I think that Mill is on the right track here, especially when we examine the argument in terms of physical objects. The object that we call a laptop is still the same object regardless of if we call it by some other name, as evidenced by the fact that multiple languages refer to this object in different ways but it maintains all critical properties.
Locke: Is Locke approaching the problem of naming by focusing on ideas and concepts more than objects? I could see the argument that 'justice', 'freedom', and other concepts are more based in how the person views them than in a concrete and definite object.
Mill: How does Mill handle arguments that focus on naming the "ideas of things", as mentioned above?
I'm really not sure how Mill can handle arguments that focus on naming the "ideas of things." I think your argument can be applied to the ideas of objects too, not only physical objects. Even by a different name, the idea of a laptop is still the same idea. I think that you've shown that ideas of objects and physical objects themselves are independent of their names, but we require more here to say that names refer to physical objects and not the ideas of them. In other words, I don't know how Mill gets around this either.
ReplyDeleteUpon some reflection, I think Mill sort of deals with the issue but not entirely to my satisfaction. [pg 035] "Virtuous, for example, is the name of a class, which includes Socrates, Howard, the Man of Ross, and an undefinable number of other individuals, past, present, and to come. These individuals, collectively and severally, can alone be said with propriety to be denoted by the word: of them alone can it properly be said to be a name. But it is a name applied to all of them in consequence of an attribute which they are supposed to possess in common, the attribute which has received the name of virtue. It is applied to all beings that are considered to possess this attribute; and to none which are not so considered."
DeleteThat argument can handle things like 'just' or 'free' in reference to a person, but not 'justice' or 'freedom'. If we argue that 'justice' relates to 'being just' and 'freedom' to 'being free', Mill's argument can handle this counter. However, if we treat 'justice' and 'freedom' as concepts in their own right, I don't think it addresses the issue.