly analogous to Grice’s cancelability which is to say that after an utterance of 1., a speaker cannot genuinely state that they really meant that the idea was good.  Whereas in 2. that could be the case.  To this end, I would classify ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm as a conventional implicature rather than a conversational one. 

                What is interesting to me is to think about how these are different.  It has been difficult for me to separate these ideas of cancelability and denial.  To some extent I find that this distinction tracks how we use sarcasm on certain occasions but at the same time I am not certain that mocking a view by using ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm translates to denying the possibility that it could be true.  Also, it is not clear how that is different from asserting the negation.  Anyways, I am very curious to hear what others may think is going on here. 

                Camp, E. and Hawthorne, J. (2008).  Sarcastic ‘Like’: A Case Study in the Interface of Syntax and Semantics.  Philosophical Perspectives 22:1: Language and Logic, ed. J. Hawthorne (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008).

Sarcasm's Inversion of Meaning [Ryan Tarbet]

Sarcasm’s Inversion of Meaning:

Is sarcasm an assertion of the negation of the semantic content of a sentence and/or is it an expression of an evaluative attitude of a position?  Are those two things different?  Take for example the sarcastic utterances of:

1.       “Thanks for holding the door”

2.       “I never  eat cake frosting directly from the container”

First off, there’s the question as to whether or not you consider 1. and 2. sarcastic but what I want to discuss is how Elisabeth Camp approaches the inversion of meaning that occurs in sarcasm. 

                Camp makes a case for sarcasm in a way that mediates a semanticist approach, one which takes sarcasm to be a syntactic operator indicated by speaker-tone, and an expressivist approach, one that disregards the compositionality of an utterance in favor of the illocutionary force.  She argues that sarcasm, similar to metaphor, embodies a function in our use of language that cannot entirely be reduced to “what is said” nor to the illocutionary dimension of speech.  To me this seems like an obvious move, especially given that indirect speech as we have viewed it through Grice is an analysis of semantic content, context and illocutionary force.  Ultimately, the view attempts to break the traditional view that sarcasm is more than the negation of its semantic content.

                So, for example, is 1. Saying that the speaker is not thankful? Well, yes but that doesn’t seem to be the full story. 1. More accurately is drawing attention to the fact that the audience didn’t save the speaker a seat. It communicates the (passive aggressive) perlocutionary effect of shaming or embarrassment.  So, it seems like this utterance isn’t merely asserting “It’s not the case that I thank you for…” but rather it is drawing attention to where that utterance would be appropriate and contrasting it with what happened.   Here, Camp draws attention to some ignored instances of sarcasm where the inversion isn’t strictly semantic but takes place on a perlocutionary or illocutionary level.  Camp argues that much of the discussion on sarcasm has revolved around assertions, something like 2., and we ought to extend our gaze to more perplexing examples of verbal irony.

                I take her account of the inversion of perlocutionary effect or illocutionary force quite accurate in how we use sarcasm.  Does this account make sense?     

Camp, E.. (2012). Sarcasm, Pretense, and The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Noûs, 46(4), 587–634. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41682690

Hornsby on Slurs [Alberto Torrigiotti]

I agree with Hornsby that one can refer to someone through the use of a derogatory word D without necessarily being committed to condemning that particular person for embodying all the characteristics of D. The example of 'Boche' is used to bring out the point that in applying a derogatory word D to a person, she need not believe that that person manifests every bit of ideology that informs D. (Hornsby 2001, 9) Hornsby argues, I think correctly, that users of derogatory words often acquire these words in their social language "quite easily", and that the acquisition and use of derogatory words are not necessarily a reflection of endorsing the ideological underpinnings of the word's history,

I am not very much convinced by anything said in the paragraph subtitled "Useless Words", so I find it difficult to take this assumption as a starting point. For instance, I see no reason why one cannot accept a claim that uses a derogatory word in the same way that he can accept a claim that uses a slang (even if the slang word is not one he endorses). (Hornsby 2001, 2-3) Now, of course, I understand what Hornsby means when she says this, and in many cases, an upstanding moral person will have no engagement with claims which use derogatory words as constituents. In these cases, the words are "useless" only in the sense that it would be "useless" to try to climb over an infinitely high wall. In other words, and I think Hornsby must agree, they are not useless if by "useless" we mean serving no function or inconsequential. I think it would have been helpful if Hornsby spent more time defining "useless" instead of taking the assumption that it is unproblematic and virtually universally accepted that derogatory words are useless.

What does Hornsby have to say about people who include derogatory words in their vocabulary? Are these people so morally reprehensible if they so much as "endorse" a claim that uses a derogatory word? Does she believe that claims including a derogatory word can only be entertained or engaged with seriously by neglecting some morally obvious truth, say a failure to recognize the ethical ramifications of prescribing to derogatory vocabulary? What separates the derogatory content of a word like 'bitch' from a word like 'buffoon' except for its severity?

H@!&$by [Drew Owens]

I am inclined to agree with Hornsby's handling of the Inferentialist view of derogatory words. It seems that the use of a derogatory word cannot carry with it some implicit intention to carry every aspect of ideology related to that word. If this were the case, casual use of such words would seem to not function int the way such use does. This would be due in part to this observation by Hornsby; "If speakers involvement with the ideology went so deep as it would need to in order to be implicit in their very use of words, then common understandings would be difficult to preserve (Hornsby, 2001, 137)."

I have trouble with Hornsby's stance on the uselessness of words. Perhaps I am not understanding her use of uselessness, but I think that derogatory words do have some use. This may be erring to much on the side of pragmatic use, but implementation of such words can often be an attempt to evoke some emotion. This is only one example, even with such a limited counterargument I find that I am not convinced by Hornsby's position.

I guess my question is, in regards to the example of the teenager's use of slang, is it actually that different of a barrier? It seems that this result could be attained if we view the barrier as being set in sociolinguistic terms. In some situations that barrier would not exist, given the correct environs and circumstances perhaps you would say "wicked" (or "golly" or whatever).

On Derogatory Words [Yuchen Jiang]

I really agree Hornsby's emphasis on the involvement of speaker as a crucial factor in concerning question about the meaning of a word in a given sentence. I take his investigation as a way to give objections to views that regard meanings of word as independent to the speaker. Moreover, I also think his account that address the use of derogatory word as a gesture that requires a interpreter to grasp captures the main point that "practice of language ... [is not] a heartless mechanical affair (141)."

I regard his point as highlighting  the natural use of language as a means of perform exchange of ideas and emotions between different individuals. Yet it captures only one perspective of language, language can also be used as a way of describe and recording things, and the origin of derogatory words may rest here. Therefore, even derogatory words have various perspectives, and it may be the case that some derogatory words indeed have another life in describing and recording other than merely producing a gesture.

In this way, I think Hornsby's account regard derogatory words would be more concise if he shows enough awareness of how some special derogatory words can be used neutrally and how some words can occasionally be used as derogatory words.

Hornsby [Gabriel Debacker]

Hornsby's conclusion about language being a "mechanical affair" without speakers proved his point about words and their connotations to me more than any of his other arguments. Words can have meanings of their own, but only because of what we attribute to them as speakers and audience members ourselves.

Hornsby's account of how these words are 'useless' and the reason why certain viewpoints cannot account for them seems lacking to me. The examples were just a little weak.

I'm not sure I completely understand what Hornsby means by calling derogatory terms 'useless,' but if it means that the word itself is not necessary for speech (because of alternative terms or what have you) then I would have to argue that a lot of words are 'useless' based on the same logic.

Hornsby [Anthony Baker]

I agree with the idea given by Hornsby exhibited in this quote as "When words--racist words, say-- have been used too often in a way that purports to validate the attitudes they impart, there is nothing to be done except to find different words" (Hornsby 133). This highlights natural flux of words and their meanings. It seems to sum up well how words, especially derogatory ones, can at one point time mean to convey a certain attitude, but a totally new one at a later point. However this does depend heavily on a locality context, as mentioned by Hornsby earlier on.

I can't say that there is any fundamental part of Hornsby that I disagree with, however if I were to quibble with one bit, it would be her idea that "a word with connotations carries those connotations" when put into use (140). Directly claiming this seems to bring about a contrary idea about how each person's understanding of a word, and its respective connotations may vary, even locally, so its hard to know which 'connotations' being communicated are in common from one conversation to the next.

Hornsby claims at one point that "the contours of the space of possible acts done with sentences containing particular derogatory words are discernible only from the standpoint of someone who can know what the words mean," and I would like to object on a small and fairly shaky ground, that while being in a position to understand the words requires that you know what they ALL mean, discerning some contours of this space I'd claim don't require that you know what the words mean (135). Perhaps some foreign derogatory word is spoken a certain way each time it's said to you (say the utterer yells and laughs while saying it), it follows that you may understand that you are being insulted, and that you'd respond the same way if it were to happen again.

Hornsby on slurs [Samuel Hinderaker]

1) "Without the postures, movements, and expressions of talking human bodies, the practice of language would be a heartless mechanical affair, and very different from how it actually is" I really like this quote and strongly agree with it; Hornsby recognizes that the intent and context surrounding the use of a slur is important in considering the meaning it has.

2)"But if this is what Hare intends, then he is denying that words are ever useless. In finding a word useless, we assume that we are not in a position to mean by it something different from that which those who use it mean." (133) I disagree with this - there have been many instances in the past of the meaning of a word changing or acquiring new connotations through use. Though it may be difficult, especially with a slur, the possibility of changing the meaning of one does seem possible.

3) For a question, I'm not sure I understand Hornsby's rejection of the "doog" example (on page 132) because she responds to the idea of a purely descriptive word by saying "But it does not seem we can [introduce such a word]."

Hornsby on Slurs [Hui Yang]

I agree with Hornsby on the people who use "derogatory words" do not necessarily express hatred, although it is the case sometimes. I can add even more examples from other situations on top of the ones in the article. For instance, the word "nigger", or typed as "nigga" nowadays, are commonly used to mean something good, especially within the people with color. I have some black and Latino friends, who call each other "my nigga", and I see things like "only love niggas" on my Facebook newsfeed all the time. I have to admit that I do have friends warning me do not use this word (just in case I am a FOB/fresh out of a boat and thus do not know the cultural norms) because I am not black or Latina/the ones can use this word. Still, I have Asian American friends who grew up in the black community use the word "nigga" comfortably. As "whore" is the negative version of the word "prostitute", it seems okay to call a girlfriend "my dirty little whore" sometimes (in "you know" kind of situations).

I do not agree with Hornsby though, on her definition of "derogatory words" though. I particularly do not agree with her practice of using Oxford dictionary as sort of justification. Yes, dictionary "defines" meanings of words in common sense, but not in the discussion of the philosophy of words. Dictionaries usually are revised once in a while, but the way we interpret languages should be something timeless and universal. I also do not agree with her using "uselessness" to call derogatory words. I admit that when I say "I fucking love chocolate," I never indicate there is something sexual between me and chocolate, nor I am angry at/hate chocolate, still this sentence somehow indicates a different level of love than merely say "I love chocolate." It emphasizes the word "love" in fact in this particular sentence. Here is a good example why I think some derogatory words are not useless: http://www.lionking.org/~mirri/Intro/TAFTMGUOTWFIASS.htm

I have something more like a question than an objection for Hornsby: when people use those sensitive words instead of the neutral versions, they can say they do not intend to offend others. Also, there are always people offended no matter what you say. Just see any popular Facebook posts and try to find one without any negative comments! So are the people who use the language or the people who hear it the ones deciding if it conveys hatred? If the intention decides, then it is like saying one always knows himself/herself the best, which is not always the case (e.g. you go to see a psychologist).

In the end, I have to share a sentence from a meme I saw yesterday on Facebook (well, it might not be relevant but totally related), "when you say f**k instead of fuck, God still knows what you mean, and he thinks you are a pussy." Meow~~

Hornsby [Henry Tran]

1. Something that I agreed with Hornsby on slurs is how they were described, there are neutral counterparts aside from the derogatory parts of the use of the words. Such as the fact that "Nigger" could mean something not derogatory to some users. For example meaning something like dark skinned or African. In another case as Hornsby states that "Politically active African Americans use the word ‘niggers’ of themselves" and "enables a word to take on a new meaning"(Hornsby 2001, 134) in account of a different attitude of use. So it seems to me that there are multiple counterparts to slurs rather than just the derogatory.

2. Something that I disagreed with in Hornsby's account of slurs is the uselessness of slurs, specifically when it is said that "..there are other words that suit us better" then derogatory words. I disagree because it isn't the words themselves that give their derogatory meanings but the ways speakers use it. There seems to be a mentality that those slurs are hurtful and discriminating because of how people use them.

3. Attributing to the last disagreement, the thing that I had an objection about in my mind was the fact that Hornsby said that slurs were useless. When people use slurs they put forth an attitude by using those derogatory words, usually anger or harmful intent. Therefore I question how Hornsby sees how derogatory words are "useless" when in fact they hold a emotion behind them.

Hornsby [Rigo Acevedo]

1. I agree with Hornsby that context is an important consideration for the full evaluation of the meaning of a statement, especially when considering slurs. The various gestures that are expressed by individuals appear to add something to meaning or intent beyond what is explicitly stated, and in some cases, can completely alter how the listener interprets our statements.

2. I don't believe that derogatory words are 'useless' as Hornsby suggests. To say that there are neutral counterparts to all derogatory words seems counter intuitive because many would argue that derogatory words seem to possess their own distinct meaning or intent (all variations of intent) that is specific to their utterance.  The utterance of a derogatory statement may invoke change in the emotions of the listener, regardless of the context or the intent of the speaker.

3. I object to the idea of words being only a result of the context of the practices of embodied speakers. It seems if when looking at the time before words, we could imagine that gestures would be necessary to rely meaning, however, words were meant to overcome the limits that are imposed on communication when we rely on gestures alone, so it seems hard to argue that words require gestures or expressions in order to possess any meaning. It would seem that we would rely upon direct meanings of words in order to relay something beyond what gestures could accomplish by any extension.

Hornsby [Raphael Nunziata]

I agree with Hornsby, that derogatory words prevent us from “reaching a theoretical perspective on question about meaning,” because derogatory words don’t not have meaning. Since derogatory words are names and names do not have meaning, because of there altering descriptions. These words, like names, are based by historical or past descriptions (there is also no definition, but the definition the user gives the word), since these descriptions are subject to times change, meaning must stand the test of time.

I disagree with Hornsby that derogatory words are “useless,” because the words have a use in a communicative sense of ideas or emotion, such as in the arts of music and poetry. For example, when a rapper is spitting lines, the rapper uses words as tools to communicate an impactful emotion or something that will captivate the listener. Although, the word could be replaced with a  complex string of other words, its by the simplicity of a single word that gives the effect it gives.

Do derogatory words only act as names or do they act as nouns as well?

Hornsby on slurs [Morgan Johnson]

1. I agree with Hornsby's claim at the end of her paper that we cannot evaluate the use of slurs in language by simply examining examining the words themselves. We must take into account the "postures, movements, and expressions of talking human bodies" as well as "the practices of embodied speakers" in order to accurately examine "the practice of language... [and] how it actually is". (Hornsby, 2001,  p. 141) Language is more than just how words interact with each other and the world and, especially with slurs, we must take into account the unspoken aspects of language in order to understand them.

2. I don't think I agree with Hornsby's claim that derogatory words always have neutral counterpart, or that this counterpart is relevant when we are discussing the derogatory use of the word. By this I mean that when slurs are used, many of their users don't know what the neutral counterpart of the slur is, and even if they are aware what the neutral counterpart is, it would not capture the same meaning or force of the slur. If one were to replace the use of the N-word in a statement they made with 'African-American' I don't think the meaning of the original statement would be completely captured using the neutral counterpart instead of the slur.

3. Are slurs actually useless, or are theorist actively avoiding them because of the underlying negativity slurs carry? I feel like slurs are in fact useful and that when they are used there is "something we want to say with them", but the way they are useful and what the user is trying to say with them is so distasteful that many people wouldn't want to be associated with them (p. 129). It seems like a cop out to say that slurs are useless and the claim that "most of us probably have no trace of a tendency to use them" does not mean they do not in fact have a use. There are many words that most people have "no trace of a tendency to use them" such as 'skirr' which means 'move, fly etc. rapidly' because there are "other words that suit us better", but that does not mean the word 'skirr' is useless (p. 129).

Hornsby [Christina Sanchez]

I agree with Hornsby's general definition of derogatory words. I think they are generally known for being both commonly understood to convey hatred and contempt, and there could be another word used in place of a derogatory one applied to the same people (Hornsby 2001, p. 128). Overall, these are good guidelines to go by when looking at derogatory words.

One aspect of Hornsby's work that I am not quite sure I agree with is when she talks about derogatory words being "useless". Although I do not think we should use derogatory words, they still express some uses even if those uses are negative and have only negative connotations. Derogatory words can be used to express negative emotions toward someone or something, and even though I do not morally support using them, derogatory words, in my opinion, cannot really be deemed useless.

A question I might have about Hornsby's writing involves situations where we might be joking around. Using derogatory words when joking around with a friend or sibling can still have a negative connotation, but I am not sure that all uses of these words have to be filled with nothing but hatred. What is Hornsby's opinion about situations such as this?

Hornsby [Arthur Toland-Barber]

I agree with Hornsby that utterances of slurs may not contain the actual meaning of the slur uttered (such as what a historian would find to be true of the word as Hornsby points out). I agree with this because I know several slurs myself, but I don't have nearly enough knowledge of their origins or meanings. The only knowledge I know of most slurs are the people or group they refer to.

I generally disagree that slurs are "useless" as the author describes them. Just as there are many different ways to say the same thing (synonyms), each one still serves some kind of purpose and has different meaning behind them. There are, of course, better words that we can use to describe a situation and words that give more meaning to our thoughts, but that doesn't mean that lesser forms of communication are useless.

I would ask if using a slur to refer to oneself has any additional meaning or if this would also be considered useless as it doesn't describe anything?

Hornsby {Korey Nuehs}

1.       I agree with Hornsby in that I don’t think a derogatory term user is necessarily committed to a huge web of racist ideology. But I don’t know if one can have a negative attitude towards something without said ideology, as she seems to implicitly state. It seems that they are committed to at least part of the ideology, i.e., unless they also have the corresponding intention to use the term in its prescribed way.

2-3.       I don’t know if I completely agree with Hornsby’s criticism of Brandom (although, I will say that the paper was kind of a slog for me using a lot of terms I don’t know). It seems to me that derogatory words are simply expressions such as ‘that A is bad_ (insert derogatory term here)’, with bad and good both being somewhat indefinable and based upon the speaker’s ideology; and derogatory words being confined to certain social groups within said ideology. I don’t know if someone has to commit to a bunch of ideological principles other than stating that ‘A is bad (or at the very least, doesn’t conform to my view of the world)’ within a certain ideological framework. In this sense, it would seem derogatory terms do two things state a principle within the framework and enforce the ideology onto the external world, which also seems to disprove Hornsby’s statement that Derogatory words are useless as a term such as ‘terrorist’ or 'extremist' could be derogatory, while also having a fairly agreed upon use.

Hornsby on Slurs [Alex Rowell]

I agree with Hornsby's assertion that slurs end up meaningless and have difficulties fitting in to theories of truth. I can definitely see where a speaker's desire not to align themselves with the connotations of a word would deny the use of the word entirely, as it seems to color everything near it. Also, due to the hidden emotional subtext it is difficult to actually evaluate the accuracy of a slur when there is a neutral counterpart that better serves the conversation.

I disagree with an assertion Hornsby lays out about removing the negative connotations of words by using them. I think Hornsby herself disagreed with this assertion, saying that those who are 'taking the words back' (to use modern phrasing) are doing so explicitly and it could not happen if they didn't consciously disavow the negative meaning of the words while using them. This is complicated in the last few years with some groups trying to take back words without being so explicit in their disavowing, while still using the words.

Question 1: Is the use of slurs really an ethical question, in that we don't want to spread around these particular emotional connotations and give them more strength?
Question 2: Where do slurs fit in the scheme of implication? Are they general?

Hornsby on Slurs [Sean Wammer]

1.
I agree with Hornsby on her objection to Hare because it seems like slurs are much more complicated than only the case where a term is used to express hate toward someone who is of the neutral counterpart. In particular, it seems like derogatory terms are offensive at least in part because of the intention of the speaker, regardless of the person the slur is directed toward.

2.
I disagree with Hornsby when she claims that "the beliefs dredged up in spelling [structures underpinning uses of derogatory words] out do not belong in an account of how individual speakers use the words on each occasion" (Hornsby 2001, 138). Intentionally using derogatory terms that are known to carry inflammatory beliefs to refer to certain people  is important enough that it effects our account of how speakers are using these words. Certain words carry strong enough connotations that using them off-highhandedly seems to be negligent and disrespectful.

3.
What exactly does Hornsby mean when she says derogatory words are "useless?" She says that there are other words that suit us better, so we can completely do without the offensive counterparts. She also says that we cannot endorse anything that is done with derogatory words. It seems like slurs have such immense connotation associated with them (unlike other words), and some people do use these words and endorse their use (that is why we are interested in slurs). In what ways are slurs really useless?

--Sean Wammer

Hornsby [Hayley Thompson]

I agree with Hornsby that derogatory words are "useless" since they are only used when the speaker wants to say something negative about another person, but does not have anything substantial to claim. If a speaker has a legitimate reason to dislike another person they can describe this without using a derogatory term. It is only when the speaker feels that their argument against the other person is feeble or unfounded, that they may find themselves throwing out derogatory terms, to make that person look bad. Most people have no use for these terms because they do not describe other people as objectionable without a reason, or almost never have an audience that approves of them doing so.

While I do not blatantly disagree with any of Hornsby's arguments, I have some trouble understanding the example of Hare's made-up word "doog", what it is meant to illustrate, and why Hornsby argues against it.  

Derogatory words seem to have the same referents and denotations as others that are not derogatory, but instead have different, negative, senses and connotations. When we object to derogatory words, we object to their senses rather than their referents.

Hornsby on slur

I agree with Hornsby in the problem that inferentialism does not account for all derogatory terms, and thus cannot be a proper explanation for the uselessness of words. The example Hornsby gives of the English woman in 1950 making an generalization demonstrates this well, when describing not of the German couples themselves, but “couple moving in next door belong to a nation whose members are barbarous, etc.” (136).

I disagree with Hornsby’s conclusion in finding more suitable words to replace derogatory terms. I think that although some words may currently be derogatory, the issue is not the word itself but rather the intent behind the word. While Hornsby may believe that replacing these words itself will solve the issue, I think that the problem is not in the word itself, but the perspectives people have towards whatever derogatory term they are targeting.

I object to to Hornsby’s account that words have come to carry particular overtones or connotations (138). I do not want to say that some words do not carry connotations, however this is very subjective in that words do not necessarily always carry overtones or connotations;rather it is more of a case by case basis where words carry connotations.

Hornsby [Evan Cottingham]

1. I agree with Hornsby's view of slurs for the most part. I agree that slurs cannot be placed into meaning theories. There are certainly words that could be used to more precisely communicate about or describe something while slurs carry connotations.

2. From a language standpoint, I do not totally agree that slurs should be considered "useless." Morally, one could say that they shouldn't be used, but the fact is that slurs carry connotations and thus can be used to express emotions. Because of this, I wouldn't consider slurs useless in language.

3. Is it fair of Hornsby to say that slurs are useless? Slurs hold connotations and thus are used to convey, often negative, attitudes and emotions. Is there meaning in that?

"Hornsby on Slurs": A Title that I Have a Use for Whose Meaning Is Not of Importance

1. I agree with this notion of speaking about derogatory words in such a way that moves away from sort of descriptionist/verificationist methods. When we consider the ethics of slurs especially, it seems that our focus should not be the meaning that these words entail or the claims expressed when these words are used, but rather the illocutionary force behind them.

2. I think a point of contention on the ethical analysis of things is the sort of utilitarian language that is used to express the unethical practices of derogatory use. When we speak of derogatory words as there being no use for them, it seems to imply this sort of thinking that it's wrong because it serves no greater good and we shouldn't use it because it serves no purpose. While that may in fact be the case, I think there is something deeper about the ethical problems that come with using slurs and the fact that slurs serve no greater purpose is a corollary of what is actually wrong about their use.

3. I think the account does a good job attempting to locate language in a more human-centric way where it's important to look at the way individuals use language as important to a general discussion on language and thus use of derogatory language. I think, however, that this move looks at language use as actions themselves and thus the ethical problem lies within the act and the act themselves should be of ethical analysis and this seems to be different from the analysis that Hornsby puts forth - that language is used for purposes.

Hornsby with Derogatory Terms [Danielle Trzil]

I agree with Hornsby that under her specified conditions (the word is used to express hatred or contempt, and can be replaced with a neutral word) that derogatory terms are basically useless. when one utters a derogatory term it is harder to accept their opinion without in turn accepting something deeper and more controversial rather than if the speaker just used a neutral descriptive word. Although some derogatory words started off as neutral words, I do not see the benefit to having connotations of hatred and hostile undertones directed at larger groups of people than if you were just to be more specific in your language in the first place.

I disagree with Hornsby that if a word is found to be derogatory in terms of racism that there is no choice but to find another word. Although I do agree that certain people (namely, those who are not the race in question here) should definitely not use the derogatory term, her reference to Hare was on the right track when he said that if we are "confined to it we cannot break free from the standards". I think we have seen this happen in common media with a certain word I personally will not say, and that to a degree the meaning of words can change over time and we don't have to altogether replace the word (there is no way to eliminate the word completely once it has been made derogatory, so wouldn't opting to change it's meaning be a better alternative?)

I object her theory that using a derogatory term in practice inherently implies the hostile attitudes of the user. One of her conditions is that the term has to be used to express hatred, but the same word that others use for hatred may be a term of endearment to others (I call my siblings a lot of nasty things - but out of love!). There's more of a gray area than what she addresses in this paper.

Hornsby [Jonathan Kosaka]

Hornby's general accounting for slurs is a move I support. Her basic premise that slurs should be taken into account by linguistic theories seems an interesting task and is something I think linguistics needs to address to be representative of our use of language. The overarching goal of her paper is something I agree with rather than the conclusions she draws from it.

I disagree with Hornby's claim that there are "other words which suit us better" (2001, 129) for, while I think they are not always the most accurate or precise, "better" is too subjective of a term to exclude slurs entirely. I could imagine individuals or groups who use words to communicate without knowledge about "better" words to use, in fact I would argue that most groups use words which could be replaced with "better" words. Hornby's claim about "better" words seems too narrow and exclusive of alternative groups and cultures which might have different vocabulary bases.

I object to Hornby's definition of uselessness where a word is useless if "we are not in a position..." (2001, 133) as this only defines a words as useless from one's own perspective, not potential perspectives. It seems that Hornby's not wanting to use the word means that the word is thus useless.

Grice [Anthony Baker]

I agree with Grice's very general notion that in many cases the meaning of an utterance can in some way supersede the meaning of what is literally said i.e. the intentions of the speaker. It is difficult, as Grice raises towards the end of the entry, to cache these intentions out precisely, or to even explain the meaning of an intention in some cases. I have found myself in the position mentioned by Grice, where a Philosopher upon being asked what something means, has to choose "how what is said is to be taken," and I think this example shows that meaning intertwined with intention can become very complex (Grice, Meaning 1957, 384).

The example of failing someone in a class with the intention of being vindictive vs. cutting in line is an interesting one, because Grice says here that the meaning of an intention is only 'meant,' or actually means something, when distress is obviously caused/meant by the action. I fail to understand how if the intention of failing man X is perceived by X as being vindictive, then why this isn't important qua 'meaning' as much as cutting someone in line when the distress caused is meant by the line cutter. Perhaps this has something to do with the people in line as being equals, whereas the teacher has some sort of authority over the student?

A distinction made by Grice as to how the the expressions 'means,' 'means something,' or 'means that' or used in differently depending on their 'sense,' seems problematic, especially as the way language is used changes. The theory seems at face value like it may present the the possibility of being too dependent on the words themselves, as opposed to what they are actually 'meant' to be used for (I'm aware that I used 'meant' in the previous sentence)... Of course this a paradox that can't be overcome from either side of the approach, so it's only a minor objection (if one at all).

Grice on Meaning [Morgan Johnson]

1. I agree with Grice that the causal theory of meaning struggles to account for when "a particular speakers of writer" uses "a sign on a particular occasion (which may well diverge from the standard meaning of the sign)" (Grice, 1957, 381).  If x "must have (roughly) a tendency to produce in an audience some attitude" and have a "tendency, in the case of a speaker, to be produced by that attitude"in order to meanNN, whenever a person uses a sign, it's meaning must line up with the standard interpretation of that sign but, in many scenarios, signs can be mean different things in different contexts (379). For example, 'Smith is farming' would most likely indicate Smith is growing and harvesting plants for food, but in some particular circumstances, such when playing a video game, 'Smith is farming' would mean Smith is killing enemy units in order to gain currency, and I agree with Grice that that causal theory of meaning would have difficulty accounting for examples like this one and the ones he includes in his article.

2. I disagree with Grice over his example of failing someone on an exam he gave. Grice says that "as an examiner" if he fails a person, Grice will likely "cause him distress or indignation or humiliation" and if he was vindictive, he would have intended this effect to happen, but Grice claims that he would "not be inclined to say that my failing him meantNN anything" (384). It seems to me that failing the student does mean something because even if Grice did not intend to attach any meaning to failing the student, the impact of that student failing would develop a meaning as it would transition to a lower grade, a failed class, etc, each of which have meaning.

3. A potential objection to Grice's theory of meaning would be against his claim on page 386 that "the indented effect must be something within the control of the audience, or at least the sort of thing which is within its control" (Grice, 1957, 386). Placing the intended effect in the control of the audience might create situations in which the utterer intended to convey one thing, but the audience, takes his statement as intending something else. For example, lets say person has the reputation of lying often, and when he is leaving a store and, when asked, says that he purchased the items he is carrying. He would intend the clerk asking him about the items to recognize that he is leaving a store carrying items in the open, and have the clerk recognize he paid for them, and then let him leave, but due to his reputation, he is accused of theft, because the clerk believes the man intended to convince them that he paid for the items when he actually didn't. Here, there is a disconnect in meaning and communication between the man and the clerk because the audience misinterpreted his intention and the effect he wanted to create.

Grice [Gabriel Debacker]

I agree with Grice that a sentence's implications can be completely different from what the words that make up the sentence might mean logically. A simple case of this is idioms, where something like "When the shit hits the fan" means 'when things start to happen/when things start to go wrong.'

I disagree that for a sentence to have meaning it must have intention from a speaker. Just as I agreed that a sentence's implications can be different from what the meanings of the words indicate, a sentence that, for example, is written on a wall can have meaning, and different meanings, with the only varying factor being the audience. If we strip language down to just words and sentences, without tone and other suprasegmental elements to indicate sarcasm and the like, I believe they can still hold meaning to someone who reads them.

Although Grice admits that everything we 'mean' does not fall into the categories he created, I'm curious if he considers things like double entendre in these other categories.

Grice [Arthur Toland-Barber]

I like how there is a list of utterances that have meaning that are considered based upon what is implied instead of what is potentially said (or its meaning being determined by logic). This is good because it fills in the gaps that a lot of theories fail to comprehend such as cases of metaphors, irony, and sarcasm.

I would disagree with Grice’s statement of truth sentences. He disagreed with the notion of a sentence such as “the policemen’s statement was true” (Grice, 55) can be considered true, as compared to sentences which have more obvious truth values such as the sky is blue since we cannot ascertain the truth of the unknown variable (being the policeman). As long as the person stating the sentence is reliable in their truth sentences I would be inclined to believe the sentences they claim are true (such as believing what a teacher says about a concept despite not having any innate beliefs about the concept but I trust my teacher to give me correct information).

A question I have is since stress in certain circumstances can help to produce meaning, does that mean that other linguistic features can also help to produce meaning such as aspiration, pauses, and pitch? 

Logic and Implicature According to Grice [Hui Yang]

I agree with Grice on there is implicature when people say something, and sometimes the implication is different from what the sentence seems to indicate logically. A simple sentence, depending on how it is said and in what conversational context, it can have two or more, sometimes totally opposite, meanings. 

It is more about me questioning instead of disagreeing with Grice: although sometimes just by what the sentence looks like we cannot tell what the speaker exactly means, surely we know what the speaker does not mean. For example, “he is a nice person” can surely express different meanings like "he IS a nice person" or "he IS NOT a nice person", but I highly doubt that it can imply as far as anything like "his ex-girlfriend works in a hospital.” In other words, by basic logic, we can still know what the speaker DOES NOT mean by the sentences he/she says.

I doubt though when people mean something different from what they said (e.g. sarcasm or joking) they usually indicate that by their tone of voice (I believe that is how we can tell it is sarcasm or jokes), and the tone of voice is usually part of language, so shouldn’t we take that into our logical variation? Then everything can be perfectly explained by logic, and we do not need to bring in the idea of “implicature” to the discussion (e.g. *the sarcastic tone of voice*= negative, so “he is a nice person” with a sarcastic tone of voice = “he is not a nice person”).

Grice [Samuel Hinderaker]

1. I agree with Grice's use of "natural" and "nonnatural" senses of meaning - in his examples, it seems clear that there's a distinction between the examples, where 1) has a very different sort of equal correlation between the two ideas, and 2) is sort of an incomplete correlation, and doesn't quite have the meaning of Smith being unable to get on without trouble etc. if one only says "Smith found his wife indispensable."

2. I think that some of his examples he uses towards the beginning are problematic. He has sentences like "those spots meant measles but he hadn't got measles" and "the recent budget means that we shall have a hard year but we shan't have." I think these sentences are not really complete - he is leaving off a sort of implied "I thought those spots meant measles." or "I thought the recent budget meant..." because in both cases the speaker is forming an educated opinion based on what's in front of them. I think these constructions are necessary to the examples he has given, and refute a good part of 1-5 he lists on page 377.

3. I would be curious what Grice means when he says: "I do not want to maintain that all our uses of "mean" fall easily, obviously, and tidily into one of the two groups I have distinguished" because I'm not sure what would fall outside of the categories he's created.

Grice on logic and conversation [Yuchen Jiang]

I agree with his demonstration of the conversational maxims and Cooperative Principle, with which Grice tries to empower the conversational implicatures with strength of providing definite meanings. Grice is clearly aware of the distinction between formalism and informalism as two side of the discussion of language. Grice’s emphasis on these two lines of rules (conversational maxims and Cooperative Principle) is an attempt to refute the formalism idea that only logical devices can provide definite meanings or references for language. Thus, Grice support the informalism through setting such principles for the conversational perspective of language, through which the informal use of language can provide definite and relevant meanings and references just like the formal use of language.

However, as Grice believes that “for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature… will not count as a converstaional implicature; it will be a conventional implicature(31).” I feel struggle to share the belief that conventional inplicature is not qualified as conversational implicature since I takes Grice’s maxims and principles as means to analyze conventional implicature, resulting in providing an more informative and fixing account of conventional implicature, which Grice has labeled “conversational implicature”. Moreover, intuition is not conflict with argument, arguments are found wherever one seeks, thus, the intuitions of conventional implicatures are there, the argument presented by conversational implicatures are means to approach logically approach the former.

I wonder how Grice would be able to provide an account for comedy shows, where languages are used primarily to produce irrelevant, logical unsound, uninformative, and ambiguous content. Yet the comedian and the adequate audiences can both have a good grasp of the point and laugh. Is not this an example, where the maxims does not work, yet the Cooperative principle solely is capable of maintaining the conversation?

Grice on Meaning [Henry Tran]

1. Specifically what I agreed with was the part when Grice talks about intention, and says "the utterer must have intended an [audience] to recognize the intention behind the utterance"(Grice 1957 p.382),  not just to have uttered something alone. There has to be an intended hearer for the utterance to successfully give meaning in the intended way. Therefore such situations where we say can be misinterpreted without context from the perspective of unintended audiences can occur.

2. The thing that I somewhat disagreed with towards Grice was the natural meanings. Where "x meant that p and x means that p entail p" (Grice 1957, p.377), and the fact that natural meanings do not rely on the intention of the speaker. Take for example, smoke means fire, it would seem intuitive that smoke means there is a fire but what if that smoke was not caused by a fire, such as the smoke was really something else, like vapor. With natural meanings/and nonnatural I don't think Grice explicitly explains them enough.

3. With the meaning from utterance and intention, what happens to meaning when the utterance's intention is not clearly conveyed? Such as the statement; "The doctor refused to work after death" (News titles with usually double meanings). There is the intention of saying, 'the doctor no longer want to work after a patient died', but can also be understood as something like 'The doctor refused to work after the doctor died'.