Locke and Mill [Alberto Torrigiotti]

       I agree with Locke that when one uses a word, he cannot help but use it to stand for his idea of an object; he is bound to operate within his particular language or apparatus for perception, understanding, etc. There are in my mind strong reasons to reject that anything like a direct experiencing of objects is possible or even intelligible, but I suppose I am presently open to the possibility that words can "stand for" objects, depending on the sense of "stand for" employed. Still, Mill's example of the sun causing day purports to show that words actually "stand for" objects and not ideas, but merely demonstrates the trivial truth that we take them to correspond to a level of reality outside of our own minds.

Locke: I am curious what Locke would regard as the important difference, if indeed he contends there is one, between ritualized utterances with signification, e.g., "it's a piece of cake" and natural utterances, e.g., "it's sunny outside".

Mill: Mill raises a very interesting point in his example of Dartmouth in which a wide range of conditions could obtain to drastically change its elements, but we may still regard it as Dartmouth. Mill seems to think this is only possible for proper names, but I can think of many examples of words which are not proper names with this quality--water for instance.

Locke and Mill [Hui Yang]

In terms of who I THINK is closer to the truth, Locke is certainly the one with a view much more closer to mine. I, an agnostic, don’t BELIEVE things exist because people BELIEVE they exist, so to me, while Mill SAYS there is a “physical” thing, that thing may not even necessarily exist. Mill intentionally chooses “sun”, a physical object commonly believed to be true (“it is true”), in his example, which makes his argument seem quite strong. However, if I replace the word “sun” with the word “God”, it is clear for many people this statement will not sound as strong anymore.

My question to Locke would be “does it seem problematic then, in such a case as you describe, people still can communicate in a degree and agree on certain issues?”

My question to Mill would be similar to what I just questioned in the first paragraph, which is “how do you explain then, when people disagree with each other on certain issues, if language necessarily reflects ‘truth’?"

Locke and Mill [Gabriel Debacker]

I think Mill does a better job in defining the meaning and reference of our terms. Locke has a point that we as humans give names to things, and that those names have no meaning whatsoever outside of our perspective, however Mill admits as much and goes into much further detail (admittedly, mostly about names) on the categorization of words and their uses.

Does Locke in saying "Till he has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them: for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing" mean that if someone were to give me a sentence consisting of words that I do not know or understand, and repeat this sentence to another who does know and understand those words, that the sentence is meaningless to another? He seems to put a heavy emphasis on the use of words to express ideas, and that words themselves have no life of their own except what an individual gives to them.

When Mill says that there is good sense in calling "the word sun the name of the sun, and not the name of our idea of the sun" he does not mean that everyone will think of the physical object itself, or even think of the object in the same way. He admits that it is inevitable that conception alone be thought of when a name is said. However he does not address the topic of homophones. He does discuss the relation of words to each other, such as his example with "the present prime minister of England," however I would like to know his thoughts on the matter.

Locke and Mill [Arthur Toland-Barber]

I think the combination of both theories makes more sense than one or the other. I say this because when I utter a single word, I am referring to the name of that object as a fact instead of my idea of whatever I am naming as Mill would say. When I string together several words I am using all of them to create an idea as Locke describes it.


Locke claims that language has the purpose of communicating ones thoughts, and concepts which don't do so are unnecessary in language (such as the argument that having a name for each individual thing would be useless). I'm wondering if marks that don't communicate thought are also useless such as those said in a song.

I think Mill's theory has some holes in it when we can use different names to refer to the same thing. An example of this is how we can refer to James Brown by his name, but by other names such as Godfather of Soul or Mr. Dynamite, which all refer to the same object but give different ideas or meaning when we use his different names/nicknames.

Locke and Mill [Morgan Johnson]

Between Locke and Mill, I think I support Locke's views more, simply because I do not agree that names must refer to the physical things. In other words, I believe that some names do in fact refer to some abstract notion that does not have a grounding on concrete, physical things like Mill argues. Additionally, I think Locke's description of language requiring general terms, and that language cannot support a 1:1 ratio of specific words each referring to specific things, and that this fact about language extends beyond Proper names like Mill would argue.

Mill tries to circumvent this problem by saying that a certain phrases like "the king the succeeded William the Conqueror" refers to a specific person, and that even "the king" could refer to a certain person if said in the right context, but I don't find this argument more motivating than Locke's general terms. Mill's argument adds an unnecessary complication to language that Locke avoids.

With that said, Locke's argument is not perfect. Locke relies on the subjective interpretation each person has about the idea a word refers to and this could lead to complications and misunderstandings. When discussing  complex ideas, relying on subjective understandings or interpretations is not strong enough to support nuanced discussions and requires some sort of objective restriction.

The Truth of the Matter (and non-matter) [Gabriela Bakun]

I would have to agree more with Locke about the meaning of our terms. He discusses the ultimate goal of our words as a means of communication, which I think is the reason that our words exist. Without society or other human beings, we would have no reason to have words, because we would not be using them to convey ideas to others.

Locke: In 3.4, Locke states that "a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge...knowledge, though founded in particular things, enlarges itself by General views." How would Locke react to knowing that Eskimo's have 50 different words for "snow"?

Mill: I'm curious to know how one would view "nothing" in Mill's perspective. How would he describe something that is nothing; would he attribute it with "nothingness"?

Locke and Mill [Mariko Roths]

While I believe that there is some truth to what both Locke and Mill had to say about words, I think that Locke's view better represents how words are used. I agree that words are used to represent the thoughts that we have in our mind. Before language occurs, it is generally necessary to have some idea in our head about the words we are going to use. Therefore, when we see something in the physical world, that physical object becomes and image in our mind. When we want to describe that object, we refer back to our mental image in order to produce the words necessary for an apt description.

I disagree with Mill for this reason, in that while we may describe something that occurs in the physical world, such as the sun causing day, I think what must first happen is for the knowledge of this physical event or object to enter our mind as an idea and then be spewed out as words. In particular, I think Mill's argument against words coming from ideas, in which he states that it is not the case that the idea of the sun causes the idea of day (in reference to the statement "the sun is the cause of day"), is not well-formed because he is breaking apart the sentence into separate ideas and separate constituents. The statement, "the sun is the cause of day," should be treated as one single idea and constituent which is thought of in the mind and then surfaced in the language of words.

Locke's view also has a few problems, in my opinion. First, I think Locke's argument that words can only stand for, "the ideas in the mind of him that uses them," is too broad of a generalization to be able to fully capture the use of words in our world. For example, if Person 1 says, "I like April," perhaps the idea in their head is that Person 1 likes someone named April. Person 2 listening, however, might have the idea that Person 1 likes the month of April. In this case, the word April either stands for a person or for the month. It can be argued that since Person 1 is the one that actually used the word, then Person 1's idea is the one attributed to the specific word April, meaning the name of someone in this case. However, we should also break apart what Locke means when he talks about the user of a word. Does this mean the person that originally used the word or could it mean all people that encounter the word? If a user includes anyone else that encounters the word, such as Person 2 who thinks April means month, then perhaps April can optionally stand for either the name or the month because these two users of the words have different ideas about them. In essence, I think that Locke's argument makes the most sense in regards to how words are used and interpreted, but I also think that it is a stretch for him to say that words can stand for nothing but the ideas of its user.

Locke & Mill [Anthony Baker]

Whatever my understanding of words and their significance is, it is closer to Locke's understanding, as I think it is more accurate to say that words we use stand for the ideas we have of those things, rather than the actual things themselves. Locke brings up the fact that it would be impossible to have words for every individual thing in the world, much the same way it would be useless to have ideas of every individual thing in the world, and he then discusses how it is because of this that words do not reflect the reality of things. I am also under the impression that it is impossible to grasp the full reality of things in the world merely with our limited conception of ideas and hence words, and Locke seems to be nearing my own conception.

Locke brings up in the end that the 'abstract idea for which a name stands' is equal to 'the essence of the species,' and I would ask him, if our words reflect our ideas, but our ideas and hence our words do not reflect reality, how can they signify the essence of a thing? I imagine the essence of a thing to be equal to or at least close to the reality of that thing.

Mill argues that the words and names of things we use are the things themselves, and I would quite simply ask him how can he be sure that everyone's understanding of a name of some thing can in fact be the same, while keeping in mind that the names of things were created by humans. He seems to be under the impression that the names of things stand alone, independent of our understanding of them, but this is hard to buy when the names themselves were human creations originally.

Names and Signs [Drew Owens]

Each argument speaks to different aspects of language. Locke's understanding of language shows a great deal of insight to the variability and arbitrariness of words. While Mill's perspective offers how language identifies and interprets aspects of the world. Mill's argument seems to inform Locke's, in that, the ideas which we have and share through language are yet rooted in sensation, and thus organized, in the respective "attributes" they share.  For me, the combination of the perspectives allow for a greater appreciation of the nature of language.

I wonder how Mills would explain the ability to explain and understand ideas or things that do not exist in any true form. (e.g. "Earth's second sun")

On Locke and Mill [Yuchen Jiang ]

 In this discussion, I consider Mill as being more convincing with his understanding of names, especially the distinction he draws between general and particular names. For Locke, he believes that people abstract general names from particular names, where the general names can be predicated to those within the under same species. Here, Locke somehow dismisses the point that general names cannot equivalently function as attributes. I think Mill has an insightful point about this distinction of attributes by themselves and those attributes as being possessed by things. As gives the example, of White and Whiteness, where the former is denotes that an object has the attributes of Whiteness, which can refer to different things, while the latter refers to only an attributes.

For Locke, his idea that language applies to the idea within people’s mind is somewhat too radical. Since if words or names only refer to ideas within our mind instead of those material objects, the communicative power of language is somewhat undermined. If language after all only applies to things in a person’s mind, given that people cannot reach out to other people’s mind intuitively, communication via language only possible when two individual accidentally have a common or similar reference for a word that they share.

However, from Mill’s perspective, there could be argued that even though a name can apply to an attributes, such as whiteness, the process of grasping this concept of Whiteness requires empirical experiences, which may lead to the result that Whiteness is a manifested concept based on a generalization of observing white object. In this way, Whiteness, any general names, are not attributes of the object, rather they are imposed by people onto objects through generalizing the similarities among these objects.  

Locke V. Mill [Alice Crowe]

Disputes about the nature of language, here exemplified in the opposing views of Locke and Mill, often question a Cartesian difference between a word signifying an idea of the mind or a physical object touchable with the body. It is, however, the former that is correct, insofar as only these two options are possible. We must consider how our interpretations of things, such as the sun, changes our understanding of them as physical objects. Consider, for a moment, the heliocentric vs. geocentric contention -- if we see the sun as orbiting the Earth, it's importance is diminished, and vice versa for a geocentric view, where it becomes more significant -- but the word "sun" remains the same in both models, and it still rises, even if our language affects how we react to such a mundane action. For Locke, I would content that a single mind, untouched by society and socialization, is the rarity, rather than the norm. Thus, ideas and words refer to how the socialized, rather than independent mind, uses them. To Mill, I would content that his understanding of day as a physical phenomenon is partially based in the language to which he subscribes. Had he, say, no word for the day, unable to communicate such a concept to a reader, he would be unable to make a clear distinction between night and day, and would be forced to coach it in (for example) light, midlight, and darkness, a fundamentally different concept than the understood term of day.

Locke and Mill [Samuel Hinderaker]

I think that both interpretations have some truth to them, but both leave something to be desired. Locke's ideas seem support the possibility that if the sun were replaced with a similar but different object, and that the viewer was in no obvious way affected by the replacement, it would be prudent to refer to this new object by the same name even though astronomers might call it something new, because as a viewer with no specific knowledge of the sun, it could be that both objects, being similar enough for a layman to not notice a difference, could be referred to with the same name because the idea of what the sun does would be no different to them because of their lack of understanding of the object. Mill in this sense may be closer to the truth, because he talks about the sun being specifically the thing that causes the specific day we have, which would be the same in the minds of everyone who experiences the day and views the sun. This doesn't allow for differences of misunderstanding of the object, like the Locke does, because it refers to the physical properties of the Sun.
The problem I see with Mill's interpretation is it doesn't seem to allow for people to have different 'interpretations' of the Sun - it seems to discount the possibility of an opinion of the sun, because the name 'the sun' only represents the physical, actual properties of the object. This seems objectionable because the sun has connotative meaning to each person based on their experiences with it.

Locke and Mill [Korey Nuehs]

I agree more with Locke, in that I believe that our words stand for our ideas and not the things in themselves. We only have direct epistemic access to the ideas within our minds and not to the actual objects in themselves, to which we have only indirect access. For example, when we call something green, we are not saying that greenness is a part of the actual object outside of our conception of it, but that the sensation of greenness is produced simultaneously with the object whenever we encounter the object, i.e. the idea of the object is only green and not the actual object itself.

Mill seems to say contrary things in that he says names are of things themselves, but then later on says that “we put a mark”, (a name), “not indeed upon the object itself, but, so to speak, upon the idea of the object.” I’m confused, is Mill contradicting his earlier statement about names being about things in themselves, or is this statement only referring to proper names, and if so, how are proper names different than regular names in this regard?

For Locke’s view my question would be: can two lifeforms with entirely different ideas of objects, i.e. receiving vastly different sensations upon their encounter with the same objects, communicate with another? For example, can a bat or an alien communicate with a human? Under his view, this seems to me to be impossible, and any communication with any future species seems unlikely.

Locke & Mill [Adam Plesser]

Locke and Mill are both right insofar as they are answering different questions. Locke is making a descriptive claim about our epistemic access to reality; namely, that the "primary or immediate signification" of words can only be those things in our minds which we are trying to describe with the words we use. However, the secondary signification, the thing which we actually wish to refer to, is the thing outside of our mind. This latter meaning is the one Mill has in mind and it is the one in terms of which we most often consider language. If Locke does not admit that Mill is also right in a certain way, as I have, then his view faces the problem that it implies that we have no way of describing or discussing the external world; his theory of language entails a degree of solipsism. Mill's view, on the other hand, does not account for the fact that the same word, used to denote the same physical object, can be meant to express vastly different things based on the particular speaker or context.

Locke and Mill [André Robert]

While I think that Locke is on to something important when he says words represent ideas, I think that to say that they represent only ideas makes language lose something. Mill has a point that language is useful in describing things as they are in the world outside of our own minds, as in his sun and day example, and it would seem somewhat arrogant to say that the only significance to those words come from the ideas in our own minds. Locke's point of view, to me, captures the arbitrary nature of why specific words have their specific meanings, but ultimately I think there is more to language than that.

As I stated above, Locke's view can seem narrow-minded in that there are more applications to language than just our internal perceptions, especially since the focus of most words is an external object to our minds. By saying that words only have meaning in our minds, Locke seems to be ignoring this aspect of language.

Mill's view, on the other hand, fails to explain/deal with the arbitrary nature of language in that any given word from any given language does not inherently by itself refer to anything for a good reason: we just have a word for any given thing because we agreed to use that word for that thing. In this way one might wonder how can a word be the name of an object itself if there is no inherent connection between the word and that object?

-- André Robert

Locke and Mill [Hayley Thompson]

While I believe the truth lies somewhere in between, Locke's views of meaning and reference lies closer to it than those of Mill. In Mill's sentence, "the sun is the cause of day," the words "sun", "cause", and "day" each have connotative meanings. Even though they may each denote a single and specific object, action, or idea, every person still must make their own mental representations of what these words mean. Even the seemingly simple and concrete concept of "the sun" may be interpreted differently; someone might know of it only as a bright object in the sky, while another may know it as the yellow star that their home planet orbits around. It is in fact the sun's brightness that causes day rather than the fact the earth orbits around it. Therefore, Mill's idea of the sun implied by this sentence is that it is extremely bright. Other descriptions and ideas of the sun would not necessarily cause "day". This said, Locke's view that words refer purely to perceptions ignores the fact that, in the physical realm (at least of our solar system), there only exists one sun. If someone said "the object that the earth orbits is the cause of day", they use the reference object as a stepping stone between two meanings: that of the earth's center of orbit, and that of the object bright enough to cause daylight.  Only knowing the first meaning, one might think the sun causes the day magic, yet knowing the reference allows them to infer that another of its property (perhaps its brightness) may cause the day.

Locke and Mill

It seems to me that Locke's perspective is more accurate because different people may associate different thoughts with the same word. The same word may also stimulate different ideas in people's minds depending on their life experiences.

I feel that Mill is sort of representing a robot's point of view, or someone or something that speaks with no emotion nor experience of life. Yes, words in and of themselves do not represent other meanings, although as humans, we naturally perceive words differently based on our experiences of those words.

I wonder if Locke's view includes words like "the" or "and", which aren't concrete objects or abstract ideas, because they are "words" as he stated.

Locke and Mill [Rigo Acevedo]

I believe that Locke's argument, that words only signify the signs of the ideas of those who use them, is a more accurate description of the use of language. Both Locke and Mill discuss that names and words are utilize to identify observable attributes of concepts or objects within our world, however, Locke's explanation better establishes that the differences in our experiences and understanding of these concepts and objects within our world can affect how we utilize these words and how we communicate with each other. Often times in discussion context is necessary in understanding how to interpret a statement or the words/names presented within the given sentence; a sentence such as "I went to the dentist yesterday" could be interpreted as a traumatic experience by an individual who has been plagued with cavities their entire life, while it could be interpreted as a pleasant experience by an individual who has been praised with great oral hygiene their entire life. Such significations of the word "dentist" are establish primarily by the ideas within the mind of the individual.

However, it can be acknowledged that some objects or concepts have specific definitions and regardless of an individual's understanding of this word/concept, and how it's presented in context, it will always have a particular signification which is not determined by the individual. "The Sun" and "the first Emperor or Rome" possess significations that pertains to physical facts, and may not be seen as up to interpretation by the individual.

Mill states that "A word may have several meanings, but all of them fixed and recognized ones". I am curious how this statement is affected by individual memories; how is the signfication of varying memories, by individuals, to a word/name considered within Mill's philosophy?

Perspectives on Words: Locke vs. Mill [Christina Sanchez]

I agree with Mill's perspective suggesting that we say what we say because of representations we see around us in the world. We grow up seeing others refer to certain objects by name, so we in turn put those names into our minds for future reference when we see those objects again. This supports Mill's view that we do not really name things based on an abstract idea or concept, they are simply named what we are referring to.

Locke does not reference the fact that words can also refer to feelings or emotions. He believes that words signify abstract concepts, and this becomes a problem when we want to express an emotion such as happiness because we seem to be referencing something beyond simply the idea of happiness, but we are conveying the actual state of happiness.

When looking at Mill's perspective, we have to ask ourselves about names that can refer to two different objects. When words such as bank or drawer are said, two different objects can come to mind for each word, and this can be a very tricky aspect of our system of language that should be addressed.

Locke and Mill [Henry Tran]

I believe that John Locke is closer to the truth of the meaning and reference to our terms. His perspective states that words are arbitrarily connected by the person who uses it, thus each person has their own meaning to the words they use. This makes sense to me, as we use words we have our own meanings behind it, people who hear our words are then tasked with understanding a common idea in order to communicate efficiently. Similarly Locke states in 2.4, "SUPPOSE THEIR WORDS TO BE MARKS OF THE IDEAS IN THE MINDS ALSO OF OTHER MEN, WITH WHOM THEY COMMUNICATE," ideas have to align to be understood. The same words may be said, but the idea behind the string of words may be understood differently.

A problem that I see with Mill's perspective is when he says that words refer to the physical fact, then what if words are overlapping? Similar words might be said but can also be referred to as two different physical objects.

What else can be problematic about Locke's perspective?

--Henry Tran

Locke and Mill: Or the abstract idea properly signified Locke and the man denoted by the name Mill

I lean towards more to Mill's understanding that names in language are not as much significations of abstract ideas but rather refer to the actual thing being named. Locke seems to have this understanding of 'naming' where abstraction is ultimately what is going on and we thus deriving from these abstractions are categorizations or significations. It seems more that in the actual usage of certain names that they are referring to something that is more than just the idea itself and if we want to refer to the idea itself we in fact have different naming schemes to convey this (see: Mill section 4 on 'white' vs. 'whiteness').

Locke's view that signification derives from abstraction seems problematic as abstraction occurs with the use of language, or in other words, abstraction does not seem possible without some use of a language type system.

The question for Mill is considering how far we should take this consideration that names in fact refer to the thing they are describing. Are names just merely referents for things in the world, useful for communication purposes, or is naming in fact the only way for our minds to access the things in the world?

Locke and Mill

I agree more with Locke, because all of our thoughts in our heads can only be described to others or relateable to others through words. If I was trying to describe how my brother looks, I can give characteristics like long hair, glasses which is supposed to represent my idea of how my brother looks. However, this is only just my idea of how he looks and others might have a different idea of how he looks and use different words

(Mill) If someone said “a strong person”, wouldn’t that be our idea of things, or our personal idea of a strong person? For Mill’s example the Sun and day are two things that are factual but what about other generalized things?

(Locke) Couldn’t words also stand for feelings people have too, and not just the ideas? I think if I said something like “I’m sad” is not me having the idea of being sad but a feeling

The Purpose of Words in Language [Evan Cottingham]

I believe that Locke's argument provides a more complete view of the purpose of words. According to Locke, words represent the speaker's ideas of things. Through my interpretation of Locke's argument, in this way, words describe things well as they represent not only the thing itself along with its attributes, but words also encompass the ideas of others which could serve as the basis of the individual's own ideas about something and people "suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men," which is like how language creates commonality within a culture. With these main points, I think that Locke has the more complete viewpoint on words and their meaning and purpose in language.

Mill's argument was narrow, asserting that words are only broken down into names and attributes of things. Although Mill's argument is a better explanation of how words are used in a language to communicate, it does not capture the meaning behind words. Furthermore, words representing ideas of a thing must also include the fact that that thing exists along with the physical facts surrounding it.

Does Mills mean to say that words are only used to refer to things and their attributes as physical facts and not how things might relate to
one another in the real world? Does Mill's argument fill in the gaps of Locke's argument or vice versa?

Locke VS Mill: Two Pieces of the Same Pie [Danielle Trzil]

I agree primarily with Mill's perspective that humans primarily say things based on iconic representations of the world. Locke has a valid point of more arbitrary thought, so by combining the two ideas together we can get a more clear representation on human thought and communication based on icon, index, and symbols whether they are based in the physical world or not. Words that describe tangible objects are pretty undeniable, but other concepts are not so easily described by humans.

Locke's idea is extremely valid in the point that when one says something that communication is based on the interpretation and perception of the speaker. This can be demonstrated in small children who assimilate that all fuzzy animals are called "cat" before they accommodate for the fact that cats, dogs, bears, and other animals are, in fact, different (but in their mind before accommodating, cat did in fact represent more.)

That being said, Mill's perspective counters this example by the fact that even if the child mislabels an animal, the iconic fact that the animal is not a cat can not be changed in the physical world. Words do not just mean what is in the speaker's mind, but also what is proven to be true (i.e.: cats and other animals are, on a scientific basis, different).

Agent-Centric vs Category Oriented

I support John Locke's rather than Mill's method of explaining the truth of meaning and reference. I think Mill's perspective, that words directly express X itself, is limited as it removes the agent from the situation. Each of our individual experiences in the world are first synthesized into ideas in our brains and then spoken, by that individual, through words, which leads me to believe that meaning and reference are based in the agent's mind and subject to one's interpretive bent, level of intention, etc.

John Locke's agency-centric approach raises the question, are our individual experiences and goings-on about the world merely coincidentally similar such that we can have a proper language?  I would argue yes, as two individual who are fluent in English can completely misunderstand each other due to personal context and their own ideas. Locke's view is heavily agent dependent, but I am wondering if agency is innate to meaning and reference; does (X + individual mind = meaning and reference) always need the individual mind?

Mill's approach would say otherwise. Mill's approach has parallels to someone who walks around with a label maker, labeling the types of true or innate names of things proper. Mill's view is comfortingly static, taking as a given that these names hold across individuals and time. I have reservations about Mill's approach ignoring the underlying humanity behind these words and assigning every word by divisions of types of names. Would this not be subject to hole-poking given a single case where it becomes widely agreed upon to use a word deviating from it assigned place by Mill?

Names, Ideas, and Objects [Sean Wammer]

I agreed with Mill more on this one because ultimately your ideas are meant to map onto the world. I think that the meaning of the words themselves are directly linked to the ideas in your mind, but those ideas are not in isolation from the world, they are motivated by real world objects. Thus, when we say bananas are yellow, we are not only communicating about an idea of bananas in our heads; we are trying to assert a fact about actual bananas themselves.

Does Locke want to claim words only refer to thoughts and nothing more, that is, that there is no connection between the ideas in our heads and the real world? If so, this view seems a little bit extreme because it does seem like our thoughts are connected to the world in some way, even loosely.

Mill's view is problematic too because different people may have different ideas about what a certain word refers to. When I use the word 'bank', the idea in my head may be different from someone else's idea (for instance, the edge of a river instead of a financial institution), so how could 'bank' possibly refer to the same actual object itself between people and in different contexts without referring to the idea of those things?

--Sean Wammer

Locke and Mill on Names [Alex Rowell]

I think that Mill is on the right track here, especially when we examine the argument in terms of physical objects. The object that we call a laptop is still the same object regardless of if we call it by some other name, as evidenced by the fact that multiple languages refer to this object in different ways but it maintains all critical properties.  

Locke: Is Locke approaching the problem of naming by focusing on ideas and concepts more than objects? I could see the argument that 'justice', 'freedom', and other concepts are more based in how the person views them than in a concrete and definite object.

Mill: How does Mill handle arguments that focus on naming the "ideas of things", as mentioned above? 

Welcome to PHIL453/LING476, Philosophy of Language, Spring 2016 [Prof. Franco]

Hello class. Welcome to Philosophy of Language. I'm looking forward to lively discussions in class and on this blog about questions concerning, say, how names work and why slurs are offensive.

In this post, I'm going to give you some very general instructions about your weekly assignment. But, first, let me selectively quote part of my statement of teaching philosophy to give you an idea of the purpose of this blog:

At an idealized level, a philosophy class consists of a student or group of students putting forward a claim (or articulating the claim made in the day’s reading), the others asking for reasons for that claim, and then, as a class, collectively analyzing the force of the reasons given for the original claim....To approximate this idealization, I ask students to post twice a week to a shared blog....This assignment format was a success. Students found their questions overlapping with their classmates’; when dealing with difficult texts, this kind of affirmation is important because it reassures students they are either on the right track or aren’t alone in being lost. In addition to the blog creating an opportunity for students to engage one another’s ideas outside of class, the students and I would reference their posted questions and answers in class. This made students active stakeholders in and shapers of the class.  

Format for the blog posts might vary week-to-week. On weeks in which a specific format is not specified, please use the following format (I appreciate when students call out or quote particular passages):

1. Write 2 -3 sentences (not any more) stating something you agreed with in the readings for that day.
2. Write 2 - 3 sentences (not any more) stating something that disagreed with in the readings for that day.
3. Ask at least one question about the reading. Your question can raise an objection or be a question for clarification about a puzzling passage.

Now, on to more technical instructions:

1. Formatting: Just like the title of this post, the title of your weekly posts should be related to the content of your post (since you're engaging particular authors, your title can just reference them) and include [Your Name] in brackets. I'll leave a comment in the comments section of this post to show you what the format of your comments should look like. 
2. "Turning your work in": After writing your blog post or making your comment, you should open the relevant assignment on Canvas (here). There should be a place to paste the URL of your post, which is all you need to post. Make sure that the URL you post is the Permalink for your specific post and not the generic link to the blog. You can find the Permalink to the right of your screen. On comments, you can find the Permalink by clicking the timestamp of the comment.
3. Who posts when: Students with last names beginning with A - O post prior to 5 p.m. on Mondays Weeks 2, 4, 6, 8; they post prior to 5 p.m. on Wednesdays Weeks 3, 5, 7, 9. Students with last names beginning P - Z post prior to 5 p.m. on Wednesdays Weeks 2, 4, 6, 8; they post prior to 5 p.m. on Mondays, Weeks 3, 5, 7, 9. 
4. Who comments when: All students post comments on a fellow student's post prior to 2:00 p.m. on Fridays.

Looking forward to a great class!

-- Prof. Franco