Reflection [Jonathan Kosaka]

The practicality and applicability of slurs made me think differently about why pejoratives and words in general can take on, to use the expression, a life of their own. The lead-up or ground setting before this unit, speech-actions was particularly interesting and I wish we had spent more time on that. I began thinking of speech and language much more different after being exposed to something which seemed fairly common place, yet something I had not considered or given serious thought to. Both of these units made me think about how language is used and the various implications/causes which result from it. I had always held language in less serious regards, taking it largely for granted, however these two units in particular changed how I perceive and think about language and its use. 

In Reflection [Drew Owens]

Regardless of my final interpretations of how our use of language connects with the world, Russell's "On Denoting" marked a pivotal point in my understanding. Up to this introduction of descriptive definitions, I was having a hard time grasping the nebulous connections between the world and our spoken models of it. Russell's logic allowed me grasp a more tangible base of understanding, which theories we studied later questioned and refined. Exploding names into a multitude of possible definitions allowed me to process the concepts of entailment and validity (with regards to language) in a more measured fashion. While I recognize that Russell was overreaching in his position, it seems the wealth of concepts and theories derived from picking at Russell's ideas demonstrate his contribution to the field.  In all, I think that when reined in by a more causal approach and refined to the cluster theory,  Russell's base concepts still speak to my intuition.

Reflections [Raphael Nunziata]

Definite description! What made this topic interesting  was the question of nonexistent references or descriptions that tie to something or nothing. Where the only types of description that will have existence, if there isn't a reference, is the referential form...versus the attributive.   Furthermore, reading through the works of Bertrand, Strawson, Frege and many others illustrated a dialectic process of change, which gave me a huge part of understanding. Although, other works like Kripke discuss the meaning of names and definite description I find the categorization of definite descriptions to be more intriguing and simpler to understand. Nevertheless, other units of the course all had some spark to them.

Reflections [Henry Tran]

The unit of this course that made me think differently was the most recent one about slurs. It also seemed to me the most interesting due to the nature of current usages related to past circumstances. Such that some words originally were designated as something mediocre and then turned into a slur. Originally, I don't believe that I thought much about the usages of slurs and the way they function in our current society. I just essentially thought that people used slurs in two ways, to joke and to insult, not realizing the philosophy behind it. Such as Hornby's gesturalism, Hom's 'thick' semantic externalism, Camp's Perspectivalism, or even Prohibitionism by Anderson & Lepore. Looking at all these views, I see that there are many ways to grasp language, not just at face value. To me now, I see context as a close relation to slurs, such that there might be some perspective, expression or some gesture attributed to the words that slur. I'll think twice when someone utters something derogatory and/or pejorative.

Course Reflections [Morgan Johnson]

I found the unit on names to be the most interesting unit that we studied. The back and forth between Searle and Kripke/Putnam over the viability of the cluster and causal chain theories really made me think about how and why we give names to things, especially how those names give meaning. I found the cluster/family theory of naming to introduce naming in a way I had never thought about by connecting not just a single definition to a name, but rather a group of descriptions such that we can get a sense of what that name means without limiting the meaning of the name to the descriptions we listed. I also enjoyed the way Kripke responded to this theory with the causal chain of reference that we are apart of when we borrow how someone uses a name. It intuitively makes sense that we often borrow the reference of a name without needing to know what exactly that name means based simply on the way it was used by others.

Course Review [Anthony Baker]

I found the unit on slurs to have changed the way I think about language, specifically slurs, the most. I knew that there was something inexplicable about the pejorative nature of slurs, and how exactly they function/are used in the world, but I hadn't put much thought into how it could be explained. After looking at different theories behind as to what this derogatory force is, and how it comes into being, I can't say that my understanding of slurs is now more easily explained, but rather it's broadened to account for them in new ways. I particularly like Hom's account of semantic externalism, because it gives a nice account as to how is meant by an utterance can be broken down into both what is said and what is implicated all while maintaining the idea that pejorative content is built into each word.

Course Reflection [Korey Nuehs]

I found Grice's theory of implication and conversation maxims to be quite amazing. Given that I'm also an English major, his theories really have made me think about how to apply in a more literary setting, such as how writers begin their works and how quality might be assessed in accordance to his theory. The elegance and simplicity of his theory is really refreshing. One area where it applies to is what Robert Frost called the 'Sound of Sense', basically how certain sounds and stresses rub off onto sentences due to the way the words are arranged. I think Grice's theory of conventional implicature and Hornsby's paper on gesturalism really makes sense of this phenomena.

Course Reflection [Hui Yang]

I enjoy the slur part the most, although I do enjoy the rest of the course as well. I am one of those who always go after people after they say something, asking "what do you mean exactly when you say ****/use that word?" Without knowing I was discussing "Philosophy of Language," I'd already discussed it a lot before I took this class. However, I could never comfortably discuss slurs here, even with friends. I always feel like mentioning "Lord Voldemort" in Harry Porter, whenever I want to mention any slurs. I have no bad intention, but how can others know?! So I am just really happy I get a chance to freely (not quite) talk about some "taboos" in this class and humbly share opinions with others.

Coming from a country that does not quite have an idea of slurs, I never quite understand slurs very well. On Facebook, whenever someone posts a picture, his/her friends and families definitely comment "oh, you are so pretty, my dear", or "you guys look soooo cute together"... If anyone even just tries to joke (by saying something negative), there is a good chance that someone will comment "rude" or "you are so messed up" later. Growing up, whenever my friends or I post pictures on Chinese social website, we only get comments like "ugh, you must gain some weight", "your photoshop skill is getting better", or "your girlfriend must be retarded or blind to find you". But, we do not get mad at all, because we think "they must feel very close to us to say something like this without worrying". In fact, the people who comment first or most usually have a crush on the person who posts stuff. Just some fun facts! :-P

Reflections [Alex Rowell]

(B) The sense and reference unit was the most interesting to me, as it made me consider how I use language to communicate with other people. Realizing that so much effort has gone in to explaining the way in which we reference objects, use names, and use senses to explain meaning was very interesting. Specifically, the process of moving through the different theories with each paper and realizing the pros and cons of them one step at a time was valuable. Then moving to another theory that attacked the previous one, or added to it in a new an interesting way, causing me to keep reevaluating the theories I thought were good ones. In the end, I felt like I had a better understanding of language in general as well as reference. Also, as an added bonus, two of my roommates also now have strong opinions about theories of reference based on my attempts to explain them.

Reflections [Hayley Thompson]

I found the names unit to be one of the most interesting in the course. The non-circularity thesis and Kripke's refutation of it were especially interesting. On its fundamental level the non-circularity thesis makes sense, since circularity occurs when, on some level, a name is defined by itself, which should not add any meaning. However, after reading Kripke's lecture's, I realized that circularity in definitions occurs all the time. All names take their definitions in relation to other named objects. In some way, every defined name is part of a giant circle that relates to every other name. When we learn new definitions, we learn how they fit in with ones we currently know.  This makes me wonder if our semantic understanding of the world rests in the way things truly are, their place in relation to everything else in the world. It also makes me wonder how this semantic understanding first originates if we have no language or semantic connections from birth.

Reflections [Christina Sanchez]

The unit of this course that I found the most interesting was definitely the unit on slurs. This is because we read a variety of papers on different perspectives on slurs, and I had never really given slurs and how we actually use them in every day language (or not every day language) much thought. We just hear slurs on the street or in conversation, but we never really think about the context or the reasoning or meaning behind the use of the slur itself. When I read Hornsby's piece and the concept of "uselessness" was brought up, that really got me thinking about how deep the substance behind using slurs really goes. Seeing the plethora of perspectives brought to the table about slurs really got me thinking about the general meaning and concepts behind slurs and other parts of language because it just shows how many different thoughts can be produced about something as simple, or not so simple, as a slur, or any other part of our language. Overall, this unit on slurs just reflects the huge amount of perspectives that we have learned can be brought up with each part of our language.

Course Reflection [Arthur Toland-Barber]

I think the papers about slurs made me consider language differently more than naming conventions. I have always known that slurs were offensive but I haven’t considered why or for what reasons. My base idea was that they didn’t show respect toward the people they referred to (which is also the case), but through these last few papers I found that there was more to slurs than I originally thought. Interesting cases like quotations exist which seem to prove that slurs have a separate linguistic category than other words since despite a supposed neutral aspect, still invoke a reaction. They are also a category of words which seem to have a sense of uselessness (unwarranted perhaps is a better term) to them, which also makes them unique. In short, slurs are more complicated than I thought and these papers have shown me that. 

Reflection [Evan Cottingham]

For me, the most interesting unit was the unit on definite descriptions. Particularly it was interesting to look at the varying viewpoints on definite descriptions as it seems to be a controversial topic within the philosophy of language. Looking at different philosophers refute other theories on definite descriptions while proposing and defending their own, each theory brought up very interesting and valid points. As we went deeper into the idea of definite descriptions, I found the discussions surrounding the cluster theory of descriptions to be the most interesting, especially our investigation of Kripke's argument attacking the classical descriptivist view on the cluster theory of descriptions for our second essay. Kripke's amendment to the varying theses of the cluster theory was most interesting to me because I found that his viewpoint largely lined up with my own personal, more realistic, view on descriptions and on the purpose and use of language.

Course Reflection

I thoroughly enjoyed the first unit on sense and references. More specifically I enjoyed a lot of Gottlob Frege’s reading on sense and reference. In the past I never really thought about the association that a word has to the meaning. It wasn’t that I disagreed with the fact that a word can have different meanings depending on the context, but it was more of something that you only begin to think about once you are exposed to the idea. The particular reading I found interesting was Frege talking about the difference in meaning of two words that have the same reference, venus. Thinking about how the morning star and the evening star both refer to Venus, yet give a different meaning to venus was quite interesting. This expanded my view on thinking about how words can be referenced in many ways but still have different meanings depending on when or how you use the word.

Class Reflections [André Robert]

The slurs unit was definitely helpful in thinking about how slurs function linguistically. Given how slurs seem to "scope out" I had not previously given much thought to how they actually work as words in our language, which having read about them I feel is important to know so that one might have the right attitude towards them. While I didn't fully agree with any of the papers we read about slurs, they did help me to develop what my own thoughts/beliefs about how slurs function were/ Hornsby's "uselessness" idea ended up being closest to how I think slurs function (though she probably could have picked a different word) though I think the other papers had useful things to say about slurs (Hom's emphasis on institutions  for example). I found it interesting (and slightly disappointing) that none of the papers on slurs gave an actual argument for why slurs could be "appropriated" rather than just being struck form the language entirely. This has always confused me and is probably why Hornsby's paper ended up being the one I most agreed with.

Course Reflection [Yuchen Jiang]

In this course, I find several papers are pretty interesting since they provide some perspectives of language that are usually ignored by people. For, example, Putnam's Paper addressing the reference of names, where he provide this model of the twin earth which, I take to be a precise demonstration of the social or institutional perspective of how can a word to be understand as being indexical and at the same time as a rigid designator. A name is indexical since the reference of its extension is not fixed by any application in an individual level, rather an institution is required for establish a paradigm that determines the extension of that name. Then, once a name is determined institutionally, it can be a rigid designator, which would have a fixed reference in all possible world.His account captures two features that I have taken to be most important to the language, first, extension of names varies under different context, which means that language can evolve or at least mutate. On the other hand, at a specific given period, a name that is institutionally fixed is able to refer to a specific entity in any given circumstance. I think this account it insightful since it employs a way that can state clearly what would the core of language be like.

On the other hand, the topic about slurs really shows what are some application of philosophy regard common use of language. and various accounts are provided for that matter, some thinks that slurs are semantically different from neutral words while other think slurs are different semantically yet having the same reference with their neutral counterpart. Some believes that slurs and slurring uses are not intrinsic parts of those words rather determining some words are slurs or are involved in slurring uses requires contextual examination. Overall, I regard that this discussion of slurs is pretty bizarre for me, showing me more of how philosophy can be used. Yet moreover, I think the use of slurs can not only be analyzed analytically (statically), meaning here as examining as a fixed given fact, it can also be analyzed dynamically, which requires more work of observing. This discussion of slurs mirrors my understanding of philosophy as being a constant dynamic struggle that occasionally cause sparks that can help to ignite and preserve the fire of humanity.

Course Reflection

I was most interested when we started talking about language in more context-sensitive approaches. Beginning with the papers on the taxonomy of language and how we can group certain uses of language into different categories to how this even relates to uses of slurs, a lot of the introduction of illocutionary force in language was definitely the most thought-provoking and, in my opinion, most complete understanding of how language works. I think it really captured how much of meaning in language is defined by relationships and structures in play. These readings gave more merit to language as more than a mere abstract symbolization of thought and more as a system of communication that involves people. Thus as a system of communication, these ideas of force offers ways of understanding how relationships and structures that are present within language affect the way language exists in our usage of it,

Course Reflections [Danielle Trzil]

B) The section that stretched my thinking the most was probably indirect speech, implicature, and names. Something I have not really thought of before is how I refer to things and assume those that I speak to know what I'm talking about. Not only did this stretch my thinking on how this is used, but the underlying information behind this. Alternate worlds that Kripke mentions is something I never really thought about explicitly before - it was just an underlying thing that was there but not thought about. When really diving into it, however, it became more clear how there is so much more to language and connected though and descriptions than I have every considered before, and that really impacts the way that I now think about when communicating with others. This helps avoid miscommunication, and is also effective when wanting to dive into theoretically madness and a cycle of "what ifs".

Reflections [Alberto Torrigiotti]

I think that the Putnam paper was probably one of my favorite materials of the course. His Twin Earth thought experiment was very insightful and it turns out that he since revised the experiment to deal with numerous criticisms. He argued in a lecture somewhere and proceeded to show that actually the thought experiment could get rid of Twin Earth entirely and still show that meanings aren't in the head, but that stipulating Twin Earth is just simpler and more elegant. I thought that his thought experiment and subsequent analysis was a particularly ingenuous way to demonstrate that the contents of our brains are not sufficient for determining meanings, and that meanings must also be determined causally by external factors. After all, water (H20) is not water (XYZ) despite there being, to Putnam, no difference in the psychological states of the individuals on Earth and on Twin Earth. There are elements of the example which I believe carry less force than Putnam himself probably believed, but it was still a pleasure to read.

Week 10: Reflection [Rigo Acevedo]

(A) The current topic that we've been discussing relating to slurs and their unusual expressive content has been the most interesting to me. The idea that slurs portray some additional content that appears to scope out and cause offense regardless of the speakers intentions is not knew to me, but I've never considered what properties of slurs might be responsible for this phenomena. I like the idea that slurs have obtained their expressive force through external influences, such as prejudicial institutions or prohibition by a particular group of whom the slur refers. However, what I think is most interesting about these theories is that their structure allows for a potential scientific investigation; a group of brave proprietors of thick semantic externalism may be able to establish an institution of prejudice, against a group of their choosing, with accompanying slurring terms, and see if such a practice is capable of imbuing the chosen terms with additional expressive force.

Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference [Sean Wammer]

I found Kripke's lectures particularly engaging. Of all the theories and frameworks, Kripke's seemed the most plausible. I think it was especially relevant to me because I find myself learning terms for new things almost everyday. My girlfriend introduces me to new ingredients and dishes that I had no name for very frequently. When I use those names, I really do use them just to refer to exactly whatever she intended to refer to. Kripke's criticism of the cluster theory of names is pretty solid, but his theory of reference is the most convincing to me.

--Sean Wammer

Hom and Camp [André Robert]

Chris Hom's account of slurs sees them as a combination of an ideology and a set of institutional practices/ They get their offensive qualities from representing bigoted views and calling on institution practices that support or perpetuate these views.

Liz Camp's account of slurs is that they represent certain perspectives. When they are used, they bring to the hearer's attention those bigoted perspectives which is why any use or mention of slurs is so uncomfortable to the hearer: in some sense they feel complicit in the perspective being referenced by the slur.

I find Camp's account slightly more compelling (but not completely accurate) than Hom's. I think there is some sense in which slurs represent ideologies and institutional practices, but at the same time I think this idea can be captured by perspectives. I do think that intuitions about how slurs can "scope out" are accurate and that this can be captured by perspectivalism. My only worry about Camp's account is that she does not provide an explanation as to how the perspectives represented by slurs are part of their semantic meaning, which seems to be the case and I want to know how Camp would account for it.

Hom vs Camp [Hui Yang]

Hom prefers semantic strategy to explain slurs, which means slurs are bad words in every context of utterance. He first rejects three plausible formulations of the pragmatic strategy, seemingly believing they are too vague to be a principled analysis. He then tries to prove in his paper that words like “nigger” themselves contain bad meaning in all possible contexts. 

In Camp’s point of view, slurs contain two parts: the objects they point out, and the perspectives from a certain group of people’s towards such objects. She points out, notably, ones cannot reject the slurs without accepting the designated meaning of them at the first place. That is probably why, before she starts her explanation, she first apologizes for using plenty of slurs in her paper that may offend some readers. 

I prefer Camp’s view, although I am not completely on her side. I disagree with Hom’s rejection of the pragmatic strategy for they cannot provide a principled analysis, and how he believes words like “nigger” has to be offensive in all utterances (considering the examples I gave last week about how “nigger” is used in a positive way in the black/color communities). I do not think something can be wrong only because it cannot provide a principled analysis, because I do not believe there must be a principled analysis for everything, and in order to make such claim, you need to first prove why there has to be a principled analysis for the things we are talking about.

Hom and Camp [Yuchen Jiang]

Hom has given the his account of Cominatorial Externalism, which emphasizes on the semantic distinction between slurs and their counterparts and the ideological practices of racism as what give slurs' their meaning. Hom believes that slurs is semantically different from its natural counterparts which means that they are filled with different meaningful contents, and referring someone with a slur is different from referring the same person by using a normal word. Also, Hom thinks the negative content of slurs is determined by social institutions, which means application of slurs inherently incorporates negative or racist contents.

Camp attempts to give a perspectival account for the use of slurs. She believes that the negative content
present by slurs is presented from a certain perspective. This means that when using a slur, the speaker has
show the allegiance to a certain perspective. Thus, Camp's account implies that the use of slurs tie to certain
thoughts or stereotypes of people, which cannot really be managed as words can.

I think it is the weakness for both case that they both left rooms for use of non-slur yet language toward
targeted groups. Both account has somewhat hinted that slurs are just a conventional way to blatantly express certain  negative content, which gives some space to use of normal words to express same amount of contempt attitude.  

Hom and Camp [Gabriel Debacker]

Hom argues there are two strategies explaining how slurs work: a semantic strategy and a pragmatic strategy. The semantic strategy argues that derogatory content is a part of a slurs meaning and cannot be separated from it, so that any use of the slur expresses its meaning. The pragmatic strategy argues that derogatory content is a part of how a slur is used, relying on context to determine for what purpose the slur is used and if it is derogatory. Hom proposes an account of slurs called combinatorial externamlism that says the derogatory meaning of a slur is determined by an external source (the relations of the speaker to the world and their speech community) usually in the form of some existent, racist attitude towards certain groups. A slur then is something that expresses the complex, negative properties held in connection with such racist ideas.

Camp says that slurs contain some meaning, unlike expressives like 'damn', and bring into a conversation some amorphous thing, some perspective, that is tied to the slur. According to Camp a perspective is a representational thing that signifies "the speaker's social, psychological, and/or emotional relation to that semantic value" (335). A slur then is something that signals a commitment to a perspective that represents some negative properties about a certain group.

I have little experience with slurs, and so I feel my opinion here holds little weight, but I found Hom's account of slurs more compelling because he gives a more detailed explanation of his reasoning. Hom defines more clearly how and when a slur has derogatory force, along with his other "uncontroversial features of how epithets function in ordinary, natural language" as listed on page 426. Camp's explanation seems more a feeling imparted by her use of examples and attempts to trap that in the idea of a 'perspective' that is presented.

Hom and Camp [Henry Tran]

The main idea behind Chris Hom's account of slurs is that he believes that the semantic argument with slurs fares better than the pragmatic in many ways. He introduces us with combinatorial externalism as he states is, "the view that racial epithets express complex, socially constructed, negative properties determined in virtue of standing in the appropriate external, causal connection with racist institutions",(Hom 2008, 431) or in other words, slurs are given pejorative meanings by the institutes whom uses them and have a certain force. Which then brings us to shifty and scalar terms, such that slurs may be derogatory in some context or have variation in force.

The main feature that Liz Camp accounts for is that there is a perspective behind the slurs, as using perspectivalism. She attributes slurs not to truth conditions but the way they are used, serving only to express emotional state of a speaker. Such that a speaker using a slur has an attributed force (perspective) towards a certain group in which that slur refers to in certain contexts.

Comparing the two from what I understand, I am compelled to lean towards Camp because I feel that it makes sense that slurs are meant from the perspective of the speaker. It is in contrast with the meaning of the slur because as I see it, there is may be no pejorative force at all if used in a certain perspective. That makes me also think about Hom's view as closely related, therefore I can't discount that slurs have a variation in force and are 'shifty'.

Camp Horn [Anthony Baker]

Horn discusses both semantic and pragmatic approaches for evaluating the derogatory content of racial epithets, and presents his own evaluative account called combinatorial externalism (CE). CE is a semantic theory in principle, and as he puts it "the view that racial epithets express complex, socially constructed, negative properties determined in virtue of standing in the appropriate external, causal connection with racist institutions" (Horn, 2008 431). This view is considered more semantic than pragmatic, partly because threats that use racial epithets have an intrinsic harm to them.

Camp holds a perspectival view which takes into account how the pejorative force of different slurs is ultimately beyond a mere relative semantic understanding of the words, and has take into account the individual psychological aspects of both slur-speaker and slur-receiver. Camp seems to be under the impression that a perspectival understanding of a slur is contingent on understanding the respective semantic role of the slur.

Intuitively, I like Camp's account because of its pragmatic perspectival considerations, however, Horn does acknowledge this intuition to side with pragmatic standpoints in the beginning of his writing, and proceeds to hold a largely semantic standpoint. In a way, the semantic macro-social considerations held by Horn sort of align with the perceived individual (micro-social?) pragmatic views of Camp. In virtue of Horn's acknowledgement here, I think I agree more with him.

Hom and Camp: [Korey Nuehs]

Christ Hom says that slurs derogatory content cannot be removed from the slur such that the speaker can cancel it, but that the slur can fail to derogate in certain situations. The Slurs ability to derogate relies on the institutions of racism that are associated with any given slur and their current power and influence over that group. A slur then states that group A has negative properties and that due to these negative properties ought to be subject to certain negative practices.

Slurs are expressions of the speaker’s relation to certain ideologies or perspectives expressed by a group of individuals towards another group indicated by the slur. Also, slurs do not in themselves express contemptuous feelings but are only contemptuous because the perspective you commit to by the use of the slur is often contemptuous or negative.

I find Camp’s solution more appealing because I think she provides a better account on how slurs become derogatory in the first place. Her theory also seems to account for how slurs are not always associated with a feeling of contempt, such as, how the n— word in the 18-19^th century was for many just a standard way of speaking about a group without a feeling of contempt (though, this might seem somewhat controversial; I think the word 'negro' also fits into this picture as well). Also, her point on slurs ability to ‘prime’ the audience is very interesting, and I think explains how forms of prejudice can spread so quickly.

Camp Hom [Drew Owens]

Hom suggests that historical and contemporary racist institutions are the external source for the derogatory content of slurs. That is, the pejorative force of a slur is semantically linked with the relevant racist practices. When a speaker utters a slur, they are expressing the negative, socially constructed, aspects of the racist institution, as experienced within their speech community.

Camp's view maintains that within a speaker's use of a slur is a declaration of belonging to a perspective. This perspective's core and structure inform a speaker's thoughts regarding a specific group of people. In the case of slurs, this perspective is structured so that when indexed, it relays both the speaker's difference from the specified group, and at a fundamental level, the speakers lack of respect for that group.

I find that I am partial to differing aspects of both approaches. Hom's external, causal source of racist institutions seems a better foundation for the beliefs which contribute to Camp's internal perspective. Camp's perspective is necessary because it incorporates the internal ordering of beliefs, rather then suggesting that the force of a slur is only determined by the external social factors experienced in a speech community. This hybrid allows for a slur's pejorative force to range (or not) between interlocutors of both similar or dissimilar experiences of the relevant racist institutions.

Hom and Camp [Raphael Nunziata]

 1. Hom’s account of slurs is that there  meaning comes from the derogatory content of the epithet and also the uses of the epithet, so it is an account that is mostly semantic but has a pragmatic strategy as well. This view that Hom advocates for, expresses that slurs stand by social constructs and there meaning corresponds from racist institutions.

2. Camp’s account of slurs is that they are based by perspective and argues this by the context, not the sound of such words or emotion put into the word. Furthermore,  Camp’s argues that these slurs have a referring facet to them, because of beliefs synonymous with the slur. She also highlights how slurs are mechanism to communicate feelings aside from contempt, but as sometimes a feeling of positivity.

3.While Camp’s account is compelling by accounting for more of the syntax of the word, I lean toward Hom’s view. Hom’s account looks at both the semantic and pragmatic strategy and takes both to make a better theory though looking at the content of the slur and meaning based by their racist institutions. Although Camp's view accounts for the content of slurs, Hom's is more wholesome and more persuasive by looking at the history and standings of slurs. 

Hom and Camp on slurs [Sam Hinderaker]

1. Hom is leaning towards and exploring an interpretation of these slurs that he calls the semantic strategy. This says that part of the actual meaning/definition of these slurs is the offense they cause. He believes that this is very context dependent however, and so the meanings of these words is to some degree determined by external forces.

2. Liz Camp is addressing the idea that it is difficult to disagree with a sentence that contains a slur without endorsing it yourself, because they remain offensive somewhat regardless of how they are used (they remain forceful in "complex constructions") She addresses what she calls the "other component" of slurs, which is separate from the predicated words, and its ability to force agreement in speakers in situations that other words (even other taboo words) don't seem to.

3. I find the first more compelling, mostly because I like the idea of the use of definitions of words being generated outside the speaker's head (which to me seems like an interesting but strong argument for the way slurs are often used) and because I agree that it seems that these slurs depend heavily on context to draw their meaning.

Hom and Camp [Alex Rowell]

Hom's account of slurs attempts to explain that slurs have partially hidden assertions within them that tend to have a negative context. Hom argues that slurs contain the non-pejorative counterpart as well as a series of traits and consequences that the members of the NPC should feel due to being the slur in question. Hom also highlights that the force of a slur is directly related to how strong the institutions that would back this slur are at a given point in time.

Camp's account of slurs argues for a perspective-based approach that is packaged in to each slur. Camp explains that slurs contain the perspective of a particular group in judging another group, and assign weight to specific attributes of the NPC group the slur points to, causing a hearer to focus in on these attributes and become complicit in the statements about this group which they may not consciously agree with. Camp focuses on the idea that this hidden bias is something that we intuitively reject, which explains the negative reaction non-bigoted listeners have to slurs.

I am not ready to give up on Hom's account, as it feels like it gives a clean and truth-evaluable way of dealing with slurs in general. However, Camp's account comes from a very intuitive and simple place that can explain the shifty and scalar nature of slurs just as well as Hom's account. I tend to lean toward Hom's account as it addresses how institutions influence slurs, and it also explains why slurs cannot be cancelled. However, Camp's account seems very strong and to me only falters in the area of truth evaluation.

Hom and Camp [Arthur Toland-Barber]

A part of what Hom talks about is how slurs are content dependent and they can’t be separated from that aspect, and he argues that there are more semantic than pragmatic. This is to say that slurs will always be degrading no matter when they are said, but they can vary on scope and harshness depending on the situation. The situations are derived from the racial institutions from where they are said, such as southern US compared the north-east US.

Camp claims that slurs are based upon perspectives and that they function differently than normal words. Slurs can just be heard by the listener to provoke an associated perspective that makes the listener consider the word from the view of the speaker, which states a certain belief system. While on the other hand, cursing words can add content without displaying a certain belief system (and are thus different from slurs). 

I believe that neither has the complete picture but they both have merits that explain certain questions about slurs. Hom’s theory accounts for how slurs can vary by intensity, and Camp shows how slurs have an inherit perspective that come with them. Both of these thoughts I believe apply to slurs and their linguistics value.

Hom and Camp [Christina Sanchez]

Hom brings up the idea that racial slurs are either semantic, which he argues more on the side for, or pragmatic. He also argues that slurs always have a negative connotation regardless of context, and these derogatory terms get their force by their meaning and racist institutions.

Camp argues that slurs get their negative force based on the perspective of the user. The force comes from what the user is implying rather than always being deemed negative. Camp also mentions that the negativity of a slur is dependent upon the relationship between the user and the target.

Given these two takes on slurs, I agree with parts of both, but I have to say I agree more so with Camp. This is because I can use derogatory words toward my best friends, such as calling her a "bitch" or something along those lines, and I do not mean that in a negative way, and she knows that. Because that is just how we talk to each other sometimes and neither of us mean anything negative by it, I have to go with the side that deals with the perspective of the user.

Camp time with Hom Sandwich [Danielle Trzil]

1. Hom first introduces the idea that racial epithets are generally believed to be either semantic (the derogatory meaning is expressed in every use of the word) or pragmatic (the derogatory meaning is based off of how they are used). While he merits each theory their due respect, he argues much more towards the semantic side. In the end, racial epithets express properties that are derived from racist institutions and carry the potential for being deeply hurtful and threatening, and this cannot be shrugged away with context.

2. Camp firmly argues that slurs are rhetorically powerful, and depend heavily on perspective. Using this treatment of slurs, she counterbalances the effects of the systematic effects and those that are left open to the conversation. She points how how we can't just take into consideration the semantic views all the while ignoring the role of the speaker and the attitudes they bring with the usage of the word.

3. I think that both arguments have a really great point, and honestly I think both can be true at the same time. This can be seen in example for when I called my roommate a, "Bitch" or "Hoe bag". I mean it as a term of endearment, and from my perspective and my roommate this is not a derogatory term or offensive. That being said, that does not change the fact that from an institutional perspective and those who do not know us, this would probably be seen as bullying or offensive.

Horn and Camp

Chris Hom argues that slurs, or racial epithets, are not pragmatic (as many people believe to be the case), but rather each slur is semantic, meaning the hatred that comes through each word is built into the word itself. Although Hom does state that both theories have issues, he believes that the semantic strategy “fares better on a number of criteria” (416).

Camp on the other hand argues that slurs do get their hatred from the perspectives of the one who gives the slur, rather than the word itself. Rather than the truth statement of the word, camp is focused more on the attitude that the word is intended depending on the one who uses it.

I agree more with Camp, who seems to argue that the derogatory slurs are derived from the perspective of the person using the word, rather than the word itself. There have been words that are now currently used which are considered to be slurs; however, in the past they had conveyed different meaning and was not considered to be universally derogatory. I agree that slurs are context dependent and words gain their meaning from the perspective or attitude that the person who uses it.

Hom and Camp [Alberto Torrigiotti]

Hom introduces combinatorial externalism (a semantic theory) because he sees no way for pragmatic minimalism to account for certain properties of slurs, and rejects radical contextualism for its wholesale skepticism toward semantic explanations. Probably the biggest difference between Hom's theory and Camp's is what makes Hom's theory externalist, i.e., that the force and meaning of the derogatory content in slurs is causally dependent upon the institutions that inform those slurs. Hom takes combinatorial externalism to be a sort of natural development of semantic externalism applied to slurs.

Camp's theory does not really set out to argue for or against semantic/pragmatic approaches to the study of slurs, and doesn't really engage with many of Hom's arguments directly or specifically. She wants to argue that what gives slurs their rhetorical force must be something like an allegiance to some perspective; perspectivalism is primarily concerned with the contributions of the speaker and recipient in uses of slurs. By using some slur, we signal our "affiliation with a way of thinking and feeling" about the targeted group, which is why listeners and bystanders may feel complicit simply in virtue of allowing themselves to entertain these thoughts and feelings, or engage with them on any level at all. (Camp 2013, 340)

I was initially convinced by Hom's sentiment that slurs ought not to be treated on an ad hoc basis because there is a sense in which it would seem superficial or arbitrary to treat slurs as exceptions or as so different from anything else in language that it ought to be approached uniquely, but I don't think I feel this way anymore. This change has led me to have more sympathy for Camp's view, particularly with regard to unique perspectival considerations for slurs, and though there certainly are incompatibilities between Hom's and Camp's theories, I think that there is room for them to be combined into a better overarching theory. Altogether, I probably have to favor Hom's theory because it is clearer, more comprehensive, gives deeper explanations for truth conditions, and includes elements or adaptations from semantic externalism which resemble my own view.

Horn and Camp [Adam Plesser]

1. Hom argues that slurs derive their derogatory force from their meaning, which is defined primarily by institutions in place amongst the speakers of a language. Horn's externalist semantics helps clarify how slurs can change in meaning or degree of offensiveness. 
2. Camp argues that slurs derive derogatory force from context; the force comes from the speaker's implication that they are affirming a certain perspective. Racial slurs, for example, derive derogatory force from their implication that the speaker endorses the hatred of the race in question as a consequence of their race.
3. I prefer Horn's account because it better explains how words can have derogatory force even when we use great care to make clear that we are not endorsing their meaning. The existence of the phrase "the N word" is difficult to account for on Camp's account. She might claim that such a phrase is merely a more convenient way of pointing to the original term, but making clear that the speaker does not endorse its perspective, but this explanation feels too facile; intuition strongly suggests that the phrase does not merely exist for the sake of convenience. 

Hom and Camp [Hayley Thompson]

Hom argues that slurs always carry an inherent negative connotation regardless of how, when, and why they are used. Even when used by the target group, or in a 'positive' manner, these words still carry their pejorative power, which these groups may try to reclaim as their own.

Camp argues a perspectivalist view of slurs, which holds that the pejorativity of a word depends on the speakers relationship with a target group. The word is only pejorative if the speaker intends it as such or does not have an inside or close relation with the target group.

I tend to side with Camp over Hom, since words such as 'queer' may lose their negative connotations in certain groups and environments. While Hom (and Hornsby) makes a good point that groups may try to reclaim words for use of the power that comes with their pejorativity, I believe over time the words become normalized and start to lose their negative connotations. Since Seattle is a largely liberal city, many of us Seattlites know people who identify as 'queer' if we do not ourselves. The term, at least in Seattle, seems to have become so commonplace, that the 'queer' is acceptable or even preferred term to refer to the lgbtqia community and its members, regardless of whether the speaker is one, as long as its not said with negative context or attitude. In other words, the majority of Seattle has a relationship with the target group that warrants a non-pejorative use of the word. In more conservative locations, the word may be pejorative regardless of who says it.

My Perspective on Camp and What Horn's Article Means

1. Horn is arguing for an account of slurs that locates its power in its meaning. By meaning, we are referring to intrinsic properties of the word itself. This is to say that the nature of slurs being derogatory is not primarily due to the context of the speaker but some actual force or institution that is inherit to the word itself which makes it derogatory.

2. Camp argues on grounds of perspectivism. Camp states that usage of a slur is to take on a certain kind of attitude that reflects the derogatory sentiment that usage of a slur implies. To make a claim that uses a slur is not merely based in truth or falsity but the making of the claim and agreement with it depends on the perspective one has in the matter.

3. I tend to lean towards Horn's semantic account of slurs, because it actually seems to provide a general framework for how words have meaning. To say that the derogatory nature is intrinsic in the way Horn describes is not to imply that words or slurs have some natural meaning but that the words come to have meaning is through some force or relationship. In the cases of slurs, the derogatory nature lies not in an individual's hateful attitudes but rather the word's power comes to exist as something derogatory in nature as it exists as part of a derogatory force or structure.

Hom & Camp [Jonathan Kosaka]

Chris Hom critiques and builds off of Hornsby's account of slurs, introducing the institutional basis for them as well as combinatorial externalism, where the derogatory properties are semantically accounted for. This leads to Hom's position on slurs to be able to account for the "shifty and scalar" aspects of slurs.

Liz Camp's argument takes the existing positions on slurs and introduces perspectivalism; the derogatory power of a slur is derived from various feelings of the agent who uses the term. Camp's argument holds slurs to actually refer to something, as evident by those who use them needed to believe or prescribe to a certain belief set.

I found Hom's account more persuasive as he does not rely on the introduction of derogating perspectives (Camp, 2013, 331) instead basing his theory on the philosophy of language. Camp's theory also seems to incorporate many variables and influences into describing an account of slurs, she draws from many previous philosophers/commentators (Camp, 2013 339), and doesn't give a ready account for how these parts come together to form the derogatory aspects of a slur.

Hom and Camp [Rigo Acevedo]

1. Hom presents an argument for what he calls Combinatorial Externalism, which suggests that racial epithets gain their ability to express socially constructed, negative properties by standing in a certain causal relationship with racial institutions. These racial institutions are composed of ideologies and certain sets of practices that distinguish themselves and their view. It is with these distinguished views and the size of these racial institutions that endow racial epithets with their expressive content and strength.

2. Camp presents an argument for Perspectivism, which suggests that racial epithets gain their expressive content and power through the identification that a speaker signals their allegiance to a certain perspective. Adopting a perspective requires that a speaker notice and remember particular features of a group, to a point in which these features become salient, along with holding the believe that some features of a group are central to their identity. For slurs, perspectives hold negative intentions and beliefs and it is this cognitive position that is conveyed when a slur is exclaimed.

3. I find Hom's argument to be more compelling. Both seem to present arguments that the expressive content that is expressed when slurs are said or mentioned appear to come from some external source or causal relationship. However, I feel that Camp's perspective(ism) doesn't seem to exactly account for why slurs hold their expressive power when mentioned, and not said. Regardless of the intent, or true perspective of a speaker it appears as if slurs still hold their expressive power and ability to cause a strong feeling in all listeners- whether the listener is of the target group, or whether the speaker is merely mentioning the slur.

Horn and Camp on slurs [Evan Cottingham]

1. In his article, Horn discusses the inadequacy of both the semantic and pragmatic strategy of explaining the meaning behind racial slurs. In doing so, Horn advocates the combinatorial externalism view. The CE view suggests that the meaning of racial slurs are derived from the racist institutions they connected to and the negative properties they are intended to express.

2. Camp argues that racial slurs are more related to the perspectives of the user of those slurs. She states that slurs are used to communicate the strong negative perspectives towards a specific group. In this way, slurs are used to derogate rather than simply express contempt.

3. Although I find Camp's thoughts about slurs being used to derogate compelling, I agree more with Horn's combinatorial externalism viewpoint. I think that combinatorial externalism does more to account for the history behind slurs and how that contributes to their meaning by connecting slurs to racist institutions.

Asserting the Negation versus Denial [Ryan Tarbet]

Asserting the Negation versus Denial:

                In another paper authored in part by Elisabeth Camp, the subject of my last blog post, and John Hawthorne, they explore the case of “like prefixed sarcasm” such as ‘Like that’s a good idea’.  One of their core claims in this essay is that in contrast to bare-sarcasm, ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm focuses on expressing the illocutionary force of denial.  Take for example the sarcastic utterances of:

1.       1. ‘Like that’s a good idea”

2.       2. ‘That’s a brilliant idea’  

1.’s focal content sounds like it is mocking anyone who would utter that sentence more than it is asserting the negation of the idea, ‘that’s a bad idea’.  The way they put it is that ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm “denies the possibility that the embedded sentence could be true” while asserting the negation “commits the speaker to the truth of its negation” (Camp and Hawthorne, 12).  It is in this regard that Camp and Hawthorne see pretense as playing a role in sarcastic utterances. 

                Additionally, Camp and Hawthorne state that in contrast to the paradigm cases of sarcasm the implicature of ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm is undeniable (given that they call their illocutionary force ‘denial’ it is important to not confuse the un-deniability of ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm with the denial, the mocking effect of its use).  Deniability is directly analogous to Grice’s cancelability which is to say that after an utterance of 1., a speaker cannot genuinely state that they really meant that the idea was good.  Whereas in 2. that could be the case.  To this end, I would classify ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm as a conventional implicature rather than a conversational one. 

                What is interesting to me is to think about how these are different.  It has been difficult for me to separate these ideas of cancelability and denial.  To some extent I find that this distinction tracks how we use sarcasm on certain occasions but at the same time I am not certain that mocking a view by using ‘like’ prefixed sarcasm translates to denying the possibility that it could be true.  Also, it is not clear how that is different from asserting the negation.  Anyways, I am very curious to hear what others may think is going on here. 

                Camp, E. and Hawthorne, J. (2008).  Sarcastic ‘Like’: A Case Study in the Interface of Syntax and Semantics.  Philosophical Perspectives 22:1: Language and Logic, ed. J. Hawthorne (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008).

Sarcasm's Inversion of Meaning [Ryan Tarbet]

Sarcasm’s Inversion of Meaning:

Is sarcasm an assertion of the negation of the semantic content of a sentence and/or is it an expression of an evaluative attitude of a position?  Are those two things different?  Take for example the sarcastic utterances of:

1.       “Thanks for holding the door”

2.       “I never  eat cake frosting directly from the container”

First off, there’s the question as to whether or not you consider 1. and 2. sarcastic but what I want to discuss is how Elisabeth Camp approaches the inversion of meaning that occurs in sarcasm. 

                Camp makes a case for sarcasm in a way that mediates a semanticist approach, one which takes sarcasm to be a syntactic operator indicated by speaker-tone, and an expressivist approach, one that disregards the compositionality of an utterance in favor of the illocutionary force.  She argues that sarcasm, similar to metaphor, embodies a function in our use of language that cannot entirely be reduced to “what is said” nor to the illocutionary dimension of speech.  To me this seems like an obvious move, especially given that indirect speech as we have viewed it through Grice is an analysis of semantic content, context and illocutionary force.  Ultimately, the view attempts to break the traditional view that sarcasm is more than the negation of its semantic content.

                So, for example, is 1. Saying that the speaker is not thankful? Well, yes but that doesn’t seem to be the full story. 1. More accurately is drawing attention to the fact that the audience didn’t save the speaker a seat. It communicates the (passive aggressive) perlocutionary effect of shaming or embarrassment.  So, it seems like this utterance isn’t merely asserting “It’s not the case that I thank you for…” but rather it is drawing attention to where that utterance would be appropriate and contrasting it with what happened.   Here, Camp draws attention to some ignored instances of sarcasm where the inversion isn’t strictly semantic but takes place on a perlocutionary or illocutionary level.  Camp argues that much of the discussion on sarcasm has revolved around assertions, something like 2., and we ought to extend our gaze to more perplexing examples of verbal irony.

                I take her account of the inversion of perlocutionary effect or illocutionary force quite accurate in how we use sarcasm.  Does this account make sense?     

Camp, E.. (2012). Sarcasm, Pretense, and The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Noûs, 46(4), 587–634. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41682690

Hornsby on Slurs [Alberto Torrigiotti]

I agree with Hornsby that one can refer to someone through the use of a derogatory word D without necessarily being committed to condemning that particular person for embodying all the characteristics of D. The example of 'Boche' is used to bring out the point that in applying a derogatory word D to a person, she need not believe that that person manifests every bit of ideology that informs D. (Hornsby 2001, 9) Hornsby argues, I think correctly, that users of derogatory words often acquire these words in their social language "quite easily", and that the acquisition and use of derogatory words are not necessarily a reflection of endorsing the ideological underpinnings of the word's history,

I am not very much convinced by anything said in the paragraph subtitled "Useless Words", so I find it difficult to take this assumption as a starting point. For instance, I see no reason why one cannot accept a claim that uses a derogatory word in the same way that he can accept a claim that uses a slang (even if the slang word is not one he endorses). (Hornsby 2001, 2-3) Now, of course, I understand what Hornsby means when she says this, and in many cases, an upstanding moral person will have no engagement with claims which use derogatory words as constituents. In these cases, the words are "useless" only in the sense that it would be "useless" to try to climb over an infinitely high wall. In other words, and I think Hornsby must agree, they are not useless if by "useless" we mean serving no function or inconsequential. I think it would have been helpful if Hornsby spent more time defining "useless" instead of taking the assumption that it is unproblematic and virtually universally accepted that derogatory words are useless.

What does Hornsby have to say about people who include derogatory words in their vocabulary? Are these people so morally reprehensible if they so much as "endorse" a claim that uses a derogatory word? Does she believe that claims including a derogatory word can only be entertained or engaged with seriously by neglecting some morally obvious truth, say a failure to recognize the ethical ramifications of prescribing to derogatory vocabulary? What separates the derogatory content of a word like 'bitch' from a word like 'buffoon' except for its severity?

H@!&$by [Drew Owens]

I am inclined to agree with Hornsby's handling of the Inferentialist view of derogatory words. It seems that the use of a derogatory word cannot carry with it some implicit intention to carry every aspect of ideology related to that word. If this were the case, casual use of such words would seem to not function int the way such use does. This would be due in part to this observation by Hornsby; "If speakers involvement with the ideology went so deep as it would need to in order to be implicit in their very use of words, then common understandings would be difficult to preserve (Hornsby, 2001, 137)."

I have trouble with Hornsby's stance on the uselessness of words. Perhaps I am not understanding her use of uselessness, but I think that derogatory words do have some use. This may be erring to much on the side of pragmatic use, but implementation of such words can often be an attempt to evoke some emotion. This is only one example, even with such a limited counterargument I find that I am not convinced by Hornsby's position.

I guess my question is, in regards to the example of the teenager's use of slang, is it actually that different of a barrier? It seems that this result could be attained if we view the barrier as being set in sociolinguistic terms. In some situations that barrier would not exist, given the correct environs and circumstances perhaps you would say "wicked" (or "golly" or whatever).

On Derogatory Words [Yuchen Jiang]

I really agree Hornsby's emphasis on the involvement of speaker as a crucial factor in concerning question about the meaning of a word in a given sentence. I take his investigation as a way to give objections to views that regard meanings of word as independent to the speaker. Moreover, I also think his account that address the use of derogatory word as a gesture that requires a interpreter to grasp captures the main point that "practice of language ... [is not] a heartless mechanical affair (141)."

I regard his point as highlighting  the natural use of language as a means of perform exchange of ideas and emotions between different individuals. Yet it captures only one perspective of language, language can also be used as a way of describe and recording things, and the origin of derogatory words may rest here. Therefore, even derogatory words have various perspectives, and it may be the case that some derogatory words indeed have another life in describing and recording other than merely producing a gesture.

In this way, I think Hornsby's account regard derogatory words would be more concise if he shows enough awareness of how some special derogatory words can be used neutrally and how some words can occasionally be used as derogatory words.

Hornsby [Gabriel Debacker]

Hornsby's conclusion about language being a "mechanical affair" without speakers proved his point about words and their connotations to me more than any of his other arguments. Words can have meanings of their own, but only because of what we attribute to them as speakers and audience members ourselves.

Hornsby's account of how these words are 'useless' and the reason why certain viewpoints cannot account for them seems lacking to me. The examples were just a little weak.

I'm not sure I completely understand what Hornsby means by calling derogatory terms 'useless,' but if it means that the word itself is not necessary for speech (because of alternative terms or what have you) then I would have to argue that a lot of words are 'useless' based on the same logic.

Hornsby [Anthony Baker]

I agree with the idea given by Hornsby exhibited in this quote as "When words--racist words, say-- have been used too often in a way that purports to validate the attitudes they impart, there is nothing to be done except to find different words" (Hornsby 133). This highlights natural flux of words and their meanings. It seems to sum up well how words, especially derogatory ones, can at one point time mean to convey a certain attitude, but a totally new one at a later point. However this does depend heavily on a locality context, as mentioned by Hornsby earlier on.

I can't say that there is any fundamental part of Hornsby that I disagree with, however if I were to quibble with one bit, it would be her idea that "a word with connotations carries those connotations" when put into use (140). Directly claiming this seems to bring about a contrary idea about how each person's understanding of a word, and its respective connotations may vary, even locally, so its hard to know which 'connotations' being communicated are in common from one conversation to the next.

Hornsby claims at one point that "the contours of the space of possible acts done with sentences containing particular derogatory words are discernible only from the standpoint of someone who can know what the words mean," and I would like to object on a small and fairly shaky ground, that while being in a position to understand the words requires that you know what they ALL mean, discerning some contours of this space I'd claim don't require that you know what the words mean (135). Perhaps some foreign derogatory word is spoken a certain way each time it's said to you (say the utterer yells and laughs while saying it), it follows that you may understand that you are being insulted, and that you'd respond the same way if it were to happen again.

Hornsby on slurs [Samuel Hinderaker]

1) "Without the postures, movements, and expressions of talking human bodies, the practice of language would be a heartless mechanical affair, and very different from how it actually is" I really like this quote and strongly agree with it; Hornsby recognizes that the intent and context surrounding the use of a slur is important in considering the meaning it has.

2)"But if this is what Hare intends, then he is denying that words are ever useless. In finding a word useless, we assume that we are not in a position to mean by it something different from that which those who use it mean." (133) I disagree with this - there have been many instances in the past of the meaning of a word changing or acquiring new connotations through use. Though it may be difficult, especially with a slur, the possibility of changing the meaning of one does seem possible.

3) For a question, I'm not sure I understand Hornsby's rejection of the "doog" example (on page 132) because she responds to the idea of a purely descriptive word by saying "But it does not seem we can [introduce such a word]."

Hornsby on Slurs [Hui Yang]

I agree with Hornsby on the people who use "derogatory words" do not necessarily express hatred, although it is the case sometimes. I can add even more examples from other situations on top of the ones in the article. For instance, the word "nigger", or typed as "nigga" nowadays, are commonly used to mean something good, especially within the people with color. I have some black and Latino friends, who call each other "my nigga", and I see things like "only love niggas" on my Facebook newsfeed all the time. I have to admit that I do have friends warning me do not use this word (just in case I am a FOB/fresh out of a boat and thus do not know the cultural norms) because I am not black or Latina/the ones can use this word. Still, I have Asian American friends who grew up in the black community use the word "nigga" comfortably. As "whore" is the negative version of the word "prostitute", it seems okay to call a girlfriend "my dirty little whore" sometimes (in "you know" kind of situations).

I do not agree with Hornsby though, on her definition of "derogatory words" though. I particularly do not agree with her practice of using Oxford dictionary as sort of justification. Yes, dictionary "defines" meanings of words in common sense, but not in the discussion of the philosophy of words. Dictionaries usually are revised once in a while, but the way we interpret languages should be something timeless and universal. I also do not agree with her using "uselessness" to call derogatory words. I admit that when I say "I fucking love chocolate," I never indicate there is something sexual between me and chocolate, nor I am angry at/hate chocolate, still this sentence somehow indicates a different level of love than merely say "I love chocolate." It emphasizes the word "love" in fact in this particular sentence. Here is a good example why I think some derogatory words are not useless: http://www.lionking.org/~mirri/Intro/TAFTMGUOTWFIASS.htm

I have something more like a question than an objection for Hornsby: when people use those sensitive words instead of the neutral versions, they can say they do not intend to offend others. Also, there are always people offended no matter what you say. Just see any popular Facebook posts and try to find one without any negative comments! So are the people who use the language or the people who hear it the ones deciding if it conveys hatred? If the intention decides, then it is like saying one always knows himself/herself the best, which is not always the case (e.g. you go to see a psychologist).

In the end, I have to share a sentence from a meme I saw yesterday on Facebook (well, it might not be relevant but totally related), "when you say f**k instead of fuck, God still knows what you mean, and he thinks you are a pussy." Meow~~

Hornsby [Henry Tran]

1. Something that I agreed with Hornsby on slurs is how they were described, there are neutral counterparts aside from the derogatory parts of the use of the words. Such as the fact that "Nigger" could mean something not derogatory to some users. For example meaning something like dark skinned or African. In another case as Hornsby states that "Politically active African Americans use the word ‘niggers’ of themselves" and "enables a word to take on a new meaning"(Hornsby 2001, 134) in account of a different attitude of use. So it seems to me that there are multiple counterparts to slurs rather than just the derogatory.

2. Something that I disagreed with in Hornsby's account of slurs is the uselessness of slurs, specifically when it is said that "..there are other words that suit us better" then derogatory words. I disagree because it isn't the words themselves that give their derogatory meanings but the ways speakers use it. There seems to be a mentality that those slurs are hurtful and discriminating because of how people use them.

3. Attributing to the last disagreement, the thing that I had an objection about in my mind was the fact that Hornsby said that slurs were useless. When people use slurs they put forth an attitude by using those derogatory words, usually anger or harmful intent. Therefore I question how Hornsby sees how derogatory words are "useless" when in fact they hold a emotion behind them.

Hornsby [Rigo Acevedo]

1. I agree with Hornsby that context is an important consideration for the full evaluation of the meaning of a statement, especially when considering slurs. The various gestures that are expressed by individuals appear to add something to meaning or intent beyond what is explicitly stated, and in some cases, can completely alter how the listener interprets our statements.

2. I don't believe that derogatory words are 'useless' as Hornsby suggests. To say that there are neutral counterparts to all derogatory words seems counter intuitive because many would argue that derogatory words seem to possess their own distinct meaning or intent (all variations of intent) that is specific to their utterance.  The utterance of a derogatory statement may invoke change in the emotions of the listener, regardless of the context or the intent of the speaker.

3. I object to the idea of words being only a result of the context of the practices of embodied speakers. It seems if when looking at the time before words, we could imagine that gestures would be necessary to rely meaning, however, words were meant to overcome the limits that are imposed on communication when we rely on gestures alone, so it seems hard to argue that words require gestures or expressions in order to possess any meaning. It would seem that we would rely upon direct meanings of words in order to relay something beyond what gestures could accomplish by any extension.

Hornsby [Raphael Nunziata]

I agree with Hornsby, that derogatory words prevent us from “reaching a theoretical perspective on question about meaning,” because derogatory words don’t not have meaning. Since derogatory words are names and names do not have meaning, because of there altering descriptions. These words, like names, are based by historical or past descriptions (there is also no definition, but the definition the user gives the word), since these descriptions are subject to times change, meaning must stand the test of time.

I disagree with Hornsby that derogatory words are “useless,” because the words have a use in a communicative sense of ideas or emotion, such as in the arts of music and poetry. For example, when a rapper is spitting lines, the rapper uses words as tools to communicate an impactful emotion or something that will captivate the listener. Although, the word could be replaced with a  complex string of other words, its by the simplicity of a single word that gives the effect it gives.

Do derogatory words only act as names or do they act as nouns as well?

Hornsby on slurs [Morgan Johnson]

1. I agree with Hornsby's claim at the end of her paper that we cannot evaluate the use of slurs in language by simply examining examining the words themselves. We must take into account the "postures, movements, and expressions of talking human bodies" as well as "the practices of embodied speakers" in order to accurately examine "the practice of language... [and] how it actually is". (Hornsby, 2001,  p. 141) Language is more than just how words interact with each other and the world and, especially with slurs, we must take into account the unspoken aspects of language in order to understand them.

2. I don't think I agree with Hornsby's claim that derogatory words always have neutral counterpart, or that this counterpart is relevant when we are discussing the derogatory use of the word. By this I mean that when slurs are used, many of their users don't know what the neutral counterpart of the slur is, and even if they are aware what the neutral counterpart is, it would not capture the same meaning or force of the slur. If one were to replace the use of the N-word in a statement they made with 'African-American' I don't think the meaning of the original statement would be completely captured using the neutral counterpart instead of the slur.

3. Are slurs actually useless, or are theorist actively avoiding them because of the underlying negativity slurs carry? I feel like slurs are in fact useful and that when they are used there is "something we want to say with them", but the way they are useful and what the user is trying to say with them is so distasteful that many people wouldn't want to be associated with them (p. 129). It seems like a cop out to say that slurs are useless and the claim that "most of us probably have no trace of a tendency to use them" does not mean they do not in fact have a use. There are many words that most people have "no trace of a tendency to use them" such as 'skirr' which means 'move, fly etc. rapidly' because there are "other words that suit us better", but that does not mean the word 'skirr' is useless (p. 129).

Hornsby [Christina Sanchez]

I agree with Hornsby's general definition of derogatory words. I think they are generally known for being both commonly understood to convey hatred and contempt, and there could be another word used in place of a derogatory one applied to the same people (Hornsby 2001, p. 128). Overall, these are good guidelines to go by when looking at derogatory words.

One aspect of Hornsby's work that I am not quite sure I agree with is when she talks about derogatory words being "useless". Although I do not think we should use derogatory words, they still express some uses even if those uses are negative and have only negative connotations. Derogatory words can be used to express negative emotions toward someone or something, and even though I do not morally support using them, derogatory words, in my opinion, cannot really be deemed useless.

A question I might have about Hornsby's writing involves situations where we might be joking around. Using derogatory words when joking around with a friend or sibling can still have a negative connotation, but I am not sure that all uses of these words have to be filled with nothing but hatred. What is Hornsby's opinion about situations such as this?

Hornsby [Arthur Toland-Barber]

I agree with Hornsby that utterances of slurs may not contain the actual meaning of the slur uttered (such as what a historian would find to be true of the word as Hornsby points out). I agree with this because I know several slurs myself, but I don't have nearly enough knowledge of their origins or meanings. The only knowledge I know of most slurs are the people or group they refer to.

I generally disagree that slurs are "useless" as the author describes them. Just as there are many different ways to say the same thing (synonyms), each one still serves some kind of purpose and has different meaning behind them. There are, of course, better words that we can use to describe a situation and words that give more meaning to our thoughts, but that doesn't mean that lesser forms of communication are useless.

I would ask if using a slur to refer to oneself has any additional meaning or if this would also be considered useless as it doesn't describe anything?

Hornsby {Korey Nuehs}

1.       I agree with Hornsby in that I don’t think a derogatory term user is necessarily committed to a huge web of racist ideology. But I don’t know if one can have a negative attitude towards something without said ideology, as she seems to implicitly state. It seems that they are committed to at least part of the ideology, i.e., unless they also have the corresponding intention to use the term in its prescribed way.

2-3.       I don’t know if I completely agree with Hornsby’s criticism of Brandom (although, I will say that the paper was kind of a slog for me using a lot of terms I don’t know). It seems to me that derogatory words are simply expressions such as ‘that A is bad_ (insert derogatory term here)’, with bad and good both being somewhat indefinable and based upon the speaker’s ideology; and derogatory words being confined to certain social groups within said ideology. I don’t know if someone has to commit to a bunch of ideological principles other than stating that ‘A is bad (or at the very least, doesn’t conform to my view of the world)’ within a certain ideological framework. In this sense, it would seem derogatory terms do two things state a principle within the framework and enforce the ideology onto the external world, which also seems to disprove Hornsby’s statement that Derogatory words are useless as a term such as ‘terrorist’ or 'extremist' could be derogatory, while also having a fairly agreed upon use.

Hornsby on Slurs [Alex Rowell]

I agree with Hornsby's assertion that slurs end up meaningless and have difficulties fitting in to theories of truth. I can definitely see where a speaker's desire not to align themselves with the connotations of a word would deny the use of the word entirely, as it seems to color everything near it. Also, due to the hidden emotional subtext it is difficult to actually evaluate the accuracy of a slur when there is a neutral counterpart that better serves the conversation.

I disagree with an assertion Hornsby lays out about removing the negative connotations of words by using them. I think Hornsby herself disagreed with this assertion, saying that those who are 'taking the words back' (to use modern phrasing) are doing so explicitly and it could not happen if they didn't consciously disavow the negative meaning of the words while using them. This is complicated in the last few years with some groups trying to take back words without being so explicit in their disavowing, while still using the words.

Question 1: Is the use of slurs really an ethical question, in that we don't want to spread around these particular emotional connotations and give them more strength?
Question 2: Where do slurs fit in the scheme of implication? Are they general?

Hornsby on Slurs [Sean Wammer]

1.
I agree with Hornsby on her objection to Hare because it seems like slurs are much more complicated than only the case where a term is used to express hate toward someone who is of the neutral counterpart. In particular, it seems like derogatory terms are offensive at least in part because of the intention of the speaker, regardless of the person the slur is directed toward.

2.
I disagree with Hornsby when she claims that "the beliefs dredged up in spelling [structures underpinning uses of derogatory words] out do not belong in an account of how individual speakers use the words on each occasion" (Hornsby 2001, 138). Intentionally using derogatory terms that are known to carry inflammatory beliefs to refer to certain people  is important enough that it effects our account of how speakers are using these words. Certain words carry strong enough connotations that using them off-highhandedly seems to be negligent and disrespectful.

3.
What exactly does Hornsby mean when she says derogatory words are "useless?" She says that there are other words that suit us better, so we can completely do without the offensive counterparts. She also says that we cannot endorse anything that is done with derogatory words. It seems like slurs have such immense connotation associated with them (unlike other words), and some people do use these words and endorse their use (that is why we are interested in slurs). In what ways are slurs really useless?

--Sean Wammer

Hornsby [Hayley Thompson]

I agree with Hornsby that derogatory words are "useless" since they are only used when the speaker wants to say something negative about another person, but does not have anything substantial to claim. If a speaker has a legitimate reason to dislike another person they can describe this without using a derogatory term. It is only when the speaker feels that their argument against the other person is feeble or unfounded, that they may find themselves throwing out derogatory terms, to make that person look bad. Most people have no use for these terms because they do not describe other people as objectionable without a reason, or almost never have an audience that approves of them doing so.

While I do not blatantly disagree with any of Hornsby's arguments, I have some trouble understanding the example of Hare's made-up word "doog", what it is meant to illustrate, and why Hornsby argues against it.  

Derogatory words seem to have the same referents and denotations as others that are not derogatory, but instead have different, negative, senses and connotations. When we object to derogatory words, we object to their senses rather than their referents.

Hornsby on slur

I agree with Hornsby in the problem that inferentialism does not account for all derogatory terms, and thus cannot be a proper explanation for the uselessness of words. The example Hornsby gives of the English woman in 1950 making an generalization demonstrates this well, when describing not of the German couples themselves, but “couple moving in next door belong to a nation whose members are barbarous, etc.” (136).

I disagree with Hornsby’s conclusion in finding more suitable words to replace derogatory terms. I think that although some words may currently be derogatory, the issue is not the word itself but rather the intent behind the word. While Hornsby may believe that replacing these words itself will solve the issue, I think that the problem is not in the word itself, but the perspectives people have towards whatever derogatory term they are targeting.

I object to to Hornsby’s account that words have come to carry particular overtones or connotations (138). I do not want to say that some words do not carry connotations, however this is very subjective in that words do not necessarily always carry overtones or connotations;rather it is more of a case by case basis where words carry connotations.

Hornsby [Evan Cottingham]

1. I agree with Hornsby's view of slurs for the most part. I agree that slurs cannot be placed into meaning theories. There are certainly words that could be used to more precisely communicate about or describe something while slurs carry connotations.

2. From a language standpoint, I do not totally agree that slurs should be considered "useless." Morally, one could say that they shouldn't be used, but the fact is that slurs carry connotations and thus can be used to express emotions. Because of this, I wouldn't consider slurs useless in language.

3. Is it fair of Hornsby to say that slurs are useless? Slurs hold connotations and thus are used to convey, often negative, attitudes and emotions. Is there meaning in that?

"Hornsby on Slurs": A Title that I Have a Use for Whose Meaning Is Not of Importance

1. I agree with this notion of speaking about derogatory words in such a way that moves away from sort of descriptionist/verificationist methods. When we consider the ethics of slurs especially, it seems that our focus should not be the meaning that these words entail or the claims expressed when these words are used, but rather the illocutionary force behind them.

2. I think a point of contention on the ethical analysis of things is the sort of utilitarian language that is used to express the unethical practices of derogatory use. When we speak of derogatory words as there being no use for them, it seems to imply this sort of thinking that it's wrong because it serves no greater good and we shouldn't use it because it serves no purpose. While that may in fact be the case, I think there is something deeper about the ethical problems that come with using slurs and the fact that slurs serve no greater purpose is a corollary of what is actually wrong about their use.

3. I think the account does a good job attempting to locate language in a more human-centric way where it's important to look at the way individuals use language as important to a general discussion on language and thus use of derogatory language. I think, however, that this move looks at language use as actions themselves and thus the ethical problem lies within the act and the act themselves should be of ethical analysis and this seems to be different from the analysis that Hornsby puts forth - that language is used for purposes.